Considering fraud in a financial statement audit : practical guidance for applying SAS no. 82; by Ramos, Michael J. et al.
University of Mississippi
eGrove
Guides, Handbooks and Manuals American Institute of Certified Public Accountants(AICPA) Historical Collection
1997
Considering fraud in a financial statement audit :
practical guidance for applying SAS no. 82;
Michael J. Ramos
Anita M. Lyons
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_guides
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Historical Collection at
eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Guides, Handbooks and Manuals by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please
contact egrove@olemiss.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ramos, Michael J.; Lyons, Anita M.; and American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, "Considering fraud in a financial
statement audit : practical guidance for applying SAS no. 82;" (1997). Guides, Handbooks and Manuals. 33.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_guides/33
Considering Fraud 






Considering Fraud in a Financial Statem
ent Audit; Practical Guidance lor Applying SAS No. 82
NOTICE TO READERS
Considering Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit: Practical 
Guidance for Applying SAS No. 82 presents the views of the author 
and others who helped in its development. This publication has not 
been approved, disapproved, or otherwise acted upon by any 
senior technical committees of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants. Therefore, the contents of this publication, 
including recommendations and suggestions, have no official or 
authoritative status.
Considering Fraud 






Michael J. Ramos, CPA
Edited by 
Anita M. Lyons, CPA
Technical Manager, 
Accounting and Auditing Publications
Copyright © 1997 by
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc.,
New York, NY 10036-8775
All rights reserved. Requests for permission to make copies
of any part of this work should be mailed to Permissions Department, AICPA,
Harborside Financial Center, 201 Plaza Three, Jersey City, NJ 07311-3881.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0  AAP 9987
PREFACE
This practice guide has been published to provide guidance in im plementing 
Statem ent on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82, Consideration o f Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit. This practice guide has been issued by the Accounting 
and Auditing Publications group of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants and is intended to provide practitioners with nonauthoritative 
practical guidance on considering fraud in financial statem ent audits.
The contents of this publication, its focus, and the way it has been presented, 
have been shaped by the feedback received from practitioners during the 
development of SAS No. 82. Through com m ent letters and question and 
answer sessions conducted at national seminars and on the Accountants 
Forum, practicing auditors provided suggestions and recom m endations for 
making the guidance in the statem ent easier to understand and implement.
By its very nature, a statem ent on auditing standards can establish only a base 
point from which you conduct your audits. How you apply the standard to the 
specific facts and circum stances of your clients depends on professional judg­
ment. The purpose of this book is to help you make informed professional 
judgm ents when you consider fraud  in a financial statement audit.
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Introduction and Overview of  SAS No. 82
C hapter O ne:
Introduction AND O verview o f  SAS No. 8 2
Organization of This 
Practice Guide
This practice guide is divided into three parts:
• Part One: Implementation Guidance. This section 
provides you with an in-depth understanding of 
SAS No. 82 by answering questions you may face 
in implementing the statement. It also includes a 
case study that illustrates many of the concepts 
discussed in this section.
• Part Two: Industry-Specific Fraud Risk Factors and 
Guidance. This section provides example risk factors 
for several specialized industries and (for some 
industries) suggested audit responses to fraud risk.
It also includes example risk factors for small, 
privately owned businesses.
• Part Three: Practice Aids. This section provides 
several practice aids and examples, including: com­
mon fraud schemes and expanded audit procedures, 
sample workpaper documentation, and sample 
engagement and client representation letters.
This book is a companion to but not a substitute for read­
ing the standard. The suggestions offered in this book are 
best understood when they’ve been read after reading 
SAS No. 82 and identifying the implementation issues 
unique to your engagements. With that in mind, the 
best way to use this book is:
If you’re implementing SAS No. 82 for the first time —
• Read SAS No. 82 and highlight those areas that require 
further clarification or that pose implementation 
issues for your clients.
• Read Part One, which summarizes the requirements 
of the statement and provides answers to the most 
frequently-asked implementation questions.
If you’re using this book as an on-going reference source —
• Use the questions and answers in Part One to 
respond to implementation issues as they arise.
• Use the list of specialized industry fraud risk 
factors in Part Two to help you tailor the fraud 
risk factors listed in SAS No. 82 to your clients 
in these particular industries.
• Use the list of typical fraud schemes and expanded 
audit procedures in Part Three to tailor your audit
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programs in response to assessed risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud.
Use the sample workpaper documentation and sample 
engagement and client representation letters in Part 
Three as ongoing reference tools.
Background 
and Overview 
of SAS No. 82
In October 1987, the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting (also known as the Treadway 
Commission) recognized that fraud and its effects 
are the concern and responsibility of many parties, 
including management, boards of directors, internal audi­
tors, and independent auditors. The Treadway 
Commission acknowledged that independent auditors 
cannot guarantee the accuracy or reliability of financial 
statements, but they also recognized that the role of the 
independent auditor can be enhanced — particularly 
with respect to fraudulent financial reporting. This 
challenge is ongoing.
In 1988 the Auditing Standards Board issued SAS No.
53, The Auditor’s Responsibility to Detect and Report 
Errors and Irregularities. Since its issuance, the 
subject of fraud has continued to draw the interest of 
ever-growing constituencies. Independent auditors have 
been the target of litigation and criticism, some of 
which has emanated from the profession’s process of 
self-examination. SAS No. 82 was issued to respond to 
these questions and criticism and to clarify that your 
role and responsibility in the detection of material 
misstatement in financial statements — whether caused 
by error or fraud — is central to an audit. The statement 
supersedes SAS No. 53 and it is effective for audits of 
financial statements for periods ending on or after 
December 15, 1997.
Basically, SAS No. 82 does two things. It:
• describes your responsibilities relating to fraud in a 
financial statement audit, and
• provides guidance on what you should do to meet 
those responsibilities.
What are my responsibilities to detect fraud under 
SAS No. 82? How do these responsibilities differ 
from those under SAS No. 53?
SAS No. 82 clearly states that you are responsible for 
planning and performing your audits to obtain reasonable
4
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assurance about whether the financial statements are 
free of material misstatement. It makes no difference 
whether those misstatements are unintentional or inten­
tional. You are responsible for planning and performing 
your audit to provide reasonable assurance about 
whether the financial statements are free of both types of 
material misstatement.
Your responsibilities relating to fraud are stated within 
the context of materiality to the financial statements 
taken as a whole. You are not responsible for detecting 
fraud per se, but for detecting material misstatements 
caused by fraud. You are not responsible for detecting 
immaterial misstatements caused by fraud.
You have always had the responsibility to detect material 
misstatement caused by fraud. These responsibilities 
have not changed with the issuance of SAS No. 82. What 
does change is performance — what’s required of you to 
fulfill those responsibilities.
How do I carry out my responsibilities under SAS No. 
82? How do these performance requirements differ 
from those under SAS No. 53?
SAS No. 82 requires you to perform the following:
• Consider the presence of fraud risk factors. Certain 
conditions (for example, a lack of an appropriate 
system of authorization and approval of transactions) 
often have been observed in circumstances where 
frauds have occurred. As an auditor, you should 
become familiar with these risk factors and be alert 
for their presence at your clients. SAS No. 82 provides 
examples of risk factors you may consider.
• Assess the risk of material misstatement of the 
financial statements due to fraud. SAS No. 82
requires you to make an assessment as to the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud. This assessment 
is separate from but may be performed in conjunction 
with other risk assessments (for example, control or 
inherent risk) you make during the audit. The SAS 
also requires you to reevaluate your assessment if 
other conditions are identified during fieldwork.
• Develop a response. Based on your assessment of risk, 
SAS No. 82 requires you to develop an appropriate 
audit response. In some circumstances, your response 
may be that your existing audit procedures are
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sufficient to obtain reasonable assurance that the 
financial statements are free of material misstate­
ment due to fraud. In other circumstances, you may 
decide to extend your planned audit procedures.
Document certain items in the workpapers. SAS No. 
82 requires you to document evidence of the perfor­
mance of your assessment of risk of material mis­
statement due to fraud. Your documentation should 
include risk factors identified as being present as 
well as your response to those risk factors.
Communicate to management. If you determine that 
there is evidence that a fraud may exist you should 
apprise the appropriate level of management, even if 
the matter may be considered inconsequential. SAS 
No. 82 also requires you to communicate directly 
with the audit committee (or equivalent) if the mat­
ter involves fraud that would materially misstate 
the financial statements or fraud committed by 
senior management.
SAS No. 82 provides guidance on your communication 
about fraud to management, the audit committee (if 
applicable) and others, including those outside the entity.
The following example illustrates SAS No. 82’s approach 
to considering the presence of risk factors, assessing the 
risk of material misstatement due to fraud, and develop­
ing a response.
A Practitioner Speaks
When I was a supervisor we audited an electrical wholesaler 
with about $1.8 million in sales. They had two locations — one 
here in town and a new one across the state. I stayed in town to 
do the audit at the main store, and we sent a staffer across state.
He came back after a week and I asked him if he found anything.
He hadn’t, which was good because we were under time pres­
sure to finish the job. The cross-state store wasn’t very big, and 
I didn’t think there’d be any problems with it.
One of the first things I did was look at the general journal entries 
selected by the staff for testing and I noticed a big one — over 
$100,000 debit to sales and a credit to accounts receivable. “To 
adjust the general ledger to the accounts receivable trial balance 
at the cross-state store” is how the description read. I asked the 
staff how an adjustment that significant would be necessary and 
he told me the store manager said they’d had some problems 
installing the accounting system at the new store.
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Fine, I thought, since I was pretty sure that the receivables they 
still had on the books were valid. A little while later I was looking 
at the analytical procedures and noticed that the gross margin 
percentages at the cross-state store were quite a bit lower than 
the margins at the main store. The workpapers included the 
explanation, “Per store manager, prices were reduced at cross­
town store in order to attract customers in a new location. ”
It wasn’t until the next day that I started to figure out something 
was wrong. I was talking to the controller at the main store and 
I mentioned how it looked like there were a few  problems at the 
cross-state store but they were working out. “I guess those price 
reductions you had earlier in the year really worked to attract 
new customers,” I said. “Price reductions?” she said. “What 
price reductions. ”
They’re a wholesale distributor — they don’t have sales like you 
find in a retail store. Then we got to talking about the problems 
they had installing the accounts receivable system at the cross­
state store. Turns out that was a lie, too.
That was enough to convince me something wasn’t right, so we 
beat up those receivables, tracing payments back and forth from  
the subledger to the general ledger. One thing led to another, 
and to make a long story short, the manager at the cross-state 
store was stealing payments their customers made on account.1 
That’s why the subledger was out of balance with the general 
ledger. To cover it up, he parked the debit in the sales account, 
which was why the gross margins didn’t make sense. That 
$100,000 misstatement was definitely material to the financial 
statements.
In this example, the auditor (whether he realized it or 
not) detected the material misstatement due to fraud by 
following the approach described in SAS No. 82. First, 
during the course of the audit, certain information came 
to his attention that he identified as fraud risk factors or 
other conditions impacting his risk assessment. That 
information included: inadequate record keeping relating 
to accounts receivable at the remote location, unex­
plained reconciling items between the subledger and the 
general ledger, anomalies in expected financial statement 
relationships, and perhaps most importantly, inconsisten­
cies in the explanations provided by management.
Once identified, the presence of these risk factors and other 
conditions caused the auditor to make an assessment that
1 See Part Three, Common Frauds and Extended Audit Procedures for examples of 
some typical schemes used to misappropriate customer payments.
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“something wasn’t right.” The planned audit procedures 
were determined to be insufficient, so he extended his 
audit procedures until he was able to detect the material 
misstatement. To complete the procedures required by the 
SAS, he would need to document certain items in the work- 
papers and make sure he complied with the communication 
requirements of the SAS. These documentation and 
communication requirements are discussed in Part One, 
Chapter Two.
The example of the electrical wholesaler may leave you 
with the impression that an assessment of fraud risk occurs 
at a given point in time during the audit. This is not the 
case. The assessment of the risk of material misstatement 
due to fraud is a cumulative process. The first three steps 
in the process (identify risk factors, assess risk, develop a 
response) are repeated over and over again throughout 
the course of the audit, as relevant audit information 
comes to your attention.
In the example provided it was the accumulation of risk 
factors and other conditions, considered individually and 
in combination, that determined the auditor’s ultimate 
assessment of risk. Your assessment of the risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud is not a static assessment made 
at a given point in time. It is an evolving assessment that 
should be revisited repeatedly during your audit.
It’s worth noting that the electrical wholesaler example is 
based on an audit that occurred before the issuance of 
SAS No. 82. In this example, the auditor knew “something 
was wrong” and pursued that question until he had a 
satisfactory answer. In some respects, SAS No. 82 provides 
a structure or a more formal process for what “good” 
auditors do instinctively.
In addition, the above story illustrates some of the reasons 
why auditors may fail to detect material misstatements 
due to fraud. These reasons include:
• An over-reliance on inquiry as the only means of 
audit evidence. The staff accountant performed 
no procedures to corroborate the store manager’s 
explanations.
• A lack of awareness that some observed conditions 
may indicate a material fraud. The staff accountant 
was concerned only with adjusting the general ledger
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to make it agree with the accounts receivable. He never 
considered that the discrepancy may indicate fraud.
A tendency to look at current numbers in isolation 
from the past or other relevant information. The staff 
accountant failed to compare gross margin percent­
ages and notice the fluctuation from the main store.
Allowing time and budget pressures to influence audit 
procedures. In order to extend audit procedures and 
ferret out the misstatement, the audit team had to 
ignore time and budget pressures and do whatever 
was necessary to gather sufficient audit evidence.
A lack of skepticism. Many auditors do not encounter 
material misstatements caused by fraud during the 
course of their career in public accounting, and it’s 
possible that one’s sensitivity to the existence of 
fraud can be dulled over time.
SAS No. 82 provides guidance to help you overcome 
these obstacles and meet your responsibilities relating 
to material misstatements due to fraud.
So how do the performance requirements of SAS No. 82 
differ from those under SAS No. 53? Before the application 
of SAS No. 82 you were required to consider the presence 
of risk of material misstatement due to errors or irregular­
ities and assess that risk as part of overall audit risk. You 
were also required to design and perform audit procedures 
appropriate for the assessed risk. The difference under SAS 
No. 82 is that you must specifically assess and respond to 
the risk of material misstatement due to fraud and you must 
assess that risk from the perspective of the broad categories 
listed in the SAS or different categories with the same sub­
stance. Additionally, under SAS No. 82, you must meet 
new documentation and communication requirements.
What are management’s responsibilities to prevent 
and detect fraud?
The Treadway Commission noted the following:
“The responsibility for reliable financial reporting resides first 
and foremost at the corporate level. Top management — starting 
with the chief executive officer — sets the tone and establishes 
the financial reporting environment. . . To set the right tone, top 
management must identify and assess the factors that could 
lead to fraudulent financial reporting; all public companies 




assurance that fraudulent financial reporting will be prevented or 
subject to early detection — this is a broader concept than 
internal accounting controls.”
SAS No. 82 reiterates this conecpt by simply stating that 
“management is responsible for the prevention and 
detection of fraud.”
As part of your assessment of the risk of material misstate­
ment due to fraud, SAS No. 82 requires you to make 
inquiries of your clients to obtain their understanding 
regarding the risk of fraud in the entity. The author 
suggests that you include with these inquiries a general 
discussion of management’s responsibilities for the 
detection and prevention of fraud. One of the benefits of 
emphasizing management’s role in preventing and detect­
ing fraud may be your ability to make your clients aware 
of the business benefits of management oversight through­
out the year versus reliance on the independent auditor at 
year-end. You may also make them aware that deficiencies 
in their efforts or attitudes relating to fraud may affect 
the nature, timing and extent of audit procedures and, 
ultimately, the audit cost. See Part One, Identifying 
Fraud Risk Factors for more information.
As an auditor, one of your ongoing challenges is to 
manage the “expectation gap” between your responsibili­
ties relating to fraud established by professional standards 
and what your clients and the users of financial state­
ments perceive those responsibilities to be. One of the 
reasons SAS No. 82 was issued was to help auditors 
narrow this expectation gap. By articulating performance 
guidelines, the statement helps to assure that auditors 
more consistently implement, and are more sensitive to 
the need to exercise the professional skepticism required 
by, the SAS.
Should I modify my engagement letters?
When it comes to your responsibilities relating to fraud, 
you can best manage the expectation gap by educating 
your clients on the limits of your responsibilities for the 
detection of fraud. One way to accomplish this is to 
describe in your engagement letter (1) the fact that your 
audit is designed to provide reasonable assurance of 
detecting misstatements that would have a material effect
10
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Characteristics 
of Fraud
on the financial statements and that it's not designed to 
detect all fraud, and (2) that it is management’s responsi­
bility to prevent and detect fraud. See Part Three, Sample 
Engagement Letter for sample wording.2
SAS No. 82 contains several paragraphs (numbers 3 through 
10) that describe the characteristics of fraud. Although 
they impose no requirements, they are important para­
graphs because the more you know about the nature of 
fraud, the better equipped you will be to identify risk 
factors, assess the risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud, and develop an appropriate audit response.
Paragraph 6 of SAS No. 82 notes that fraud frequently 
involves the following: (a) a pressure or an incentive to 
commit fraud and (b) a perceived opportunity to do so. 
The statement stops short of saying what many fraud 
experts believe, namely that both elements must be 
present for a fraud to be committed.
SAS No. 82 draws a distinction between misstatements 
arising from fraudulent financial reporting and those 
arising from misappropriation of assets. The following 
example illustrates fraudulent financial reporting perpe­
trated by management. After presenting the example, 
the framework described in paragraph 6 will be used to 
analyze the fraud.
FastTrack Savings & Loan was a rapidly growing, publicly traded 
financial institution. In the early 1980s, the institution doubled 
its assets and earnings for three consecutive years by acquiring 
smaller financial institutions and by instituting aggressive lend­
ing policies. Because of this rapid growth, the institution’s stock 
price soared. In order to attract and retain the best available 
personnel, senior management compensation consisted princi­
pally of stock options, and base salary was tied to stock price.
The aggressive lending policies inevitably led to a large number 
of foreclosures, and after several years, the institution held a 
significant portfolio of foreclosed real estate assets on its books. 
These high levels of foreclosed real estate proved problematic.
2 As this publication went to print, the AICPA Auditing Standards Board has 
approved an exposure draft of a proposed amendment to SAS No. 1, section 310, 
Relationship Between the Auditor’s Appointment and Planning. The exposure 
draft, titled Establishing an Understanding with the Client, states that the 
auditor should establish an understanding with the client regarding services to be 
performed and this understanding should be documented in the working papers, 
preferably through a written communication with the client.
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Stock analysts became concerned about the quality of the entity’s 
assets and the institutions regulatory capital was eroded, pushing 
the entity close to violating their regulatory capital requirements. 
The vice president in charge of real estate knew of a commercial 
real estate developer who was looking to finance a project. The 
vice president approached the developer with a proposition: If 
the developer agreed to buy foreclosed property from FastTrack, 
FastTrack would provide financing on the construction project 
and the foreclosed property at below-market terms. All other 
principal on the foreclosed property financing would be due 
when the developer sold the property. In addition, the vice pres­
ident promised to take the property back if the developer could 
not sell it within three years. The developer agreed to the deal.
Under generally accepted accounting principles, the transaction 
should not have been accounted for as a sale.
The vice president recorded these transactions as sales. 
Although he was not familiar with the complex generally accepted 
accounting principles for real estate transactions, he did recognize 
that under FastTrack’s normal accounting policies such a loan 
would not be approved because of the deferral of principal pay­
ments and the promise to take back the property. He realized his 
immediate goal of reducing the amount of foreclosed real estate 
reported on the institution’s balance sheet. He also recognized a 
profit from the sale of the real estate and fee and interest income 
from the construction loan, which improved profitability.
Within a short period of time, these types of transactions became 
commonplace at FastTrack. Loans that were originated by the 
real estate department received special consideration and were 
not subject to the normal underwriting policies and procedures 
required of other loans. The institution’s board of directors never 
questioned how the vice president was able to sell foreclosed 
properties so quickly. They merely congratulated him on a job 
well done.
The vice president took certain precautions to conceal the true 
nature of the transactions. All side agreements linking the loan 
approval to the sale of the real estate were made orally and 
never written down. The vice president required the developers 
to form two separate entities (usually partnerships), one to 
receive the loan funds and another to buy the property.
In this way, FastTrack was able to fraudulently and materially 
misstate its financial statements by misstating and overstating 
the composition of its assets and overstating its income and 
regulatory capital.
SAS No. 82 describes several characteristics of fraudulent 
financial reporting, two of which were present in the 
FastTrack example:
• The financial statements misrepresented certain 
transactions and intentionally omitted certain 
events and significant information.
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• The entity intentionally misapplied accounting prin­
ciples.
In the above example, the vice president had ample 
motivation to perpetrate his scheme. He had been direct­
ed to reduce the amount of foreclosed real estate assets, 
his compensation was linked to the entity’s stock price, 
and the institution needed regulatory capital and profits 
to maintain its stock price levels. The vice president also 
perceived an opportunity to commit his fraud. He was at 
a high enough level in the organization that he was able 
to bypass established underwriting controls. The people 
to whom he reported exercised little if any oversight of 
his activities.
Note that both elements were necessary for the vice 
president to commit his fraud. Absent a motivation to 
commit the fraud — for example, continued high levels 
of profitability and regulatory capital, no pressure to 
increase sales of foreclosed property — he would have 
had no reason to devise and carry out such a scheme. If 
he didn’t perceive he had the opportunity to commit the 
fraud (and get away with it) he never would have tried.
Key Point. When assessing the risk of material misstate­
ment due to fraud, some practitioners find it helpful to 
consider this framework of motivation and opportunity. 
Although not required by SAS No. 82, you might want to 
focus your audit attention on the areas where both a 
motivation and a perceived opportunity to commit 
fraud exists. Where both factors are present is usually 
where the greatest risk lies. (See Part One, Assessing 
the Risk of Material Misstatement Due to Fraud.)
What level o f assurance should I obtain that the 
financial statements are free o f material misstatement 
due to fraud?
SAS No. 82 very clearly states that you can obtain only 
reasonable assurance that material misstatements in the 
financial statements, including misstatements resulting 
from fraud, are detected. “Reasonable assurance” is a 
high threshold. But it is not absolute assurance.
When discussing your responsibilities for considering 
fraud, you may wish to discuss the difference between 
“reasonable” and “absolute” assurance with your client.
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C hapter Two: 
Applying SAS No. 82
As an auditor, you have a responsibility to obtain reason­
able assurance that the financial statements are free of 
material misstatement, including material misstatements 
caused by fraud. In order to fulfill that responsibility SAS 
No. 82 requires you to:
• Consider the presence of fraud risk factors during all 
stages of the audit process.
• Based on the risk factors present, make an assessment 
of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud.
• Based on that assessment, develop an appropriate 
response.
SAS No. 82 also contains certain workpaper documentation 
and client communication requirements.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide you with sugges­
tions and recommendations for implementing the guidance 
contained in SAS No. 82. It is organized according to the 
process described above.
Key Point. Included as an appendix to this chapter is a 
comprehensive case study of a material fraud that was 
detected by independent auditors. This case study will be 
referred to frequently in this chapter to illustrate certain 
points so you may want to read it before continuing on 




To fulfill your responsibilities relating to fraud, begin by 
identifying the presence of fraud risk factors in your audit. 
As noted in SAS No. 82, risk factors do not necessarily 
indicate the existence of fraud, but they often have been 
observed in circumstances in which fraud has occurred.
Am I required to consider all fraud risk factors listed 
in the SAS? How much flexibility do I have to develop 
fraud risk factors tailored to my clients?
You are not required to consider all of the risk factors 
listed in the SAS as not all of these examples are relevant 
in all circumstances. You should use your professional
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judgment in determining which example risk factors are 
relevant to your client. You are required, however, to 
consider fraud risk factor categories that embody the 
substance of the categories listed in paragraphs 16 and 
18 of SAS No. 82. These categories are:
Misstatements Arising From Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting
• Management’s Characteristics and Influence over 
the Control Environment. These pertain to manage­
ment’s abilities, pressures, style, and attitude relating 
to internal control and the financial reporting process.
• Industry Conditions. These involve the economic and 
regulatory environment in which the entity operates.
• Operating Characteristics and Financial Stability.
These pertain to the nature and complexity of the 
entity and its transactions, the entity’s financial 
condition, and its profitability.
Misstatements Arising From Misappropriation o f Assets
• Susceptibility of Assets to Misappropriation. These 
pertain to the nature of an entity’s assets and the 
degree to which they are subject to theft.
• Controls. These involve lack of controls designed 
to prevent or detect misappropriations of assets.
The detailed example risk factors listed in paragraphs 17 
and 19 of SAS No. 82 are just that, a list of examples. 
They are meant to be generic or, in other words, they are 
geared to apply to many enterprises. Some of these may 
not apply to your client. For example, if your client is not 
a publicly held company, risk factors related to stock 
price would not apply. You are allowed flexibility in deter­
mining the specific risk factors that should be considered 
within each category. SAS No. 82 allows you to tailor the 
example fraud risk factors to your particular clients, as 
long as they encompass the substance of the broad cate­
gories described in paragraphs 16 and 18 of the statement. 
A Practitioner Speaks
In implementing SAS No. 82, we consider risk factors only in the 
broad sense listed in paragraphs 16 and 18. We’re not getting 
bogged down in the details but instead, ask ourselves some gen­
eral questions, like these below, that capture the substance of the 
SAS’s fraudulent financial reporting risk factor categories:
• Are there pressures on management that might motivate them 
to commit fraudulent financial reporting?
16
Applying SA S  No. 82
• Does management have the type of attitude or style that would 
allow them to commit and rationalize a fraud? What kind of 
culture do they create for their employees?
• Does the client operate in a rapidly changing, highly regulated, 
or deteriorating industry?
• Do the client’s financial results contain anomalies that point 
to the possibility of fraud?
• Does the client engage in transactions conducive to fraud?
We think these questions capture the essence of paragraph 16, 
and it’s more meaningful for us and our staff to think in terms of 
the big picture. If we need further clarification — like what do 
we mean by “anomalies that point to fraud?” — we look to para­
graph 17 of the SAS for examples.
That’s how we consider the risk of fraudulent financial report­
ing, and we approach the risk of misappropriation of assets in 
the same way.
While the implementation example noted above satisfies 
the requirements of SAS No. 82, it is the minimum allowed 
and may not be appropriate in all circumstances. Some 
circumstances may dictate the need to consider all or 
most of the risk factors in the SAS.
You may wish to tailor the example risk factors to smaller 
entities (see discussion below) or to clients in specific 
industries. For example, if you’re auditing a real estate 
entity, you might include “aggressive or unrealistic real 
estate appraisal assumptions” as an indication that 
management has the attitude or style that might lead to 
fraudulent financial reporting. See Part Two for examples 
of risk factors tailored to specific industries and small, 
privately owned businesses.
Key Point. Even though you are allowed flexibility in 
determining which risk factors to consider, use caution 
when deciding that some of the risk factors listed in the 
SAS do not apply. Expect questions to be raised if a 
material misstatement due to fraud is discovered in your 
client’s financial statements and several of the example 
fraud risk factors listed in SAS No. 82 were identified 
during the course of your audit, but you decided not 
to consider them as possible indicators of fraud.
Application to Smaller Entities. If you audit primarily 
smaller, privately held companies, it may be beneficial for
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you to develop a list of risk factors tailored to those types of 
clients. Here are some suggestions for creating such a list.
Internal Controls. Small business entities often are 
characterized by internal control conditions that in larger 
entities would be considered fraud risk factors. For exam­
ple, in a larger entity, the domination of management by 
a single individual is unusual and may be considered an 
indication of a higher risk of material misstatement due 
to fraud; in a smaller entity, this condition is normal and 
is much less useful as a barometer for measuring risk.
For that reason, when assessing the risk related to fraud­
ulent financial reporting, auditors of small businesses 
typically focus on the motivation of management to 
fraudulently misstate their financial statements and 
other attitudes and characteristics that indicate a willing­
ness to do so. Internal controls are considered in this 
context — as an indication of management’s attitude. 
When considering controls in your assessment of risk 
of material misstatement due to fraud, try to distinguish 
between control weaknesses that are understandable 
given the entity’s size and nature and those weaknesses 
that display an inappropriate attitude regarding internal 
control and the financial reporting process.
Operating Characteristics. In a small business entity, 
the financial performance of the company has a direct 
impact on the owner-manager. For that reason, risk fac­
tors described in SAS No. 82 as relating to the operating 
characteristics and financial stability of the entity may 
be considered as factors that affect management’s motiva­
tion to engage in fraudulent financial reporting. Specific 
examples of operating characteristics indicating that 
management may be motivated to fraudulently misstate 
their financial statements include:
• Threat of imminent bankruptcy or foreclosure
• Poor or deteriorating financial position when 
management has personally guaranteed significant 
debts of the entity
• Adverse consequences on significant matters if poor 
financial results are reported
Motivation to Under-Report Income or Assets. Be aware 
of situations in which management of a small business
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entity may have the motivation to under-report income 
or assets. For instance, management may be motivated 
to inappropriately reduce income taxes. Also, you may 
become aware that the financial statements are to be used 
in situations in which the owner-manager may be motivat­
ed to misstate (under- or overstate) income or assets. For 
example, an owner-manager may be motivated to under­
report income or assets to defraud a divorced spouse or 
a partner of his or her share of the profits or assets of 
the business or to convince a judge or arbitrator that the 
business has inadequate cash flow. You are not required 
to plan your audit to discover personal information (i.e., 
marital status) of the owner-manager. However, if you 
become aware of such information, you should consider 
it in your assessment of risk of material misstatement 
due to fraud.
Risk Factors that Clearly Do Not Apply. SAS No. 82 
includes several risk factors that clearly do not apply to a 
non-public company. For example, risk factors relating to 
stock price or hostile takeovers need not be considered.
Part Two includes a list of example fraud risk factors 
tailored to small, privately held companies. If you decide 
to tailor such a list for your audit practice, you may 
want to —
• Review and update the list regularly — don’t let it 
become stale.
• Consider the example specialized industry risk 
factors listed in Part Two when making the list.
• Circulate the list among the staff and educate them 
as to its use.
How actively should I seek out the presence of fraud  
risk factors? Do I need to change my existing audit 
approach ju st to seek out the risk factors listed in 
SAS No. 82?
SAS No. 82 requires you to actively seek out the presence 
of fraud risk factor categories in paragraphs 16 and 18, 
or different categories with the same substance. To the 
extent that your existing audit process does not identify 
the existence of these categories of fraud risk factors, 
that process should be changed. As a practical matter, 
the application of SAS No. 22, Planning and Supervision 
and SAS No. 55, Consideration of Internal Control in a 
Financial Statement Audit (as amended by SAS No. 78,
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Consideration of Internal Control in a Financial State­
ment Audit: An Amendment to Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. 55) should allow you to identify the broad 
categories of fraud risk factors listed in paragraphs 16 
and 18 of SAS No. 82.
Paragraphs 17 and 19 of SAS No. 82 provide certain 
detailed examples of fraud risk factors you might 
consider. You probably already actively consider these 
items — they are merely a subset of all the information 
you should gather as part of performing an effective 
and efficient audit. The following diagram describes 
this relationship.
By highlighting the items in the smaller circle and 
labeling them “fraud risk factors,” SAS No. 82 serves 
to remind you that some of the information you 
consider during the course of the audit may indicate 
the presence of fraud. Use the list of fraud risk factors 
in the SAS (or your own tailored list) as a “memory 
jogger”, a reminder to be alert for and assess the 
risk of the possibility of material misstatement due 
to fraud.
In the Internet Solutions case study included as an 
appendix to this chapter, the auditor understood that 
the company was having cash flow problems (in spite of 
reported profits) and they were operating in a declining 
industry. Initially, this information was used to identify 
the auditor’s high risk audit areas. But the auditor 
also was aware that these items often are observed 
in circumstances involving fraud (that is, they were 
fraud risk factors). Because of this, he considered this
20
information from a second perspective, namely, as an 
indicator of possible fraud.
Key Point. In the Internet Solutions case study, the 
auditor initially could not draw any conclusions 
about the risk of material misstatement due to fraud 
based on the information known to him during plan­
ning. But assessments of risk relating to fraud are 
cumulative. Some of the information gathered during 
the planning phase of the audit should have been 
“flagged” by the auditor, stored in his mind as an 
indicator of possible fraud, and re-evaluated contin­
ually throughout the audit as other information 
became known.
Key Point. Fraud risk factors can be identified by 
any audit team member at any stage of the audit. For 
that reason, it’s important that all engagement members 
be properly trained to identify fraud risk factors when 
they’re present. Once identified, it’s also important 
for team members to communicate with each other 
to ensure these risk factors are considered when 
assessing risk.
What about information related to financial stress of 
employees or adverse relationships between the entity 
and its employees? Are the items listed in paragraph 
20 of SAS No. 82 fraud risk factors that I should 
actively consider?
The examples listed in paragraph 20 of SAS No. 82 are 
important because they often have been observed in 
circumstances in which employees have misappropriated 
assets. However, you are not required to plan and perform 
your audit to discover this information. If you “stumble 
upon” this kind of information during the course of your 
audit, you should note it, consider its significance, and 
respond accordingly. However, you are not required to 
develop audit program steps specifically to obtain this 
information.
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Expanding on the diagram presented previously, Area G 
represents the examples listed in paragraph 20. Note that 
it falls outside of the information normally gathered in 
an audit.
The following table summarizes the fraud risk factors listed 





16 and 18 Broad categories 
of risk factors
You must design your 
audit to assess risk 
within these risk 
factor categories or 
similar categories 
that embody the 
substance of those 
listed in SAS No. 82.
If identified, they 
should be considered 
in your assessment 












These are examples to 
illustrate the broad 
categories of risk 
factors described in 
paragraphs 16 and 
18. You may wish to 
tailor these examples 
for your particular 
client.
They usually are a 
subset of information 
normally gathered to 
perform an effective 
and efficient audit.
20 Information relating 
to employee relation­
ships or pressures
You are not required to 
plan your audit to 
detect these fraud 
risk factors.
If you become aware 
of the presence of 
these risk factors dur­
ing your audit, you 
must consider them 
when making your 
assessment of the risk 
of material misstate­
ment due to fraud. *•
How can computers he used to fraudulently create 
material misstatements in the financial statements?
Computerized frauds can be categorized as follows:
• Input frauds. Phony transactions are altered or 
added to the stream of data being processed. For 
example, input documents such as invoices are 
altered, forged, or falsified.
• Throughput frauds. These are the types of computer 
frauds that tend to be reported in the press. A com­
puter “wizard” alters the programming to achieve 
some desired result. For example, a program that 
calculates interest earned on savings accounts at a 
bank is changed so that rounded amounts (fractions 
of pennies) are deposited into an account controlled 
by the computer programmer.
• Output frauds. Output reports, documents, or files 
are altered, suppressed or stolen. For example, an
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exception report used for internal control purposes 
may be altered to conceal a defalcation.
In terms of the number of frauds committed (as opposed 
to their dollar amount) most computer frauds can be 
categorized as input frauds.
Believe it or not, computer technology has not significant­
ly changed the types of frauds committed. For example, 
in the past, management may have overstated inventory 
by altering a manual record. Now, they may overstate 
inventory by entering false information into the electronic 
data processing system.
One thing that computer technology has changed is that 
the fraud perpetrator no longer needs physical access to 
certain documents and information. For example, in 
order to misstate the physical inventory count in a man­
ual environment the perpetrator needs physical access to 
the count tags. In a computerized environment, he or she 
needs only logical access to the inventory information.
Which o f the risk factors in SAS No. 82 relate to the 
electronic data processing (EDP) system?
SAS No. 82 does not contain a separate discussion on 
how computers are used to perpetrate fraud. 
Technological considerations are an integral, not sepa­
rate, part of the example fraud risk factors and the guid­
ance on assessing and responding to the risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud. However, the following exam­
ple risk factors most closely relate to EDP considerations:
• A failure by management to display and communicate 
an appropriate attitude regarding internal control 
and the financial reporting process, including 
inadequate monitoring of significant controls.
(This includes significant controls over computer 
processing activities.)
• A failure by management to display and communicate 
an appropriate attitude regarding internal control 
and the financial reporting process, including 
management continuing to employ an ineffective 
information technology staff.
• Risk factors relating to controls, including a lack 
of appropriate segregation of duties or independent 
checks (which includes the computer processing 
functions).
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The scope of this publication does not allow a detailed 
discussion of all the controls that should be present relating 
to your client’s computer system. For a discussion of audit 
issues relating to EDP environments, you may wish to refer 
to the Auditing Procedure Study Auditing in Common 
Computer Environments, published by the AICPA (product 
no. 021059). This study focuses on the computer environ­
ments found in most companies today and describes the 
audit ramifications relating to microcomputers, end-user 
computing, local area networks, data bases and telecom­
munications.
The author’s survey of reported computer frauds indicates 
the following conditions as being most prevalent in instances 
in which fraud has occurred:
• Lack of adequate logical access control. Many material 
frauds are committed because unauthorized people 
gain access to important data or programs. For this 
reason, companies should take steps, such as program 
password control, to limit logical access. Often, 
companies obtain access control software, but fail
to install it or improperly install it so that it is 
easily bypassed.
• Lack of independent checks over input and output.
Most computer fraud schemes involve altering input 
data to alter transactions or enter fraudulent trans­
actions. Therefore, controls to verify the validity of 
input data can reduce this risk of fraud. Independent 
checks and follow-up also should be made of computer 
output, including exception listings, error reports, and 
evidence of other controls performed automatically 
by the computer system.
• Lack of proper segregation of duties. Incompatible 
computer functions should be segregated. In some 
instances this may not be possible, particularly in an 
environment in which microcomputers are used by 
individuals who develop and execute the computer 
program (for example, a spreadsheet application) 
that generates the information used by that same 
individual. In those situations, other controls should 
be in place to reduce the risk of material misstate­
ment due to fraud.
See Part Three, Common Frauds and Extended Audit 
Procedures for a discussion of common computer frauds 
and expanded audit procedures that may be performed
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in response to assessed risk of material misstatement 
due to these types of frauds.
What kinds o f inquiries relating to fraud should I 
make o f management?
As part of your assessment of the risk of material misstate­
ment due to fraud, paragraph 13 of SAS No. 82 requires 
you to make inquiries of your client to obtain your client’s 
understanding regarding the risk of fraud in the entity. 
The author suggests that you include with these inquiries 
a general discussion of management’s responsibilities for 
the detection and prevention of fraud. Part Three, Sample 
Client Representation Letter provides an example written 
representation you may wish to obtain from your client 
relating to responsibility for fraud detection and prevention. 
If you choose to include this in your client representation 
letter, you should first discuss this with your client.
Paragraph 13 of SAS No. 82 also requires you to ask if 
management has any knowledge of fraud that has been 
perpetrated on or within the entity. The statement 
also provides examples of other matters that might be 
discussed, including;
• Whether there are particular subsidiary locations, bus­
iness segments, types of transactions, account bal­
ances, or financial statement categories where fraud 
risk factors exist or may be more likely to exist, and
• How management may be addressing such risks.
The example inquiries provided in the statement presup­
pose that the client has an understanding of fraud risk 
factors and how to determine where the risk of fraud 
exists. This may not be true with your clients, in which  
case you may need to “educate” them on the importance 
of fraud risk factors and the characteristics of fraud. 
Although not required by SAS No. 82, you may wish to 
present your discussion of fraud within the context of 
motivation and opportunity, as discussed in Part One, 
Characteristics of Fraud.
People who commit fraud tend to deliberate on their acts. 
Their first instance of fraud may be an impulsive action, 
but continual, material fraudulent acts require consider­
able thought by the perpetrator. They must think about 
how to commit the scheme and how to cover it up, and 
usually they have to develop a rationalization to justify 
their actions.
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In the Internet Solutions ease study presented in the 
Appendix to this chapter, Norman Wilder’s first instance 
of fraudulent financial reporting is not completely 
premeditated — he decides to recognize revenue before 
the sale is completed. However, on some level he must 
have deliberated this action and concluded that his 
chances of getting caught were small. Later, he exploits 
this weakness in the system, designing an even bigger 
scheme and identifying the person most likely to help 
him commit fraud. He devises elaborate measures to 
conceal the fraud.
In making inquiries of clients regarding their understand­
ing of the risk of fraud in their entity, you might invite 
them to think through the reasoning process of someone 
who wishes to commit fraud. Consider asking the follow­
ing questions (which are not required by SAS No. 82 but 
are presented here merely as suggestions):
• If someone wanted to misstate the financial state­
ments or misappropriate company assets, what 
would be the easiest way for them to do that without 
getting caught?
• What deviations from generally accepted accounting 
principles are most common in your industry? are 
most likely at your company?
• What are the weakest links in your company’s 
internal controls?
• If segregation of duties is not always possible, what 
other controls are in place to reduce the risk that 
one person can perpetrate and conceal a fraud?
• How are non-routine transactions initiated, 
approved and processed by your accounting system?
• Which controls can be bypassed or overridden? Do 
you know of instances in which these controls were 
bypassed or overridden in the past?
• Which source documents are the easiest to access 
and forge?
• How could someone introduce a fake entry into the 
accounting system to conceal a defalcation?
As indicated in SAS No. 82, the information you gather 
will be more useful if you can focus your inquiries on 
particular types of transactions or account balances.
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In addition to helping you assess the risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud, inquiries of management will 
help remind them of their responsibilities to prevent and 
detect fraud.
Key Point. “Management” is not just one person. Although 
not required by SAS No. 82, you should consider extend­
ing your inquiries to include personnel outside of the 
accounting department. In the Internet Solutions case 
study, inquiries made of the Director of Sales would 
have provided auditors with important information 
regarding the risk of material fraud at the company 
or perhaps disclosed the actual fraud.
Application to Smaller Entities. The smaller entity usually 
is more susceptible to misappropriation of assets than to 
fraudulent financial reporting. If this is true for your clients, 
focus your inquiries on defalcations. In doing so, try to 
avoid discussions of the personal traits and characteristics 
of individuals (like “I’d trust Helen with my life”) and 
focus instead on the duties and responsibilities of a specif­
ic job description. (For instance, “The store managers 
have responsibility for depositing and writing checks and 
reconciling the bank accounts for their stores.”) If your 
client describes a fraud committed against the entity, 
gather information about how the fraud was committed 
and concealed, what controls were bypassed, what con­
trols the client might implement to ensure it doesn’t 
occur again, and how the fraud was eventually detected. 
Personal details about the individual who committed the 
fraud, though interesting, usually are less relevant for 
prevention and detection of further fraud.
Should management’s responses to inquiries relating 
to fraud be documented in the client representa­
tion letter?
Client representation letters confirm oral representations 
made to you during the audit and reduce the possibility 
of misunderstanding between you and your client. Repre­
sentation letters are part of the evidential matter you 
obtain during the audit, but they are not a substitute 
for the application of those auditing procedures necessary 
to afford a reasonable basis for your opinion on the 
financial statements.
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Assessing the 
Risk of Material 
Misstatement Due 
to Fraud
SAS No. 82 does not require you to obtain written repre­
sentation from management in response to inquiries 
relating to fraud. However, you may wish to do so, and 
Part Three, Sample Client Representation Letter contains 
example language you may choose to add to your repre­
sentation letter.
Before making your assessment of material misstatement 
due to fraud, remember that, as an independent auditor, 
you consider fraud within the context of materiality to the 
financial statements. You are concerned primarily with 
detecting material misstatements; your objective is not to 
detect fraud per se, but to detect material misstatement 
caused by fraud. Be sure to consider the question, “What 
is the risk that the fraud risk factor(s) observed indicates 
a material financial statement misstatement?” If you 
judge the risk of material misstatement to be minimal and 
the planned audit procedures sufficient to obtain reason­
able assurance about the absence of a material fraud, 
then there’s no reason to consider the matter further.
The following example illustrates an auditor’s considera­
tion of an identified risk factor.
A Practitioner Speaks
We had a client — a medium-sized manufacturer — who sold a 
warehouse to an affiliated company on December 31. The terms 
of the sale included an agreement to buy back the property in ten 
years. This is a fraud risk factor right out of SAS No. 82 — a 
significant related party transaction not in the ordinary course 
of business. Not only that, but by the time we came out to do the 
audit, the client still hadn’t gotten signed originals of all 
the documents.
To tell you the truth, we didn’t really spend a lot of time ponder­
ing the risk due to fraud. This was a big transaction. We needed 
to make sure we got the right answer.
The first thing I told the client was that we had to have signed 
original documentation. That was the easy part. I decided to 
also confirm the key terms of the agreement directly with the 
other company. If the sale had been an arms-length transaction,
I probably wouldn’t have bothered with the confirmation, but in 
this case, I thought it would be a good idea.
In this example the auditor considered whether the 
situation could lead to a material misstatement and 
decided that it could. He then considered and elected 
to perform additional audit procedures in response to 
the risk of material misstatement due to fraud.
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 Is the fraud risk assessment the same as the inherent 
and control risk assessment?
Key Point. No. Your assessment of the risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud is a separate risk assessment, 
distinct from your assessment of inherent and control 
risk. Its true that many of the example fraud risk factors 
listed in SAS No. 82 are similar to the factors you consider 
when you assess inherent and control risk, and your assess­
ment of risk of material misstatement due to fraud may be 
performed in conjunction with your inherent and control 
risk assessment. But it's a separate thought process. Thus, 
even if you assess inherent and control risk at the maxi­
mum, you still must consider fraud risk factors and 
assess the risk of material misstatement due to fraud. 
(This concept is articulated in footnote 6 of SAS No. 82.) *•
In the Internet Solutions ease study, the auditor became 
aware of industry conditions (declining market for the prod­
uct) and client characteristics (cash flow problems and 
increasing receivables) and used this information to plan 
the audit. SAS No. 82 requires him to go one step further, 
to consider the presence of these fraud risk factors and ask 
himself the question, “Does the presence of these risk factors 
indicate the risk of a material misstatement due to fraud?”
How should I evaluate the presence o f risk factors to 
make an assessment o f the risk o f material misstate­
ment due to fraud?
SAS No. 82 gives you a lot of flexibility in evaluating the 
presence of risk factors to make an assessment of the risk 
of material misstatement due to fraud. Your thought 
process is a function of your experience, your knowledge 
of the client, and your professional judgment.
In making those judgments, keep in mind the following:
• There is not necessarily a one-to-one relationship 
between risk factors, an assessment, and a response. 
The presence of risk factors usually is not considered 
in isolation but rather in combination with other risk 
factors or mitigating circumstances at the client. For 
example, the presence of easily convertible assets, such 
as bearer bonds, represents a risk factor that may be 
mitigated by controls such as physical safeguards, 
adequate record keeping, and detailed independent 
review of such records.
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• There is no requirement to label your assessment 
(as “high,” “medium,” or “low”, for instance). Rather, 
you assess whether certain circumstances, or risk 
factors, result in risk of material misstatement of the 
financial statements due to fraud. This assessment is 
cumulative (risk factors can be considered individu­
ally and in combination) and continuous (risk factors 
can be identified at any stage of the audit).
Although not required by SAS No. 82, you might consider 
the following approach when evaluating the presence of 
fraud risk factors.
Look for Both Opportunity and Motivation 
Part One, Characteristics of Fraud points out that many 
fraud experts believe that in order for a fraud to occur, the 
perpetrator must have both the motivation to commit fraud 
and the perceived opportunity to do so. Absent one or the 
other, it’s much less likely a material fraud will be committed.
As an auditor, you might evaluate the risk factors you 
identify as providing either motivation or opportunity. 
(Note: SAS No. 82 does not categorize the risk factors in 
this way.) Focus your audit attention where you perceive 
both motivation and opportunity.
For example, in the Internet Solutions case study, the 
article indicated a number of risk factors that provided 
Norman Wilder with the perceived opportunity to commit 
a material fraud and get away with it, including:
• Mr. Wilder’s domination of management without 
effective compensating controls
• His excessive participation in the application of 
accounting principles for revenue recognition
• The retention of an ineffective accounting staff
Other risk factors pertain to Mr. Wilder’s motivation for 
committing a material fraud:
• An obsession with taking the company public, which 
was contingent upon the company meeting revenue 
and earnings growth projections
• A practice of committing to the outside board of 
directors to achieve unduly aggressive sales or 
revenue projections
• Significant pressure to obtain additional capital 
necessary to finance research and development
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• Unrealistically aggressive (given the declining market 
for the company’s product) sales programs
Analyzing these two categories of fraud risk factors side- 
by-side, you can see that they converge around the issue 
of revenue recognition. It’s in the area of sales (more so 
than profitability) where Wilder had both the motivation 
and opportunity to commit a material fraud. For example, 
he might have misclassified long-term assets as current 
assets in order to improve the company’s current ratio, or 
he might have intentionally understated the allowance for 
obsolete inventory. However, he had no motivation to 
commit these frauds, and they didn’t happen.
Key Point. When considering the presence of fraud risk 
factors for the purpose of assessing risk, consider these 
risk factors independent of the person involved.
Auditors sometimes let their personal relationship with 
the client or the client’s personality influence their 
assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud. “My client isn’t the type of person who’d commit 
fraud, ” is not a sufficient reason for concluding that the 
risk of material misstatement due to fraud does not exist. 
When considering the fraud risk factors present at the 
client, try to be as objective as possible; consider the 
position (controller, president, owner) and not the 
person (my golfing buddy Harry).
The assessment of the risk of material misstatement due 
to fraud is more of an art than a science, and for that 
reason, the process of making that assessment is difficult 
to describe. One auditor offers the following:
[When considering the risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud] the auditor absorbs information, organizes it in some 
meaningful way, and then sees what the pattern looks like. The 
patterns to look for are the exceptions and oddities, the things 
that do not seem to fit in an organized scheme of things because 
they seem too large, too small, too frequent, too rare, too high, too 
low, too good to be true, too extraordinary, too many, too few; 
they involve odd times, odd places, odd hours, odd people, and 
odd combinations. In a word, the auditor looks for the unusual 
rather than the usual.3
3 Jack Bologna, Handbook on Corporate Fraud (Stoneham, MA: Butterworth- 
Heineman, 1993).
Several of the example fraud risk factors listed in SAS No. 
82 are included to help you identify the unusual. In the 
case of Internet Solutions, the auditor noted:
• The company’s inability to generate cash flows 
from operations while reporting earnings and 
earnings growth
• Unusually rapid growth or profitability when compared 
with that of other companies in the same [in this case 
declining] industry
Application to Smaller Entities. When assessing the risk 
of material misstatement due to fraud at a smaller entity, 
it is important to pay particular attention to the motivation 
of the owner-manager to commit fraudulent financial 
reporting. In many instances, management of small, pri­
vately held companies has little motivation to intentionally 
and materially misstate the entity’s financial statements. 
However, notable exceptions to this general rule include:
• An interest by management to pursue inappropriate 
means to minimize reported earnings for tax-moti­
vated reasons
• Debt covenants that are difficult to maintain
• Adverse consequences on significant pending trans­
actions (for example, a contract award, the loss of 
bonding, or the sale of the business) if poor financial 
results are reported.
You should also be alert for adverse consequences on 
significant pending transactions if good financial results 
are reported. For example, if the financial statements 
of the entity will be used in a divorce proceeding, the 
owner-manager may be motivated to under-report the 
earnings, cash flow or assets of the company in order 
to reduce the amount awarded to the spouse.
Absent these or other risk factors that would motivate 
an owner-manager to fraudulently misstate the financial 
statements, the risk of a material misstatement due to 
fraudulent financial reporting in a small entity usually 
is addressed adequately by typical audit procedures.
When considering internal controls for a small business 
entity, try to distinguish between control weaknesses 
that are understandable given the entity’s size and
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nature and those weaknesses that display an inappropri­
ate attitude regarding internal control and the financial 
reporting process.
A lack of controls due to management’s improper attitude 
may indicate a willingness to commit fraudulent financial 
reporting. For example, if your client exhibits a total dis­
dain for internal controls, you may consider this a risk 
factor for fraudulent financial reporting.
On the other hand, a lack of controls due mainly to the 
nature of the client (for example, too few employees to 
have a sufficient segregation of duties) does not usually 
increase the risk of fraudulent financial reporting. It 
does, however, leave the company vulnerable to misap­
propriation of assets.
When assessing the risk o f material misstatement due 
to fraud, how should I determine materiality?
Fraudulent financial statements are intended to deceive 
financial statement users. Therefore, such fraud is almost 
always material. Otherwise it wouldn’t have the desired 
effect.
Issues relating to materiality judgments usually are more 
problematic when they relate to misappropriation of 
assets. Consider the following example:
XYZ is a retail department store. At year-end, the inventory 
records are adjusted to the physical count. Invariably, a certain 
amount of “shrinkage” is present, which flows through cost of 
goods sold. In the client’s industry, 1.5% to 2.0% shrinkage is 
considered normal.
In the above example, suppose the physical count revealed 
a discrepancy significantly in excess of normal amounts 
and cost of goods sold was adjusted to reflect the significant 
shrinkage. Is the auditor required to extend procedures to 
determine how much of the shrinkage was caused by theft?
SAS No. 82 provides no specific guidance on this ques­
tion. Your response will be based on judgment and on the 
specific facts and circumstances of each situation.
Many practitioners argue that, in the above example, the 
theft of inventory truly is a cost of goods sold. One could 
argue that if the balance sheet and net income for the period 
are fairly stated, then it would be rare that a defalcation, 
“buried” inside another income statement line item, would 
be material to the financial statements taken as a whole.
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Using this logic, some practitioners would choose not to 
extend their audit procedures in the above example.
However, don’t be too quick in dismissing the possibility 
of extending your procedures. In the above example, the 
author believes an auditor should make a reasonable 
effort to determine the true cause of the shrinkage. That 
effort will be constrained by the time you have to devote 
to the issue and the quality of the available information, 
but as a client service matter, the issue is worth pursuing. 
If a good faith effort fails to provide a definitive answer, 
then consider the question, are the financial statements 
materially correct if a theft is “buried” in cost of goods 
sold? But don’t answer this question until you first make 
an effort to identify the possible fraud.
What advice can you give me for assessing the risk of 
material defalcations?
The previous discussion on motivation and opportunity 
works well for the risk assessment related to fraudulent 
financial reporting. It may not be quite as practical for 
assessing the risk related to defalcation, mainly because 
(1) defalcation often is committed by employees, which 
makes it difficult to consider fraud risk factors for all 
possible perpetrators, and (2) the motivation for defalca­
tion (for example, stealing cash) applies to almost every­
one (who wouldn’t want some extra cash?), which makes 
the methodology ineffective for pinpointing areas of 
increased risk.
Based on the author’s experience (again, this is not 
required by SAS No. 82), you might want to consider 
the following approach.
Look for Evidence of Concealment
In Part One, Background and Overview of SAS No. 82 an 
auditor provided a description of a material defalcation 
he detected at an electrical wholesale distribution company 
with two stores, the main store and the cross-state store. 
In this situation, the manager of the cross-state store 
stole payments from customers made on their account. 
Think of a defalcation as a three step process:
• The fraud is committed. (The store manager stole 
the money.)
• The benefits to the fraud are realized. (The store 
manager converts the money to his personal use,
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by depositing it into a checking account he controls 
and then spending the money.)
• The fraud is concealed. (In this case, the store manager 
tried to conceal his actions by lying to the auditors. 
Alternatively, he might have tried to conceal it by 
adjusting the accounting records, for example 
recording credit memos for the money taken.)
As an auditor, it is unlikely that you will observe someone 
committing a fraud. In the example provided, the chances 
are slim that an auditor would ever observe an employee 
actually taking the money. It is also unlikely that you will 
recognize the benefits of the fraud that he or she realizes.
Key Point When financial statements are materially 
misstated as a result of a misappropriation of assets, 
what you are most likely to observe are attempts to 
conceal the fraud. *•
Paragraph 25 of SAS No. 82 provides examples of condi­
tions you may identify during field work that change or 
support your judgment regarding the assessment of risk 
of material fraud. Many of those items listed (particularly 
those regarding discrepancies in the accounting records 
and conflicting or missing evidential matter) often are 
present when a fraud is being concealed. In the electrical 
wholesaler example, the following were present:
• Significant unexplained reconciling items between the 
accounts receivable subledger and the general ledger
• Inconsistent, vague, and implausible responses from 
management arising from inquiries
The misappropriation of assets usually is concealed by 
entering a fake debit into the accounting system. When 
someone steals an asset, cash for example, the credit is 
obvious — cash no longer exists and the cash account 
must be credited. To conceal this theft, a corresponding 
debit must be entered into the system. Usually, this debit 
is to cost of sales or another expense account because 
these accounts are closed out at year-end and, unlike 






False debits often are entered into the accounting system 
using a fictitious journal entry. In addition to the items listed 
in paragraph 25 of SAS No. 82, the following have been 
observed in situations involving fraudulent journal entries.
• Entries made by individuals who normally would not 
make such entries
• Entries that lack support
• Entries made to adjust receivables, payables, revenues 
or expenses without explanation
• Entries that don’t balance
Application to Smaller Entities. Small companies usually 
are more susceptible to material misstatements caused by 
defalcations. Part Three, Common Frauds and Extended 
Audit Procedures provides a discussion of the common 
types of frauds for several audit areas as well as alterna­
tive audit procedures for these areas. Becoming familiar 
with these schemes will help you to better recognize a 
material misstatement caused by a defalcation of assets.
SAS No. 82 requires you to develop a response based on 
your assessment of the risk of material misstatement due 
to fraud. As with other risk assessments, the greater the 
risk, the more extensive your audit procedures need to be 
in order to obtain reasonable assurance that the financial 
statements are free of material misstatement. In some 
situations, your planned audit procedures may be sufficient, 
as in the following example:
The ABC Partnership owns a mid-rise office building in 
Anytown. The primary asset of the partnership is the building, 
and the primary liability is the related mortgage. Revenues 
consist of rent income, and most of the expenses relate to build­
ing operations.
During the course of planning and performing the audit, the 
auditor concludes that there is not much risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud relating to the building. It is not 
susceptible to misappropriation, nor is it easy to fraudulently 
misstate the asset on the balance sheet or in the related notes. 
The audit fieldwork related to the mortgage (confirmation with 
the lender) is considered sufficient to detect any material 
misstatement.
A slightly higher risk is assessed for rental income receipts. 
However, as part of the planned audit procedures, the auditor 
performs analytical procedures of rental income, including a 
comparison of income recognized and cash deposits by month. 
The auditor also performs detailed tests of the rent roll, by
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comparing the lease terms listed on the rent roll to original 
executed leases.
Based on the assessed risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud, the auditor believes that these procedures are sufficient to 
detect a material misstatement caused by fraud.
In other situations, your planned audit procedures may 
not be sufficient, and you will need to extend them. For 
example, in the Internet Solutions ease study, the auditor 
decided that his original sample size for reviewing ship­
ping documents should be expanded, and that he should 
receive original documents for all accounts receivable 
confirmations received via fax.
What are some specific responses I  can take as a result 
o f my assessment o f risk o f material misstatement due 
to fraud?
Paragraphs 26 through 32 of SAS No. 82 provide guidance 
on how you might respond to your assessment of the risk 
of material misstatement due to fraud. These paragraphs 
impose no requirements on how to respond — they can’t, 
because circumstances vary from audit to audit and you 
will need to develop a response that is most appropriate 
to your situation. Instead, these paragraphs of the state­
ment provide examples for you to consider.
Your response to a risk assessment can fall into one of 
two categories: an overall response directed at the 
engagement level, or specific response directed to an 
account balance, class of transaction or assertion, or to 
a particular type of fraud (that is, fraudulent financial 
reporting or misappropriation of assets).
Part Three, Common Frauds and Extended Audit Proce­
dures provides a description of typical frauds (both fraud­
ulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets) 
broken down by audit area. Also described are audit 
procedures that might be performed to specifically detect 
material misstatements caused by these frauds. If you 
identify fraud risk factors on your audits, consider whether 
they fit a pattern that might describe the typical frauds 
listed in Part Three. If they do, you might want to perform 
some of the suggested procedures to determine whether 
the financial statements are free of material misstatement 
due to fraud.
Much of the guidance provided in SAS No. 82 was followed 
by the auditor in the Internet Solutions case study in
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response to his assessment of the risk of material mis­
statement due to fraud. For example:
• Overall considerations (paragraph 27 of SAS No.
82). During the planning of the audit, the auditor 
identified this engagement as one of high overall 
risk. In addition to the factors mentioned in the arti­
cle, the fact that the company was preparing to go 
public also increased the audit risk in this engage­
ment. Although not stated in the article, certainly 
under these situations the auditor would have care­
fully considered the assignment of personnel. CPA 
firms with a large pool of staff members would be apt 
to assign their best staff members to an engagement 
of this sort. In a smaller CPA firm where staffing 
options are limited, an engagement of this type 
probably would call for more active involvement
of the partner.
During the course of the engagement, as other con­
siderations came to the attention of the auditor and 
he began to revisit his assessment of the risk relating 
to fraud, he would have developed a more skeptical 
attitude in the assessment of audit evidence. His 
application of professional skepticism included: (1) 
re-thinking the nature and extent of documentation 
required to be examined to support sales and 
accounts receivable (Are faxed confirmation 
responses adequate? Did we look at enough shipping 
documents?); and (2) the decision to corroborate 
management’s explanations with additional evidence 
(for example, the attempt to verify explanation that 
the shipping document discrepancy was an isolated 
mistake by examining a larger selection of docu­
ments).
• Nature, timing and extent of procedures (paragraph 
28 of SAS No. 82). During the course of the audit, 
the auditor modified the nature and extent of planned 
audit procedures. These modifications were in 
response to the identification of fraud risk factors 
and other considerations that increased the assessed 
risk of material misstatement due to fraud.
It’s also possible that many of the decisions regard­
ing the nature, timing and extent of audit procedures 
were made during the planning phase of the audit. 
For example, at another, less risky client, the auditor
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may have been inclined to perform substantive tests 
in advance of year end. In the Internet Solutions 
case study, because of the risk factors identified 
during planning, the auditor decided to perform the 
substantive audit procedures as of the balance sheet 
date rather than at an interim date.
• Consideration at the Account Balance, Class of 
Transactions, and Assertion Level (paragraph 29 of 
SAS No. 82). As fraud risk factors and other conditions 
were identified during the course of the audit, the 
auditor developed a response directed specifically 
toward accounts receivable. This included contact­
ing major customers by phone to verify reported 
sales, including the presence of any side agreements 
with the client. Additionally, the auditor might have 
conducted interviews with sales personnel, who in 
this case would have informed the auditor of the 
material fraud.
• Specific Responses — Misstatements Arising From 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting (paragraph 30 of 
SAS No. 82). Once the auditor identified revenue 
recognition as an area that required a specific 
response, he applied the suggestions listed in para­
graph 30 of SAS No. 82.
How should the results o f audit procedures be consid­
ered in assessing the risk o f fraud? What should I do to 
assess the clearly inconsequential audit differences that 
are passed by the staff in the individual workpapers?
SAS No. 82 requires you to consider, at the completion of 
the audit, whether the accumulated results of audit pro­
cedures and other observations affect your assessment of 
the risk of material misstatement due to fraud.
Audit differences (both booked and not booked by the client) 
are a source of information that can help you identify 
fraud risk factors. When reviewing audit differences use 
your list of fraud risk factors as a “memory jogger” to 
see if any are present that weren’t identified previously. 
(Remember, you’re not required to consider each adjust­
ment individually — they may be, and in many cases are 
most effective when, considered in combination). If you 
do uncover the presence of fraud risk factors that were 
unnoticed before, you should reconsider your assessment 
of risk of material misstatement due to fraud and whether
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your audit procedures were sufficient in light of that risk. 
If you believe your audit procedures were insufficient, 
additional tests should be performed.
On many engagements, the audit staff “passes” clearly 
inconsequential differences in the individual workpapers 
and never carries these forward to a proposed adjustments 
schedule or other workpaper where they can be reviewed 
by the engagement partner. These types of passed adjust­
ments should be considered by someone on the audit 
team in the same way that proposed adjustments are 
considered. Keep in mind, however, that your focus is 
still on items that could lead to material misstatement.
Detection of Fraud 
or Misstatements 
That May Be the 
Result of Fraud
How should I respond when I detect errors that may 
be the result o f fraud?
Paragraph 35 of SAS No. 82 provides guidance on what to 
do when you determine that a misstatement is, or may be, 
the result of fraud. Note the key threshold of is or may 
be. You do not have to know for certain the misstatement 
is caused by fraud or even be able to say the misstatement 
is probably the result of fraud. The threshold established 
by this paragraph is considerably lower than “probable.”
In those instances in which a misstatement is or may 
be the result of fraud, and the effect is either material 
or can’t be determined, you are required to take the 
following steps.
• Consider the implications for other aspects of the 
audit (as described in paragraph 34 of SAS No. 82). 
One of the important points made in paragraph 34 is 
that you should evaluate the implications of the pos­
sible fraud, “espeeially those dealing with the organi­
zational position of the person(s) involved.” In the 
Internet Solutions case study, the possible fraud 
involved the highest levels of management in the 
company, which increases the risk the fraud could 
be widespread and material. On the other hand, as 
pointed out in the statement, a fraud involving a 
lower level employee usually is restricted, based on 
the functions performed by that employee. The per­
son responsible for the petty cash fund could not 
commit a fraud the nature and magnitude of that 
committed by Norman Wilder of Internet Solutions.
In some instances, determining that a misstatement 
is or may be the result of fraud may require you to
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reconsider audit procedures previously performed 
and revisit a particular audit area (i.e., inventory) 
to perform additional procedures. You may need 
to reassign testing of this audit area to a more 
experienced staff or to a specialist.
• Discuss the matter and your approach with the 
client. SAS No. 82 states that these discussions 
should be conducted at a level that is at least one 
level above those involved. Again, if senior manage­
ment is involved in a fraud, then you may have to 
consider the guidance contained in paragraph 36 of 
the statement relating to possible withdrawal from 
the engagement.
• Attempt to obtain additional evidential matter. If 
additional procedures are expected to be costly and 
time consuming, you probably should first discuss 
this with your client before proceeding.
• If appropriate, suggest the client consult with legal 
counsel. In the Internet Solutions case study, the 
auditor reached a point in which the indications
of fraud were so strong, he had no choice but to 
recommend to the board of directors that they seek 
legal advice.
You may encounter situations in which you’ve identified an 
audit difference and proposed an adjustment but you are 
unable to determine whether the misstatement is caused 
by fraud and the client asks you to expand your procedures 
to try to come to a more definitive answer about whether 
fraud was involved. Or, once you’ve performed some pro­
cedures, you discover that a possible misstatement due to 
fraud would be immaterial to the financial statements yet 
your client expects you to “get to the bottom of it” anyway. 
In situations like these, you should take care to distinguish 
between procedures that are a part of a financial statement 
audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing stan­
dards (GAAS) and those that constitute a fraud examination. 
To help you distinguish between the two, the following 
















GAAS Audit Fraud Examination
To obtain sufficient 
competent evidential matter 
to provide a reasonable basis 
for forming an opinion about 
the financial statements. 
Performed regularly.
To determine whether a 
fraud has or is occurring, 
and to determine who is 
responsible for the fraud. 
Performed only with 
sufficient basis that a fraud 
may have occurred.
Usually required by third 
party users of the financial 
statements.
Performed only with 
sufficient predication, that 
is, the totality of circum­
stances leads a reasonable, 
professionally trained, and 
prudent individual to believe 
a fraud has occurred, is 
occurring, and/or will occur.
An auditor’s opinion provides 
credibility to financial 
information reported by 
management to third parties.
The fraud examination is 
conducted to resolve specific 
allegations of fraud and 
to assign blame.
Primarily the underlying 
accounting data supporting 
the financial statements.
Evidential matter including 
financial and nonfinancial 
data. Techniques include: 
document examination, 
review of public records, 
and interviews.
In the majority of cases, 
the auditor relies on 
evidence that is persuasive 
rather than convincing.
Fraud examiners attempt to 
establish proof to support or 
refute an allegation of fraud.
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Documentation
Requirements
Under what circumstances should I withdraw from an 
engagement?
A Practitioner Speaks
I had one situation in which the outcome of our audit would 
determine whether the client received a significant amount of 
funding from a third party. During the audit, we came across a 
document that I was fairly certain was forged by the client. I was 
pretty sure the client had lied to us.
My first reaction was to withdraw immediately. But it wasn't 
that simple. It was the “eleventh” hour of this funding plan, and 
our lawyer told us that if we withdrew and the client lost the 
funding, they would probably sue us. We were really stuck 
between a rock and a hard place on that one — work with a 
client we suspected was lying or withdraw and invite a lawsuit.
I’d hesitate to draw any general conclusions from that experi­
ence except that you should always proceed with caution and 
get as much legal advice as you can.
The above story illustrates some of the complications that 
can arise when you consider withdrawing from an engage­
ment. In this case the practitioner’s initial impulse was 
to withdraw immediately from the engagement. Other 
practitioners may be predisposed the other way, to 
continue with the engagement and “get to the bottom of 
things.” Still others may not even consider withdrawal as 
an option.
The practitioner’s advice noted above is sound. It is 
impossible to provide general guidance on when to with­
draw from an engagement, as each situation will have its 
own unique considerations. Paragraph 36 of SAS No. 82 
says that you “may wish to consult with your legal coun­
sel when considering withdrawal from an engagement.” 
From a practical standpoint, to do otherwise would not 
be advisable.
The documentation requirements relating to your consid­
eration of fraud in a financial statement audit are described 
in paragraph 37 of SAS No. 82. These requirements are 
somewhat broad, and you have considerable flexibility 
in choosing how to meet them.
What is required to be documented in the workpapers 
to comply with SAS No. 82?
SAS No. 82 requires you to document evidence of the 
performance of the assessment of the risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud. You are not required to
44
Applying SA S  No. 82
label your assessment (“high”, “medium”, or “low”, for 
instance) nor are you required to describe your thought 
process or rationale used to make the assessment. You 
are only required to document that you performed an 
assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud. As discussed in Part One, Assessing the Risk of 
Material Misstatement Due to Fraud, this assessment is a 
separate risk assessment, distinct from your assessment 
of inherent and control risk. Although the assessment 
may be performed in conjunction with your inherent and 
control risk assessment, it’s a separate thought process 
and should be documented as such.
To document evidence of your performance of this risk 
assessment you should document:
• The risk factors identified as present
• Your response to those risk factors
• Fraud risk factors or other conditions, if any, 
identified during the performance of field work 
that caused you to believe that an additional audit 
response is required
If, as a result of your assessment, you conclude that a 
further response is appropriate, that response should also 
be documented.
Going into your audit you will be using a list of fraud risk 
factors to serve as a “memory jogger” to remind you that 
some of the information gathered during your audit may 
indicate the presence of fraud. This list may represent the 
examples listed in paragraphs 17 and 19 of SAS No. 82, 
or the examples provided may be tailored to your clients 
(say, for small, privately owned businesses or entities 
within a particular industry) provided that they embody 
the substance of the five broad risk factor categories in 
paragraphs 16 and 18 of the SAS. Documentation of this 
overall list of fraud risk factors you use is not required.
During the planning and performance of the audit, you 
may identify some of the fraud risk factors from your list 
as being present at your client. Of these risk factors pre­
sent, some will be addressed sufficiently by your planned 
audit procedures; others may require you to extend your 
audit procedures. SAS No. 82 requires you to document 
all risk factors identified as present (and your response) 
regardless of whether the presence of those risk factors 
requires extended audit procedures.
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The diagram below illustrates what is required. Circle A 
represents the overall “memory jogger” list you use and 
Circle B represents the risk factors on that list you identify 
as being present at your client. Circle C represents those 
identified risk factors that require additional, extended 
audit procedures (above and beyond your planned proce­
dures).
The shaded area depicts your required documentation. 
You are required to document the risk factors identified 
as present and your response.
SAS No. 82 Documentation Requirements
In a rare event in which no risk factors are identified as 
being present at your client, keep in mind that you must 
document evidence of the performance of the assessment 
of material misstatement due to fraud. At a minimum, 
you’d document that no risk factors were identified.
What format should the documentation take?
SAS No. 82 does not require any specific format (for 
example, a checklist or a memo) or standard language to 
comply with these documentation requirements. You are 
allowed a great deal of flexibility.
Some practitioners prefer to document items and judg­
ments that go beyond the requirements of SAS No. 82 
because they find this information useful in the event 
that others may ask how certain decisions were reached. 
Other practitioners prefer to limit their documentation 
to the minimum required. Refer to Part Three, Sample
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Communication 
Requirements
Documentation for examples of documentation (including 
documentation relating to the Internet Solutions case 
study) that demonstrate this range of possibility.
What information am I required to communicate to 
my clients, and what threshold needs to be crossed for 
that communication to be required?
The answer to that question is provided in paragraph 38 
of SAS No. 82, which says, in part:
Whenever the auditor has determined that there is evidence that 
fraud may exist, that matter should be brought to the attention 
of an appropriate level of management. This is generally appro­
priate even if the matter might be considered inconsequential, 
such as a minor defalcation by an employee at a low level in the 
entity’s organization.
Thus, the threshold for communication is “evidence that 
a fraud may exist.” The mere presence of a fraud risk 
factor generally does not meet this threshold.
For example, a single employee may have the authority 
to write checks and the responsibility to reconcile the 
bank account(s). Absent other controls, this lack of seg­
regation of duties may be a fraud risk factor that leaves 
the company vulnerable to the theft of cash. The identifi­
cation of this risk factor, by itself, is not required to be 
communicated to your client (although you may wish to 
do so as a client service matter.)
But suppose there is a delay of several weeks before the 
employee is able to provide you with a year-end bank 
reconciliation. When testing the reconciliation, you dis­
cover that certain canceled checks are missing. The 
employee is unable to offer an explanation other than the 
possibility that the bank made a mistake.
At this point you probably have evidence that a fraud 
may exist (namely, that the employee has stolen cash 
and attempted to conceal it by destroying the canceled 
check). Even though the theft may not be material to the 
financial statements, you should still bring the matter to 
the attention of management. Although not stated in SAS 
No. 82, the matter is usually brought to the attention of 
management in the context of, “Do you want us to pursue 
this further?” (Again, keep in mind that if the possible 
misstatement is immaterial and you perform additional 
procedures at your client’s request, these procedures fall 
outside of the GAAS financial statement audit.)
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Key Point. The communication threshold described in 
SAS No. 82 is different from the threshold previously 
established under SAS No. 53. The requirements under 
that previous statement were —
. . .the auditor should assure himself that the audit com­
mittee is adequately informed about any irregularities of 
which the auditor becomes aware during the audit 
unless those irregularities are clearly inconsequential. *•
The threshold for communication established by SAS No. 
82 is “evidenee that a fraud may exist. . .even if the mat­
ter is considered ineonsequential.” This is a lower thresh­
old than that established by the previous statement, and 
therefore you should expect to communicate more and 
different matters to management concerning fraud than 
you did in the past.
Also keep in mind that you are required to communicate 
reportable conditions, as defined in SAS No. 60, Commu­
nication of Internal Control Related Matters Noted in 
an Audit, to the entity’s audit committee or its equivalent. 
The existence of a fraud risk factor or several risk factors 
may lead to the identification of a reportable condition(s).
For clients with no audit committees, to whom should 
I address my communication?
Paragraph 38 of SAS No. 82 describes two situations in 
which an auditor should communicate directly with the 
audit committee:
• A fraud causes a material misstatement of the finan­
cial statements
• A fraud involves the senior management of the company
The SAS does not provide guidance in situations in which 
one of the above two conditions exists but the client does 
not have an audit committee.
In the author’s opinion, if you become aware of a fraud that 
causes a material misstatement of the financial statements 
and there is no audit committee, you should consider 
reporting that to senior management of the company.
The second situation is a bit more problematic. As a prac­
tical matter, if you become aware that an owner manager 
of a privately held company has committed fraud, you
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should consider the guidance contained in paragraph 36 
of SAS No. 82, which includes consideration of withdraw­
ing from the engagement. See Part One, Detection of Fraud 




Before continuing with this section, read the Internet 
Solutions Case Study in Appendix A.
Understandably, the auditor in the Internet Solutions 
case study chose not to be interviewed for the magazine 
article. The following is an interpretation, based on his 
testimony at Mr. Wilder’s trial, of how Internet’s auditor, 
Dan White, CPA, might have applied the guidance con­
tained in SAS No. 82.
Audit Planning. By virtue of the consulting work performed 
during the year, the auditor was able to gain an under­
standing of the nature of the client and the industry in 
which it operated. Referring to the example risk factors 
listed in paragraph 17a of SAS No. 82, Mr. White knew 
that the company planned to go public and that in order 
to do so it would need to report solid earnings. He knew 
that Mr. Wilder reported earnings projections to the 
board of directors. He was aware that the company had 
reported a steadily increasing earnings trend.
All of this information came to Mr. White during the normal 
course of audit planning, and it was used by him to draw 
some conclusions about overall engagement risk. To apply 
SAS No. 82, Mr. White also recognizes that this information 
indicates the possible presence of fraud risk factors.
At this point, it is impossible for him to determine whether 
the targeted operating results are “unduly aggressive” or 
whether Mr. Wilder has “an excessive interest to increase 
the company’s earnings trend.” But remember, the assess­
ment of material misstatement due to fraud is a cumula­
tive process, and over the course of the audit, Mr. White 
will gather additional information to help him judge whether 
the situation is “unduly aggressive” or “excessive.”
With regard to internal controls, Mr. White recognizes that 
management is dominated by a small group of individuals 
who probably could override any controls. He recognizes 
other control weaknesses and assesses control risk at the 
maximum, planning to perform a purely substantive audit. 
SAS No. 82 requires Mr. White also to consider controls 
within the context of an assessment of risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud.
49
At the planning stage of the audit, Mr. White decides that, 
no, these conditions do not represent a fraud risk factor 
but are merely a fact of life in a small, growing company. 
Again, he makes this initial decision knowing that it may 
change over the course of the audit as other information 
becomes known.
Many of the risk factors relating to industry conditions 
(SAS No. 82, paragraph 17b) are identified during audit 
planning, ineluding a declining industry and high vulner­
ability to rapidly changing technology. Mr. White’s first 
response is to identify inventory valuation as a high risk 
audit area. He also notes that these items are fraud risk 
factors to be considered in his initial assessment of the 
risk of material misstatement due to fraud.
During the planning phase of the audit, Mr. White does not 
identify any additional fraud risk factors. For the fraud 
risk factors identified, he must now make an assessment 
of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud and 
develop an appropriate response. He considers the fraud 
risk factors in combination and he identifies accounts 
receivable and inventory valuation to be the areas of 
primary audit concern. He further determines that the 
planned audit procedures in these areas are sufficient to 
provide reasonable assurance that a material misstate­
ment — whether caused unintentionally by error, or 
intentionally by fraud — will be detected.
However, based on this initial risk assessment, Mr. White 
plans two overall audit responses for this engagement. First, 
he plans to be more involved in the review and supervision 
of this audit than he would be on other audits. Second, 
he instructs the staff to be sure to obtain corroborating 
evidence for management’s explanations regarding the 
valuation of receivables and inventory. Both of these 
responses are in line with those described in SAS No. 82, 
paragraph 27.
Early Fieldwork. Mr. White visits the client early in 
the audit fieldwork to review workpapers and discuss the 
audit with Mr. Wilder. He reviews the preliminary analyti­
cal procedures performed by the staff. The first thing he 
notices is that the company has shown a healthy profit 
for the current year. Margins have held steady over the 
previous year, but volume has increased approximately 
15%. Inventory turnover is reasonable, but accounts 
receivable turnover has slowed considerably — receivable
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balances have increased significantly over the prior year. 
He also notices that the company has received a signifi­
cant amount of short-term financing.
It strikes him as unusual that a company that shows such 
an increase in profits would have to borrow so much money. 
He then reads an article about the company included in the 
planning workpapers. The article is highly favorable and 
notes that “Internet Solutions continued to post record 
profits while others in the industry struggle to compete.”
Mr. White discusses the progress of the audit with Mr. 
Wilder. Mr. White comments that the company has had a 
good year, and Mr. Wilder responds enthusiastically about 
the company’s product. Mr. White refines his question. 
He’s really curious about how the company was able to 
expand its volume while maintaining margins in a deteri­
orating industry. Mr. Wilder discusses how the company’s 
product is superior to the competition and he uses a lot 
of technical jargon to explain why. It occurs to Mr. White 
that the response wasn’t exactly what he was looking for, 
but he declines to pursue the matter further.
He asks about the short term borrowing, which sobers 
Mr. Wilder considerably. “There are times,” he says, 
“when growing businesses run short of cash.” He enlists 
Mr. White’s help in designing a cash management strategy. 
“We really have to generate some positive cash flow around 
here,” says Mr. Wilder.
Mr. White ends the conversation with general talk of the 
plans for the public offering. Mr. Wilder is convinced 
the offering will happen soon based on the company’s 
outstanding track record of revenue and earnings growth.
At the end of the day, Mr. White refleets on his experience 
at the client. Using the list of fraud risk factors in SAS No. 
82 as a memory jogger, he realizes that he has identified 
two more. The company has an inability to generate cash 
flows from operations in spite of reporting earnings and 
earnings growth. Also, compared with other companies in 
the same industry, Internet Solutions has experienced 
unusual profitability and growth. He considers that Mr. 
Wilder’s response to inquiries about these two anomalies 
was vague and unsatisfying.
He returns to his earlier questions as to whether the budgets 
and foreeasts made by the company early in the year were 
“unduly aggressive.” It seems odd that the company would
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forecast such growth in an industry widely recognized as 
in decline. For the first time he draws a link between Mr. 
Wilder’s desire to take the company public and the need 
for a positive earnings trend. He’s not sure Mr. Wilder’s 
interest is “excessive,” but clearly there’s an interest.
Though puzzling and somewhat troublesome, the identifi­
cation of additional risk factors is not enough to change 
Mr. White’s assessment of the risk of material misstate­
ment due to fraud. At this point, he believes the existing 
audit approach and planned procedures are sufficient.
Later Fieldwork. Mr. White returns to the client to review 
the accounts receivable fieldwork. He reviews the work 
performed on nonresponding confirmation replies, which 
consists of examining invoices and shipping documents 
supporting reported sales. He is struck by the following 
comment in the workpapers:
“While reviewing this shipping document, we noticed that the 
date of the shipment (10/2/XX) was different from the invoice 
date of 3/31/XX. We inquired of the controller, Mr. Stem, who 
indicated that the shipping date reported by the outside ware­
house was in error. He said he planned to seek a reimbursement 
from the warehouse company for the six months of storage 
charged on this item, and so the following audit adjustment is 
proposed. . . . ”
The workpapers included an audit adjustment to debit 
receivable from supplier and credit storage expense for 
six months of storage.
Previous identification of fraud risk factors had resulted 
in Mr. White displaying a high degree of professional 
skepticism when evaluating explanations made by man­
agement. He was skeptical of Mr. Stern’s explanation for 
the discrepancy in dates. If the dates were right and Mr. 
Stern was wrong, then the company had recognized 
revenue six months in advance of an actual sale.
Mr. White reviewed the scope of the audit team’s sales 
cut-off fieldwork. They looked at shipping documents five 
days before and five days after year-end to be sure the 
transactions were recorded as sales in the proper period. 
The procedures required the auditor to trace the shipping 
document to a numerical listing of sales invoices.
“On this sales cut-off fieldwork,” he asks the senior auditor, 
“did we ever tie down the date of the shipping report to 
the date of the invoice?”
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Chagrined, the senior says no, because that’s not what 
they did in last year’s audit.
“Do me a favor,” says Mr. White. “Trace these shipping docu­
ments to the actual invoices and compare dates. Look for 
large time lags between invoice dates and shipping dates.” 
From these actions we can see that the situation identified 
in the workpapers and Mr. Stern’s explanation has effective­
ly pushed Mr. White “over the edge.” He has evidence a 
fraud may exist. He is no longer convinced that his planned 
audit procedures are sufficient to provide reasonable assur­
ance that the financial statements are free of material 
misstatement due to fraud. Consequently, he extends his 
audit procedures.
He then reviews the confirmation replies. He notices that 
one reply (sent via fax) contains the first page only, but 
not the second page with the customer’s signature. “What 
happened here,” he asks the senior auditor.
She explains how the second page was sent during a time 
when the fax machine was out of paper, but that she 
called the customer and asked them to send another. She 
says that the customer indicated they never got the first 
confirmation request.
Mr. White goes on to review the other confirm replies and 
notices that a large number of them were faxed. “Have 




Mr. White understands that his previously identified fraud 
risk factors centered on the issues of profitability, sales, 
and accounts receivable. The faxed confirmation replies 
raise concerns about these same issues — enough of a 
concern for him to change his assessment of the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud. His planned audit 
procedures (accept a faxed confirmation reply) are insuf­
ficient to respond to this risk, so he decides to expand 
the procedures.
In analyzing this case study it is clear that, throughout the 
course of the audit, Mr. White identified fraud risk factors
4Paragraph 29 of SAS No. 67, The Confirmation Process, provides guidance on the 
procedures an auditor should consider when confirmation replies are faxed to 
the auditor.
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and made an assessment of the risk of material misstate­
ment due to fraud. That assessment was continually 
revisited throughout the course of the audit, and consid­
eration was given as to whether the planned audit proce­
dures were sufficient to reduce the risk to an acceptable 
level. Mr. White’s approach meets the requirements of 
SAS No. 82. For an illustration of how Mr. White complies 
with the documentation requirements of the SAS, refer to 
Part Three, Sample Documentation, Example #3.
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Internet Solutions Case Study
The article that follows is something you might find in a general business magazine. 
This case study illustrates many of the key issues identified in Part One of this publi­
cation. The events in this case study are based on a combination of several actual 
frauds. The magazine article, including names and places, is a work of fiction.
Internet Solutions Case Study
F R A U D
HAPPENS
—Former Wheatfield 
Hero to Serve 
Jail Time
Later this month, 
Norman Wilder, a former 
Wheatfield High Alumnus 
of the Year, will be sen­
tenced to jail in Denver.
The 52 year-old former 
president and founder of 
Internet Solutions, Inc. 
was convicted last fall of 
committing a blatant 
accounting fraud at his 
company, a small leading 
edge computer manufac­
turer located in the “High 
Tech Corridor” just out­
side of Denver.
Under Mr. Wilder’s direc­
tion, Internet Solutions 
recorded millions of dol­
lars in phony sales during 
the period leading up 
to their planned initial 
public stock offering. 
Once the fraud was dis­
covered by the outside 
auditing firm of White and
White, the investment 
firms who planned to 
underwrite the financing 
quickly backed out of the 
deal.
Oldest Fraud in the Book
Testifying at the trial, 
Lance N. Cassandra, a 
forensic accounting spe­
cialist described the 
scheme as “a classic 
revenue recognition 
accounting fraud.”
As Mr. Cassandra 
described it, Internet 
Solutions recorded $5 
million of revenue on 
products it supposedly 
shipped to customers. In 
truth, the goods were 
stored in a warehouse, 
becoming more obsolete 
with each passing day.
To conceal the fraud 
from outside auditors and 
directors, Wilder and his 
chief accountant forged 
customer signatures, 
altered and withheld criti­
cal documents, and took a 
hard line position with 
the auditors in an effort to 
discourage them from 
pursuing leads.
These tactics worked 
for a while, but in the 
end the fraud was discov­
ered. “In hindsight,” said 
Cassandra, “there were 
telltale signs of fraud all 
over the place. You had a 
guy [Wilder] obsessed 
with showing increased 
profits in a sagging indus­
try, increasing profits but 
no cash flow, and a very 
passive board of direc­
tors.”
When asked if he felt 
the auditors should have 
detected the fraud sooner, 
Cassandra responded, 
“It’s hard to find fraud 
perpetrated by top man­
agement, especially when 
they’re forging documents 
and lying to the auditors. 
On the contrary, I give the 
auditing firm a lot of cred­
it for figuring things out as 
soon as they did.”
Local Hero Gone Bad
It is hard for anyone 
who knows Mr. Wilder to 
imagine him committing 
such a crime. A self- 
described “former sci­
ence geek,” he graduated
Wheatfield Business Review
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from Wheatfield High 35 
years ago and received 
a full scholarship to 
the prestigious Zurich 
Technological Institute, 
where he earned his Ph.D. 
in Applied Electro-mag­
netism. Dr. Wolfgang 
Horstmann, dean of the 
physics department at 
ZTI recalls, “As a scientist 
there was a tremendous 
amount of integrity to his 
work. He was one of the 
few young people who 
really valued and respect­
ed the ethical norms of 
the profession.”
Five years ago, Mr. 
Wilder returned to 
Wheatfield where he was 
honored as the 
Wheatfield High “Alumni 
of the Year”. “He never 
forgot where his roots 
were. He was really a 
humble person. When I 
found out that he cheated 
people out of their money 
like that, I was in shock. 
Why did he do it?” said 




tion may have been that 
Mr. Wilder believed his 
company had to show 
significant revenue and 
profitability growth 
before he could sell stock 
to the public.
Debra MacDonald, 
Director of Sales for the 
company, was the one 
who finally divulged the 
scheme to the auditors 
and later became the star 
witness for the prosecu­
tion. She recalls Mr. 
Wilder being “obsessed 
with meeting his sales 
projections.”
She saw another side 
to Mr. Wilder, one kept 
carefully hidden from his 
friends in Wheatfield. 
“Norman was extremely 
driven,” says Ms. 
MacDonald. I think he 
really wanted to prove 
to people that he was 
successful.”
Mr. Cassandra agrees. 
Based on interviews he 
conducted with company 
staff, he concluded that, 
“Norman could be very 
unreasonable at times. 
Taking that company 
public was a mission for 
him. Not only would it 
have given him a lot of 
self-esteem — let’s face it, 
it would have also made 
him extremely rich.”
Zero to Hero
Mr. Wilder never imag­
ined himself as an entre­
preneur. After graduating 
from ZTI, he took a job 
teaching physics at State 
University. It was there 
that he first became
interested in the 
Internet, programming a 
website for the physics 
department just for fun 
over Christmas break.
An engineer at the 
local phone company 
stumbled across the site 
one day and was so 
impressed, she con­
vinced her boss to hire 
Mr. Wilder to improve 
the phone company’s 
website. He was more 
than up to the challenge.
Not content with 
merely programming a 
website, Mr. Wilder built 
an entire computer to 
serve as the company’s 
host. “It was the only 
way,” he said in an inter­
view with the Science 
Business Times. “They 
had so many different 
kinds of computer sys­
tems, so much software, 
it was easier for me to 
build a custom computer 
for them rather than do 
some half-baked patch 
job with some equip­
ment I can buy at a dis­
count retailer.”
He sold his computer to 
the phone company for 
the princely sum of 
$20,000.
A friend suggested that 
he quit his job as a 
university professor and 
start his own business.
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“Those early years 
were fun,” recalls Ms. 
MacDonald. “But there 
was also a lot of pressure 
just to pay the bills and 
keep the doors open. 
There were a couple of 
times Norman had to put 
the payroll on his credit 
card. Then we got the 
Post Office contract, and 
things really took off.”
Internet Solutions 
received a $2.5 million 
contract to design and 
install custom website 
servers for regional 
offices of the U.S. Post 
Office.
The problem was that 
technology was changing 
so quickly, even the large 
contract wasn’t enough 
for Mr. Wilder to spend 
all he needed to on addi­
tional research and 
development. But the 
contract with the Post 
Office gave the company 
a vital shot in the arm 
and established their 
credibility with outside 
investors. Soon Mr. 
Wilder was able to con­
vince wealthy individu­
als and small venture 
capitalists to back the 
company.
The days of meeting 
payroll with a credit card 
were over, but other trou­
bles loomed ahead.
The Slippery Slope to 
Fraud
“All that money made 
Norman feel incredibly 
responsible to those 
investors. I don’t think he 
was a greedy person at all, 
but he felt a true responsi­
bility to make sure those 
people’s faith in him was 
justified.”
Mr. Wilder began down 
the slippery slope of 
fraud in a fairly innocu­
ous way. All of his com­
pany’s products were 
custom built. Under the 
terms of the contract 
with the Post Office, the 
machines had to be test­
ed and approved by the 
customer before they 
would be accepted. Once 
accepted, they were 
physically moved to a 
secure spot in the com­
pany warehouse until 
the Post Office was ready 
to accept actual delivery.
At first, production of 
the machines and accep­
tance by the customers 
occurred at approximate­
ly the same time. But 
slowdowns at the Post 
Office and improvements 
in Internet Solutions’ 
production process grad­
ually increased the time 
between the completion 
of the units and their 
acceptance.
One quarter, the com­
pany was behind its sales 
goals previously reported 
to the investors. Mr. 
Wilder told his chief 
accountant, Oscar Stern, 
to record as sales the 
completed products that 
had not yet been accepted 
by the Post Office.
At the trial last fall Mr. 
Stern testified that under 
generally accepted
accounting principles, the 
sales revenue should not 
have been reported until 
the goods were actually 
accepted by the customer.
“Norman is a very intel­
ligent person,” says Ms. 
MacDonald. “But some­
times he’s too smart for 
his own good. He thinks 
he can tell accountants 
how to do their jobs even 
if he doesn’t have the 
slightest idea of what he’s 
talking about.”
In rationalizing his 
actions Mr. Wilder report­
edly told Mr. Stern, 
“Accounting is not sci­
ence, you know. It is com­
pletely arbitrary. So what 
difference does a couple 
of days make. By next 
week they will approve 
the products.”
Business Worsens
Even though unit sales 
appeared to be increas­
ing, the company was
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having trouble generating 
cash. The research and 
development costs con­
tinued to climb, just at a 
time when the market for 
Internet websites was 
beginning to soften.
Additionally, off-the- 
shelf website products 
had become more sophis­
ticated and flexible, mak­
ing it harder for potential 
customers to justify 
spending large amounts 
on Internet Solutions’ 
custom machines. Plans 
to take the company pub­
lic were delayed a year.
For some time, a group 
of outside investors had 
served as the company’s 
board of directors. In 
anticipation of eventually 
selling shares to the pub­
lic, the board hired the 
accounting firm of White 
and White to provide con­
sulting advice in the areas 
of cash management and 
internal controls.
Dan White was the 
engagement partner 
assigned to Internet 
Solutions. At the trial of 
Mr. Wilder he testified, 
“We were brought in 
during the spring to do 
some consulting work 
with the understanding 
that we would perform 
the year-end audit. It 
was a good opportunity 
for us because doing the
consulting work would 
allow us time to learn 
about the company and 
the industry in which it 
operates.”
Mr. White declined to 
be interviewed further for 
this article.
Unknown to Mr. White, 
while he and his staff 
were making recommen­
dations on bookkeeping 
software packages, the 
company was fabricating 
sales in its quarterly 
reports to the investors.
What began as a slight 
“cut-off’ problem of only a 
few days had deteriorated 
into forgery and blatant 
fraud. Production on new 
machines continued even 
in the absence of commit­
ments from customers.
At the end of one quar­
ter, with $400,000 of 
equipment sitting com­
plete on the shop floor, 
the potential buyer 
hadn’t even committed 
to purchase the product. 
Frantic, Mr. Wilder 
approached Ms. Mac­
Donald and pleaded with 
her to get the customer 
to sign a contract. “I told 
him that was impossible,” 
she said. “I’d already been 
pressuring the client to 
sign, and I was afraid if I 
put on too much of a 
hard sell, he’d back out 
completely.”
“I’ll talk to Oscar,” said 
Mr. Wilder, and he left her 
office. A few days later Ms. 
MacDonald received a 
purchase order on her 
desk, allegedly signed 
by her client, but the 
handwriting looked like 
Mr. Stem’s.
Ms. MacDonald decided 
not to say anything, and 
two weeks later the client 
called to say that he was 
ready to sign a contract 
and would like immediate 
delivery of the units.
To close another large 
sale, Mr. Wilder drafted a 
letter to the client saying 
that a $300,000 sale would 
be “contingent on our 
mutual agreement of the 
final contract.” In other 
words, the customer had 
not agreed to anything. 
Under the accounting 
rules, no sales transaction 
had occurred, but 
Internet Solutions report­
ed the income anyway.
On another occasion 
Ms. MacDonald wandered 
into Mr. Stern’s office and 
discovered several invoic­
es to customers she had 
never heard of, for sales 
she had never made. 
“Norman made these 
sales,” Mr. Stem told her.
When asked about his 
recent sales calls, Mr. 
Wilder told her that 
in order to meet the
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quarterly projections, 
he’d been forced to “hit 
the road and do some 
calling on friends of mine 
from the university days.”
Looking back on it, 
MacDonald admits that 
she should have realized 
Mr. Wilder was not telling 
the truth. “I’d been work­
ing with him for five years 
to make this business a 
success. I just wanted to 
believe him.”
Later, when she looked 
at a quarterly report to 
shareholders, she realized 
that much of the sales 
figures had been fabricat­
ed. But she didn’t say 
anything.
At the trial she defend­
ed her actions. “Who 
could I go to?” she asks. 
“Everyone else wanted to 
believe the numbers just 
as much as Norman did.”
Now she admits, “I was 
wrong. But we play these 
little games with our own 
integrity, rationalizing 
things away. I thought I 
would be disloyal if I con­
fronted Norman with 
what I knew, but I knew 
what he was doing was 
wrong. I knew Dan White 
would be coming out soon 
to do the audit, so I made 
a compromise with 
myself. I couldn’t be the 
one to make the first con­
tact, but if they came to
me and asked, I wasn’t 
going to lie.”
House of Cards
Dan White testified 
about the audit performed 
by White and White. 
“During the planning 
phase of our audit, we 
identified certain areas as 
posing a high risk. We 
noted that accounts 
receivable balances had 
increased significantly 
during the year, and we 
knew the market for 
Internet websites had 
declined considerably 
since the previous year.”
“Our workpapers also 
indicate that we noted a 
lack of cash flow from 
operations in spite of 
reported accrual-based 
profits.”
Initially, Mr. White was 
concerned about the ade­
quacy of the company’s 
reserves for bad debts and 
obsolete inventory. In the 
early stages of the audit 
Mr. White believed “the 
client posed a high overall 
engagement risk, but no, 
we did not suspect fraud 
at first.”
To prepare for the 
audit, Mr. Stern and Mr. 
Wilder prepared fake 
invoices and contracts. 
They doctored a shipping 
logbook, even using differ­
ent colored pens to make 
it appear as if entries had
been made on different 
days.
The White and White 
auditors prepared confir­
mation letters to send to 
Internet Solutions’ cus­
tomers, and these letters 
were signed by Mr. Wilder. 
Noting that the confirma­
tions asked if there were 
“any side agreements, 
written or oral with 
regard to purchases from 
Internet Solutions” Mr. 
Wilder pulled the confir­
mations addressed to cus­
tomers with whom he’d 
struck side deals. He also 
pulled the confirmations 
addressed to customers 
for whom he’d prepared 
fictitious invoices.
“It wasn’t that diffi­
cult,” said Mr. Cassandra. 
“The auditors put their 
confirmations in the com­
pany’s outgoing mail bas­
ket, and during lunch 
time, Norm Wilder just 
removed the ones he 
didn’t want sent out.”
Several days later, Mr. 
Wilder forged a signature 
on the confirmation and 
faxed his response to the 
auditors directly at their 
office.
Two things happened to 
finally tip the auditors off 
to the massive fraud. The 
first was simply the result 




forms prepared by Mr. 
Wilder was sent to the 
White and White office 
after hours, a ploy to 
make it appear as if it had 
come from the west coast. 
The fax machine ran out 
of paper, and with no one 
to replace it, the second 
page of the confirmation, 
which contained the 
forged signature, never 
arrived.
The next day, realizing 
what had happened, a 
staff person on the 
engagement called the 
customer to ask them to 
send a copy of their reply. 
The customer was con­
fused. She stated that she 
had never received the 
request in the first place.
The second instance 
was an example of 
“good auditing” accord­
ing to testimony by 
Mr. White.
One of the firm’s staff 
people was performing 
routine audit work, 
checking shipping docu­
ments. On one shipping 
report, she noticed a 
charge for six months 
storage on an order that 
had been recorded as a
sale during the first quar­
ter of the year. When 
asked about this, Mr. 
Stern replied that it must 
have been some kind of 
mistake.
“There were several 
things that didn’t quite 
add up for me,” said Mr. 
White. “We decided to 
expand our fieldwork at 
that point and look at 
more shipping documents 
than we normally would 
have. I also instructed 
the staff to call all cus­
tomers for whom we had 
received faxed confirma­
tion replies.”
When those additional 
procedures yielded more 
questions than answers, 
Mr. Cassandra was called 
in to investigate further. 
Saddened and Stunned
Mr. Cassandra special­
izes in fraud investiga­
tions. “Usually by the 
time I’m called in every­
one’s pretty sure a fraud 
has been committed.”
He didn’t have to look 
very far to confirm his 
suspicions. His first task 
was to question Ms. 
MacDonald, who kept the 
bargain she had made
earlier with herself and 
told Mr. Cassandra all 
she knew.
“I was so relieved when 
someone finally asked me 
those questions.” She had 
saved copies of the ques­
tionable documents pre­
pared by Stern and 
Wilder, and she gave these 
to Mr. Cassandra.
They were all he need­
ed to bring the house 
of cards crashing to the 
ground.
Ms. MacDonald is still 
saddened by what 
happened. “I worked so 
many years for Norman 
and that company. Now 
what am I supposed 
to do?”
In Wheatfield, civic 
leaders still express shock 
over what happened. “It’s 
just a very sad situation,” 
says Ms. Freeman. 
“Norman was a role 
model for our kids — I 
can’t tell you how popular 
he was — and now they’re 
so ashamed. He really let 
us down.”
Sentencing guidelines 
call for Mr. Wilder to 
receive up to ten years; 




Fraud Risk Factors 
AND G uidance
Part Two
I n trod uction
Background SAS No. 82 requires you to consider risk factors and other 
conditions in assessing the risk of material misstatement 
due to fraud and it provides examples of risk factors and 
other conditions. The SAS defines broad risk factor 
categories in paragraphs 16 and 18 and it lists detailed 
examples of risk factors within these categories in para­
graphs 17 and 19. The detailed example risk factors are 
just that — examples. They are meant to be generic 
or, in other words, geared to apply to most enterprises. 
However, there’s certainly no “one size fits all” approach 
to assessing risk of material misstatement due to fraud. 
For that reason, you are allowed flexibility in tailoring the 
risk factors to your particular clients, as long as they 
embody the substance of the broad risk factor categories 
described in paragraphs 16 and 18 of the statement.
What is
Part Two About?
This Part of the practice guide includes example industry- 
specific fraud risk factors and other conditions that have 
been developed by AICPA Accounting and Auditing 
Publications staff in consultation with members of the 
AICPA industry committees. Industry-specific fraud risk 
factors may be identified throughout the entire engagement 
process (e.g., during client acceptance/continuance proce­
dures, planning, field work, or review). Other conditions, 
which may support or alter your judgement about the 
risk of material misstatement due to fraud, may be iden­
tified during audit field work. The fraud risk factors and 
conditions presented in Part Two are intended to help you 
tailor the five broad risk factor categories defined in SAS 
No. 82 for your clients in various industries. The guidance 
in Part Two supplements the risk factors, other conditions, 
and related guidance found in the SAS. It is a companion 
to but not a substitute for the guidance in the SAS.
A Caveat The illustrative listings of industry-specific fraud risk factors 
and other conditions should not be used exclusively in 
considering and identifying fraud risk factors and other 
conditions that may be identified in an audit. Rather, 
your identification of the presence of such factors and 
conditions should be based on sound and careful consid­
eration of the circumstances that are particular to every 
engagement. These industry-specific fraud risk factors 
and other conditions are only examples. They are not an
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I Found a 
Risk Factor!
all-encompassing inventory of fraud risk factors and other 
conditions that may be encountered in every industry. 
Furthermore, the presence of these example risk factors 
and other conditions identified during the engagement 
does not necessarily indicate the existence of fraud.
When fraud risk factors or other conditions are found to 
be present during the engagement, professional judgment 
should be exercised when assessing their significance and 
relevance. As you assess the risk of material misstatement, 
keep in mind that the presence of a risk factor or condition 
should not be considered in isolation, but rather in com­
bination with other risk factors and conditions or mitigat­
ing circumstances. For instance, the presence of easily con­
vertible assets, such as bearer bonds, represents a risk 
factor that may be mitigated by controls such as physical 
safeguards, adequate record keeping, and independent 
review of such records.
Please refer to Part One for a more detailed discussion of 
the SAS’s requirements. Part One includes guidance on 
considering fraud risk factors and other conditions, 
assessing the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, 
and developing a response to the assessed risk. It also 
guides you through documentation and communication 
requirements of the SAS.
Organization of 
Part Two
Risk Factors and Other Conditions
The industry-specific sections that follow include inter­
pretations of some of the SAS’s example risk factors tailored 
to particular industries. Also included are additional risk 
factors and other conditions that fall within the broad 
risk factor categories of the SAS. Other than the “Small, 
Privately Owned Businesses” section, the fraud risk factors 
reprinted from the SAS appear in italics. Interpretations 
of these risk factors and additional risk factors and other 
conditions appear in Roman type. The “Small, Privately 
Owned Businesses” section presents those SAS No. 82 
example risk factors most relevant to small, privately owned 
businesses, as well as additional example risk factors.
Every industry-specific section should be used in con­
junction with SAS No. 82 because example risk factors 
in paragraphs 17 and 19 of SAS No. 82 not interpreted or 





this section. However, the example risk factors not 
reprinted may be applicable to your client.
For some industries, the guidance includes some suggested 
alternative procedures to consider when fraud risk factors 
and other conditions are present. Like the fraud risk factors 
and conditions in this Part, these suggestions supplement 
the responses described in SAS No. 82. (For additional 
suggestions on alternative audit procedures, see Part Three, 
Common Frauds and Extended Audit Procedures, of 
this book.)
How to Use 
Part Two in 
Identifying the 
Presence of Risk 
Factors and 
Other Conditions
1) Read SAS No. 82 in its entirety and carefully review 
the risk factor categories and example risk factors 
found in paragraphs 16 through 19.
2) Read Part One of this book, “Identifying Fraud Risk 
Factors."
3) Consider the example risk factors and other conditions 
described in this section for your client’s industry.
4) Consider other conditions identified throughout the 
audit engagement that may alert you to the possibility 
that material misstatements due to fraud may exist.
6S





Over the Control 
Environment
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts 
that cause a material misstatement of financial statements. 
Some of the following factors and conditions will be 
present in institutions where the specific circumstances 
do not present a risk o f material misstatement. Also, 
specific controls may exist which mitigate the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk 
factors or conditions are present. When identifying risk 
factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in 
combination, present a risk of material misstatement of 
the financial statements.
•  An excessive interest by management in maintaining 
or increasing the institution’s stock price or earnings 
trend through the use of unusually aggressive 
accounting practices.
— Unusually aggressive recognition of income related 
to complex lending arrangements or capital mar­
kets transactions.
— Unusually aggressive interpretation of authoritative 
guidance related to hedge accounting.
•  A failure by management to display and communicate 
an appropriate attitude regarding internal control 
and the financial reporting process.
— Lack of Board/management oversight of critical 
processes, such as:
► Intercompany/Interbranch Cash/Suspense (“I/O”) 
Accounts and “Internal” demand deposit 
accounts (“DDAs”) — monitoring of activity and 
resolution of aged items.
► Lending — ineffective risk review function or one 
that lacks independence.
5 Refer to the “Introduction” of this Part for guidance on how to use this section.
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► Treasury — securities/derivatives valuation (selec­
tion of models, methodologies and assumptions)6.
► Regulatory Compliance — serious lack of knowl­
edge of pertinent regulations.
► Deposits — lack of monitoring unusual and 
significant activity.
► Customer Acceptance — failure to establish 
sound and effective due diligence procedures 
on potential new customers.
— Management’s failure to establish independent 
reporting lines for key assurance functions (e.g., 
internal audit, risk review, appraisal group, etc.).
— Lack of Board approved credit (underwriting and 
administration) policies.
— Substantially weak CAMEL (BOPEC for bank hold­
ing companies) ratings.
•  Management displaying a significant disregard for 
regulatory authorities.
— Existence of a regulatory cease and desist order, 
memorandum of understanding or other regulatory 
agreements (whether formal or informal), that con­
cern management competence or internal control.
•  Nonfinancial management's excessive participation 
in, or preoccupation with, the selection of accounting 
principles or the determination of significant estimates.
— Excessive consideration of “business issues” (e.g., 
shareholder expectations) in determining the 
allowance for loan losses methodology and related 
significant assumptions.
— Unusual propensity to enter into complex collateral 
disposition agreements.
•  Strained relationship between management and the 
current or predecessor auditor.
— Frequent disputes with current or predecessor 
auditors regarding the reasonableness of sensitive
6 For more information on derivatives refer to Derivatives — Current Accounting 
and Auditing Literature (AIPCA Product #014888) and Internal Control Issues 
in Derivatives Usage: An Information Tool fo r  Considering the COSO Internal 
Control Integrated Framework in Derivatives Applications.
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estimates (allowance for loan losses, recourse liabil­
ities, deferred loan origination costs, prepayment 
assumptions on mortgage-related assets, etc.).
•  High degree of competition or market saturation, 
accompanied by declining margins.
— A very large increase in the returns on investment 
products offered by competitors, that are close 
alternatives for the institution’s deposit products 
(e.g., mutual funds, insurance annuities, etc.), 
accompanied by declining margins.
•  Rapid changes in the industry, such as high vulnera­
bility to rapidly changing technology or rapid product 
obsolescence.
— A failure or inability to keep pace with the rapid 
growth in electronic banking, if the financial stabili­
ty or profitability of the particular institution is 
placed at risk due to that failure or inability.
— Deteriorating economic conditions (declining cor­
porate earnings, adverse exchange movements, real 
estate prices, etc.) within industries or geographic 
regions where the institution has significant credit 
concentrations.
— Significant volatility (interest rates, foreign exchange 
rates, commodity prices, etc.) in financial markets 
where the institution has a significant capital mar­
kets presence.
— For credit unions, losing a very substantial portion 
of the membership base which places considerable 
pressure on management, insofar as financial pro­
jections are often based upon gaining new members.
•  Significant related party transactions not in the 
ordinary course of business or with related entities 
not audited or audited by another firm.
— Concentrations of substantial loans and other trans­
actions with directors, significant shareholders, 
affiliates, and other related parties, particularly 
those involving favorable terms.
— Significant purchases of assets by directors and 





•  Unrealistically aggressive sales or profitability incen­
tive programs.
— Unrealistically aggressive loan goals and highly 
lucrative incentive programs for loan originations.
— A very large decrease in lending rates that are 
unaccompanied by decreases in the general level 
of interest rates.
— Unusually high increase in deposit rates, unattrib­
utable to a general interest rate increase.
In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No.
82, an auditor may want to consider the following response.
Allowance for Loan Losses
If an auditor concludes that the allowance for loan losses is 
a significant estimate that is based on unusually subjective 
judgments and further concludes that a risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud exists, it may be necessary to 
modify the procedures used to audit the allowance for 
loan losses. Such an approach might involve more detailed 
analytical procedures (such as analyzing specific credit 
lines rather than the portfolio taken as a whole), increasing 
the sample size of loans sufficiently to reach a conclusion 
as to the accuracy of credit risk ratings and the adequacy 
of specific loan loss allowances. Consideration should 
also be given to increasing confirmation coverage when 
existence is questioned.
M isappropiation  of A ssets
An auditor's interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts 
that cause a material misstatement of financial statements. 
Some of the following factors and conditions will be 
present in institutions where the specific circumstances 
do not present a risk o f m aterial misstatement. Also, 
specific controls may exist which mitigate the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk 
factors or conditions are present. When identifying risk 
factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in 
combination, present a risk of material misstatement of 
the financial statements.
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Banks, Savings Institutions, and Credit Unions
A. Controls Lack of appropriate management oversight.
— Vacant branch manager positions or branch man­
agers away on leave without replacement for an 
inordinate amount of time, causing a considerable 
lack of management oversight.
Lack of job applicant screening procedures relating to 
employees with access to assets susceptible to 
misappropriation.
— FBI background checks, credit reports, and bond- 
ability screening not incorporated into the hiring 
process for employees with access to significant 
assets susceptible to misappropriation.
Lack of appropriate segregation of duties or indepen­
dent checks.
— Lack of independent monitoring of activity in inter­
nal demand deposit accounts (“DDAs”).
— No independent monitoring and resolution of customer 
exceptions/inquiries related to EFT transactions, 
loan disbursements/payments, customer deposit 
accounts, securities/derivatives transactions, and 
trust/fiduciary accounts.
— Lack of key periodic independent reconciliations 
(in addition to reconciliations of subledgers to the 
G/L) between:
► EFT — daily transaction batch totals and the EFT 
system
► Treasury — daily trading logs and the treasury 
system
► Treasury — treasury system securities/derivatives 
positions and custodian records
► Trust/Fiduciary — assets recorded on the 
trust/fiduciary system and sub-custodians and 
sub-agent records
► Vault — vault asset register and both pre-numbered 
asset receipts and customer/bank asset records
► Retail Branch — teller/branch counts of 
cash/negotiable instruments and the related bal­
ancing reports
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Lack of segregation of duties in the following areas:
► EFT — origination, processing, confirmation and 
record keeping.
► Lending — relationship management, underwrit­
ing (including approval), processing, cash collec- 
tion/disbursement and record keeping.
► Treasury — trading, processing, settlement and 
record keeping.
► Trust — relationship management, transaction 
authorization, transaction execution, settlement, 
custody, and account record keeping.
► Fiduciary — issuance, registration, transfer, can­
cellation and record keeping.
Independent or objective internal appraisals not 
performed on collateral related to real estate loans 
as part of the underwriting process.
Gash payments to securities/derivatives counter 
parties are not executed through an independent 
settlement/operations area.
No periodic independent validation of derivatives 
pricing models.
The derivatives/securities positions on the Treasury 
system are not priced by an independent opera­
tions area.
The capital markets risk management process is 
not independent from the trading function or the 
independent risk management function does not 
have the appropriate level of sophistication or the 
capability to effectively monitor and measure the 
risks related to capital markets activities.
No periodic confirmation of customer loan informa­
tion or indebtedness by personnel independent of 
the relationship officer.
Significant teller/branch cash shortages/overages 
are not aged and independently resolved.
No annual review of the activity in trust accounts 
by an investment committee to ensure compliance 
with the terms of the trust agreement and bank 
investment guidelines.
Employees (who have access to assets susceptible to 
misappropriation) that are known to have bounced
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Remember
checks or have difficulty maintaining minimum 
balances within their personal accounts (This type 
of activity within employee personal accounts is 
typically identified through an institution’s internal 
audit testing).
Case in Point. An employee working in the check clear­
ing Junction processes transactions and encodes them to 
individual accounts. This same employee also has respon­
sibility over the general ledger suspense account related 
to check clearing. Taking advantage of the situation, 
this employee ensured that his personal account and his 
family's accounts were never debited for any transactions; 
imbalances were fixed through the general ledger suspense 
account. A material misstatement of the financial state­
ments occurred due to these fraudulent acts.
Had the institution maintained a better process of 
reviewing employee accounts, this fraud may have been 
detected. Based on his risk assessment, an auditor may 
want to determine the adequacy of the process an insti­
tution has established for reviewing employee, Board 
and “associated’’ accounts. Many fraudulent activities 
are run through an employee’s own account or the 
account of a relative or friend.
Also, periodic tests to identify accounts with duplicate 
addresses might uncover fictitious accounts used by 
employees to cover fraudulent activities.
Such fraud is unlikely to be detected if such accounts 
are not reviewed by the institution.
SAS No. 82 does not require an auditor to plan the audit 
to discover information that is indicative of financial 
stress of employees or adverse relationships between the 
institution and its employees. If the auditor becomes 
aware of the existence of such information, he should 
consider it in addressing the risk of material misstate­
ment arising from misappropriation of assets.
•  Lack of appropriate system of authorization and
approval of transactions.
— No verification of EFT transaction initiation and 




bank employees initiate a transaction on a 
customer’s behalf.
— Frequent underwriting exceptions to Board estab­
lished credit authorization limits.
— Frequent instances of cash disbursements on loans 
that have not yet received all approvals or met all 
preconditions for funding.
— Lack of Board approval for significant loans or 
unusually high loan officer approval limits. (Be alert 
to the existence of multiple loans being funded just 
below a loan officer’s limit.)
•  Poor physical safeguards over cash, investments, 
inventory or fixed assets.
— Lack of adequate physical security over the EFT 
operations area and customer records.
— Access to the vault is not appropriately limited to 
authorized employees acting within the scope of 
their job.
• Lack of accountability over negotiable instruments and 
inadequate training of tellers regarding controls over 
those instruments.
In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No. 
82, an auditor may want to consider the following 
response.
“Internal" DDA Accounts
The auditor may have concluded that a risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud exists with regard to the lack 
of independent monitoring over the activity in “internal” 
DDAs (those bank DDA accounts where bank employees 
have authority to write checks). In this instance, the 
auditor might modify his audit procedures by stratifying 
the population of checks written by dollar amount and 
selecting a sample of checks from the highest stratum.
The auditor would test each check for proper authoriza­
tion, noting whether the purpose for the disbursement 
appeared to be within the scope of the employee’s responsi­
bility and supported by appropriate evidential matter.
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Over the Control 
Environment
An auditor's interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts 
that cause a material misstatement of financial statements. 
Some of the following factors and conditions will be 
present in entities where the specific circumstances 
do not present a risk o f material misstatement. Also, 
specific controls may exist which mitigate the risk of 
material misstatement due to fr aud, even though risk 
factors or conditions are present. When identifying risk 
factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in 
combination, present a risk of material misstatement of 
the financial statements.
•  A motivation for management to engage in fraudulent 
financial reporting.
— The structure of incentive plans induces traders to 
take unusually greater risks.
— Unusually high level of internal competition for 
capital allocation among product types/trading 
desks.
•  A failure by management to display and communicate 
an appropriate attitude regarding internal control 
and the financial reporting process.
— A failure by management and the Board of 
Directors to set parameters (i.e., trading limits, 
credit limits, aggregate market risk limits) and con­
tinuously monitor trading activities against those 
parameters.
— A failure by management to ensure that the brokers 
are properly trained, appropriately licensed and 
adequately supervised.
— Lack of policies and training on derivatives, retail 
sales and other sales practices.
— Lack of sufficient access controls for front-office 
and back-office systems.




— Lack of adequate “Chinese Wall” between invest­
ment banking and trading (i.e., insider trading).
— Failure to monitor the filling of customer orders 
from the firm’s inventory (i.e., front-running, and 
excessive mark-up).
— Lack of review of customer lists and insufficient 
controls surrounding the customer account 
approval and maintenance process for both cash 
and margin accounts.
— Lack of Board approval and a specialist’s independent 
evaluation of in-house developed valuation models.
— A failure by management to assess the quality and 
breadth of the company’s internal audit department, 
to ensure that the department receives adequate 
training and resources to match the sophistication 
and progression of the company.
•  An excessive interest by management in maintaining 
or increasing the entity’s stock price or earnings 
trend through the use of unusually aggressive 
accounting practices.
— Unusually aggressive interpretation of regulatory 
rules (i.e., Net Capital Rules and Weekly Reserve 
Formula) when the company is reaching minimum 
Net Capital required by the SEC.
• A failure by management to have an adequate understand­
ing of the entity’s trading and investment strategies as 
conducted by the entity’s traders, including the types, 
characteristics, and risks associated with the financial 
products purchased and sold by the entity.
•  High degree of competition or market saturation, 
accompanied by declining margins.
— High degree of competition relating to bank-owned 
broker-dealers that have been granted expanded 
powers to engage in securities activities, registered 
investment companies/mutual funds, accompanied 
by declining margins. •
•  Rapid changes in the industry, such as high vulnera­
bility to rapidly changing technology or rapid product 
obsolescence.
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— A failure or inability to keep pace with the rapid 
growth in electronic trading, if the financial stabili­
ty or profitability of the particular entity is placed 
at risk, due to that failure or inability.
• Unusually high level of “soft dollar” brokerage activities.
•  Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions,
especially those close to year end that pose difficult
“substance over form ” questions.
— Unusually significant increase in unsettled trades at 
year end.
In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No.
82, an auditor may want to consider the following responses.
— Extend confirmation procedures concerning agree­
ments with counterparties (e.g., leases, clearing, 
custody, margin, subordinated debt).
— Extend confirmation procedures concerning the 
terms of selected transactions (e.g., swaps, financ­
ing transactions, fails) with counterparties.
— Review the results of valuation testing performed 
by departments of the company (i.e., controllers, 
internal audit and middle office).
— Review background information about the board 
of directors and management to determine if 
they have the capacity to understand trading and 
investment strategies. Conversations with appro­
priate people and review of the board’s and 
management’s experience and credentials may 
be necessary.
— Review management summary reports on perfor­
mance and meet with management to discuss 
trading and business direction.
— Perform periodic reviews of valuation methodologies 
by independent specialists throughout the year.
— Meet with middle office personnel to gain an under­
standing of the company’s policies concerning 
managing risk (e.g., stress testing, valuations, etc.).
— Extend testing on regulatory computations for 
companies barely meeting the minimum net capital 
requirements.
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— Extend testing of the entity’s “soft dollar” arrange­
ments to ensure compliance with SEC rules and 
regulations.
M isappropriation of Assets
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fr a udulent acts 
that cause a material misstatement of financial statements. 
Some of the following factors and conditions will be 
present in entities where the specific circumstances 
do not present a risk of m aterial m isstatem ent Also, 
specific controls may exist which mitigate the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk 
factors or conditions are present. When identifying risk 
factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in 
combination, present a risk of material misstatement of 
the financial statements.
A. Susceptibility of 
Assets to 
Misappropriation
Large amounts of securities (e.g., bearer instruments) 
held in the company’s vault.
Commingling of customer securities with the entity’s 
securities at a custodian bank.
B. Controls Lack of appropriate management oversight.
— Lack of management oversight of extensive retail 
branches, or overseas branches and subsidiaries.
— Inadequate supervision of traders’ trading practices 
and limits, especially for those generating a large 
proportion of the entity’s total revenue.
Lack of appropriate segregation of duties or indepen­
dent checks.
— Lack of segregation of duties between the front- 
office (i.e., execution of trades) and the back-office 
(i.e., settlement and accounting for trades).
— Lack of independent review of periodic reconcilia­
tions (e.g., settlement accounts, cash accounts, 
stock record, etc.).
— Failure to confirm failed transactions on a timely 
basis.
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Brokers and Dealers in Securities
C. Auditor 
Responses
— Failure to periodically review items in suspense 
accounts.
— Failure to review the aging of items, including failed 
transactions and receivables.
— Lack of or infrequent independent pricing of inven­
tory performed by middle-office or back-office (i.e., 
Risk Management and Controller’s group).
•  Poor physical safeguards over cash, investments, 
inventory or fixed assets.
— Lack of safeguarding and insuring securities in 
transfer.
— Lack of sufficient access controls for cash wiring 
systems.
•  Lack of timely and appropriate documentation for 
transactions.
— Lack of documentation related to “soft dollar” bro­
kerage activities.
— Lack of documentation related to derivative trans­
actions with counter parties, such as ISDA Master 
Agreements.
In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No.
82, an auditor may want to consider the following responses.
• Review exception/break reports for settlement activities.
• Ensure that the compliance function reviews the per­
sonal account statements of the company’s brokers 
and traders.
• Review registration statements of individual traders, 
account representatives and principals.
• Extend testing of access controls of on-line fund wiring 
system terminals.
• Review revenue trend of an individual trader over a 
period of time.








Over the Control 
Environment
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts 
that cause a material misstatement of financial statements. 
Some of the following factors and conditions will be 
present in entities where the specific circumstances 
do  n o t p resen t a  r is k  o f  m a ter ia l m issta tem en t. Also, 
specific controls may exist which mitigate the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk 
factors or conditions are present. When identifying risk 
factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in 
combination, present a risk of material misstatement of 
the financial statements.
•  A motivation for management to engage in fraudulent 
financial reporting.
— Senior management of the plan sponsor appoints 
itself trustee of the plan and uses that position to 
benefit the plan sponsor, for example uses the plan’s 
money to do speculative investing or to support 
the company through buying employer assets, or 
supporting a supplier.
•  A failure by management to display and communi­
cate an appropriate attitude regarding internal 
control and the financial reporting process.
— Failure by management to have adequate valua­
tions performed, including actuarial valuations.
— The plan administrator lacks an understanding 
of the major regulations that govern the plans 
(i.e, ERISA, IRS Code, etc.).
•  Management displaying a significant disregard for 
regulatory authorities.
— Management displaying a significant disregard toward 
compliance with ERISA and Internal Revenue Code 
and Department of Labor regulations.




— The plan administrator or trustees have been 
investigated by the Department of Labor or IRS 
for fiduciary violations in operating the plan.
• Lack of management candor in dealing with plan par­
ticipants, claimants, actuaries, and auditors regarding 
decisions that could have an impact on plan assets 
including restructuring or downsizing arrangements.
• The plan has participated in a voluntary compliance 
program in conjunction with the IRS or DOL (Such 
participation could be an indication of ineffective 
management of the plan or controls over the plan.).
•  Declining industry with increasing business failures 
and significant declines in customer demand.
— The plan sponsor is in an industry that is declining 
in stability and which could lead to difficulties
in meeting financial commitments to the plan 
including contributions.
• The plan holds employer securities and the employer 
is in an industry in which the value of the securities is 
subject to significant volatility or is not readily deter­
minable.
• The plan has limited investment options or the plan 
has invested significantly in employer securities or 





•  Significant related-party transactions not in the 
ordinary course of business or with related entities 
not audited or audited by another firm.
— Indications of significant or unusual parties-in-inter­
est transactions not in the ordinary course of opera­
tions.




In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No. 
82, an auditor in an employee benefit plan audit engage­
ment may want to consider the following responses. •
• Investment Results. Obtain the requisite investment 
information directly from the plan trustee, and obtain
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the same information from the party named as having 
discretion to make investment decisions, such as the 
plan administrator, the plan’s investment committee, 
or the plan’s investment advisor (the directing party) 
and review and reconcile the directing party’s reports 
(investment position and activity) with those of 
the trustee.
• Claim Reserves. Confirm, with third parties, the histor­
ical and statistical information that is being used to 
prepare the reserves. Review the qualifications of the 
individuals preparing the reserves.
• Apply the following procedures to fully understand a 
party in interest transaction:9
— Confirm transaction amount and terms, including 
guarantees and other significant data, with the 
other party or parties to the transaction.
— Inspect evidence in possession of the other party or 
parties to the transaction.
— Confirm or discuss significant information with 
intermediaries, such as banks, guarantors, agents, 
or attorneys, to obtain a better understanding of 
the transaction.
— Refer to financial publications, trade journals, credit 
agencies, and other information sources when there 
is reason to believe that unfamiliar customers, sup­
pliers, or other business enterprises with which 
material amounts of business have been transacted 
may lack substance.
— With respect to material uncollected balances, 
guarantees, and other obligations, obtain informa­
tion about the financial capability of the other party 
or parties to the transaction. Such information may 
be obtained from audited financial statements, 
unaudited financial statements, income tax returns, 
and reports issued by regulatory agencies, taxing 
authorities, financial publications, or credit agencies. 
The auditor should decide on the degree of assur­
ance required and the extent to which available 
information provides such assurance.
9 See Chapter 11 of the AICPA Audit and Accounting Guide, Audits o f Employee 
Benefit Plans, for further audit guidance.
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Employee Benefit P lans
For single employer plans, obtain the most recent 
financial statements of the plan sponsor and review for 
indicators of financial difficulties. For multi-employer 
plans obtain an understanding of the industry.
M isappropriation of Assets
A. Controls
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts 
that cause a material misstatement of financial statements. 
Some of the following factors and conditions will be 
present in entities where the specific circumstances 
do not present a risk o f m aterial misstatement. Also, 
specific controls may exist which mitigate the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk 
factors or conditions are present. When identifying risk 
factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in 
combination, present a risk of material misstatement of 
the financial statements.
•  Lack of appropriate management oversight.
— Lack of review of investment transactions by 
trustees, sponsor, or investment committee.
— Lack of appropriate segregation of duties or inde­
pendent checks.
— Lack of independent preparation and review of rec­
onciliations of trust assets to participant accounts 
or accounting records of the plan.
•  Lack of segregation of duties related to benefit payments,
contributions, investment transactions, and loans.
— No independent records of the plan are maintained 
to enable the plan administrator to periodically 
check the information to the custodian.
•  Lack of appropriate system of authorization and
approval of transactions.
— Insufficient approval over transactions with 






•  Lack of timely and appropriate documentation for 
transactions.
— Trustee does not prepare required supplemental 
information (e.g., historical cost records not 
maintained).
• Lack of controls surrounding benefit payments includ­
ing the termination of payments in accordance with 
plan provisions.
• Lack of appropriate segregation of plan assets from the 
sponsor’s assets or inappropriate access to plan assets 
by plan sponsor.
• SAS No. 70 report indicates a lack of adequate controls 
at an outside service provider.
• Use of a service provider that does not provide a 
SAS No. 70 report.
• Unreconciled differences between net assets available 
for benefits per the trustee/custodian records and the 
recordkeeping amounts for a defined contribution plan 
(unallocated assets or liabilities).
In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No.
82, an auditor in an employee benefit plan audit engage­
ment may want to consider the following responses. •
• Review reconciliations of the assets held by the trust 
with participant records throughout the year. Review 
any reconciling adjustments for propriety.
• Review the account activity for participants who have 
access to plan assets or assist in administering the plan.
• The auditor may have concluded that a risk of material 
misstatement exists with regard to a lack of a qualified 
outside service provider acting as trustee and/or custo­
dian for plan assets. In these instances, the auditor 
should physically inspect assets and examine other 
evidence relating to ownership. In addition, the fair 
value of investments should be tested by reference to 
market quotations or other evidence of fair value in 
accordance with SAS No. 57, Auditing Accounting 
Estimates.
• The auditor may have concluded that a risk of material 
misstatement exists with regard to unreconciled differ­
ences between net assets available for benefits per the
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trustee/custodian records and the record keeping amounts 
for a defined contribution plan. If the trustee/custodian 
records are higher than the record keeping totals (exclud­
ing accrual adjustments) an unallocated asset exists 
that should be allocated to participant accounts. If the 
trustee/custodian records are lower than the record 
keeping totals (excluding accrual adjustments), plan 
assets may have been misappropriated requiring further 
investigation by the auditor (e.g., reconciliation of monthly 
trustee/custodian activity to the record keeper).
The auditor may have concluded that a risk of material 
misstatement exists with regard to remittance of 
employee contributions for a defined contribution plan 
with a sponsor experiencing cash flow problems. In 
this instance, the auditor may perform a reconciliation 
of total employee contributions per the payroll register 
to the record keeping report for the year. In addition, 
the auditor may select certain months to test for the 
timely remittance of employee contributions in accor­
dance with regulations.
The auditor may have concluded that a risk of material 
misstatement exists with regard to expenses being paid 
by an overfunded defined benefit plan on behalf of an 
underfunded plan. In this instance, the auditor might 
select expense amounts paid by the overfunded plan 
and trace them to specific invoices noting that the 
expense pertained to the proper plan. Alternatively, the 
auditor could also ask to review expense invoices per­
taining to the underfunded plan paid by the company 
to make sure the overfunded plan did not pay them.
Review the timeliness of contributions from the plan 
sponsor throughout the year.
Compare canceled checks to disbursement records. 
Where benefits are paid by check disbursements, 
compare the signature on the canceled check to 
participant signatures on other employee documents.
Confirm benefit payments with participants or 
beneficiaries.
Confirm medical bills directly with service providers.
Fraud Examples Listed below are actual instances of fraudulent activity on 
employee benefit plan engagements. They are presented to 
help auditors become better acquainted with fraudulent
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activities. Although none of these particular examples 
resulted in a material misstatement of the financial 
statements, similar fraudulent activity at other benefit 
plans may cause a material misstatement of the financial 
statements, depending upon the circumstances.
• A pension plan notifies participants who have reached 
the age of 70 1/2 that they must under law take their 
distributions from the plan. An employee of the 
company is responsible for notifying the participants 
and providing distribution forms. Once the forms 
are completed, they are provided to a supervisor for 
approval and submitted to the insurance company 
(custodian) for payment. For all participants reaching 
the age of 70 1/2, the employee decides to forge the 
distribution forms and not notify the participants of 
the distributions. The forged forms are provided to 
the supervisor who approves them and the insurance 
company is directed to make lump sum distributions 
via wire transfers into an account set up with the 
employee’s name as a relative for the beneficiary. The 
fraud continues for several months until a participant 
notifies the supervisor that they would like to receive 
their distribution, and the supervisor notices that a 
lump sum was already distributed.
• A long time employee at a company is responsible for 
reporting loan repayments (for loans not paid off by 
automatic payroll deduction) to the recordkeeper by 
providing copies of the face of the repayment checks 
to the recordkeeper. The employee is also a participant 
in the plan and currently has a $20,000 loan from her 
account. The employee decides to take a second loan 
but under plan provisions cannot do it until her first 
loan is paid off. The employee makes out a check to 
pay off the $20,000 loan from her personal account and 
provides a copy of the check to the recordkeeper. A 
second loan for $25,000 is taken out for the employee. 
However, the first loan is never paid off because the 
employee never deposits the $20,000 check into the 
plan. Gash reconciliations continually show immaterial 
unreconciled items that are not followed up timely and 
the fraud is not discovered for months.
• A company has two defined benefit plans; one is over- 
funded and one is underfunded. In past years, 
administrative expenses were paid from each plan’s
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assets; however, this year the company decides it 
will pay the expenses for the underfunded plan. The 
overfunded plan continues to pay its own expenses. 
Due to an administrative error, the overfunded plan 
ends up paying the expenses for both plans. When 
management discovers this fact, a decision is made 
not to reimburse the plan which paid the expenses 
because it is fully funded.
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Governmental Entities: General Purpose Financial S tatements10
Fraudulent  Financial Reporting
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts 
that cause a material misstatement of financial statements. 
Some of the following factors and conditions will be 
present in entities where the specific circumstances 
do not present a risk o f m aterial m isstatement. Also, 
specific controls may exist which mitigate the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk 
factors or conditions are present. When identifying risk 
factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in 





Over the Control 
Environment
•  A motivation for management to engage in fraudulent 
financial reporting.
— Substantial political pressure on management cre­
ates an undue concern about reporting positive 
financial accomplishments.
•  A significant portion of management’s compensation 
represented by bonuses, stock options, or other incen­
tives, the value of which is contingent upon the entity 
achieving unduly aggressive targets for operating 
results, financial position or cash flow.
— A significant portion of entity-wide, department, or 
fund management’s compensation or performance 
appraisals linked to budgetary or program accom­
plishments or other incentives, the value or results 
of which are contingent upon the entity achieving 
unduly aggressive targets for budgetary or operating 
results.
•  An excessive interest by management in maintaining 
or increasing the entity’s stock price or earnings trend 
through the use of unusually aggressive accounting 
practices.
— An excessive interest in meeting or exceeding the 
entity’s budgetary targets or maintaining fund




balance or debt coverage requirements through the 
use of unusually aggressive accounting practices.
•  A failure by management (either executive manage­
ment, financial management, or the entity’s governing 
body) to display and communicate an appropriate 
attitude regarding internal control and the financial 
reporting process.
— A governing body that lacks appropriate back­
ground knowledge or experience regarding the 
function and responsibilities of government.
— Lack of established policies or controls related to 
investment risk levels.
•  An ineffective means of communicating and support­
ing the entity’s values or ethics, or communication of 
inappropriate values or ethics.
— An ineffective or nonexistent means of communi­
cating and supporting the entity’s accountability for 
public resources and ethics, especially regarding 
such matters as acceptable business practices, 
conflicts of interests, and codes of conduct.
• An individual or individuals with no apparent executive 
position(s) with the entity appear to exercise substantial 
influence over its affairs or over individual departments 
or funds (for example, a major political donor or fund­
raiser, or a major employer in the community).
•  New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements 
that could impair the financial stability or profitability 
of the entity.
— Imminent or anticipated adverse changes in major 
program legislation or regulations that could impair 
the financial stability or profitability of the entity.
•  Declining industry with increasing business failures 
and significant declines in customer demand.
— Major taxpayers in declining industries or tenuous 
financial condition.
— Declining property values or tax base or other 
restrictions on revenue recognition or realization.
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— The entity is experiencing a stagnant tax base or 
revenue base, declining enrollments, or declining 
demand or use.
Rapid changes in the industry, such as high vulnera­
bility to rapidly changing technology or rapid product 
obsolescence.
— Rapid changes in major taxpayers’ industries such 






•  Significant pressure to obtain additional capital nec­
essary to stay competitive considering the financial 
position of the entity —  including need for funds to 
finance major research and development or capital 
expenditures.
— Significant pressure to obtain additional funding 
necessary to stay viable and maintain levels of service 
considering the financial or budgetary position of 
the entity or of a specific fund or program, including 
need for funds to finance major infrastructure 
improvements or other capital expenditures.
•  Overly complex organizational structure involving 
numerous or unusual legal entities, managerial lines 
of authority, or contractual arrangements without 
apparent programmatic or governmental purpose.
— Significant subrecipient or subcontract relationships 
for which there appears to be no clear programmatic 
or business justification (for example, a subrecipient 
providing services it does not appear qualified to 
provide, or a vendor geographically distant from 
the entity when nearby vendors are available).
•  Unrealistically aggressive sales or profitability incen­
tive programs.
— Unrealistically aggressive budget or program goals.
•  Unusually high dependence on debt or marginal 
ability to meet debt repayment requirements; debt 
covenants that are difficult to maintain.
— Threat of imminent third-party funding termination 




the effect of which would be financially material to 
the entity.
• A mix of fixed price and cost reimbursable program 
types funded by third parties that create incentives to 
shift costs or otherwise manipulate accounting trans­
actions.
• Significant investments in high risk financial instru­
ments or high risk ventures.
In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No.
82, an auditor may want to consider the following
responses to fraud risk factors.
• Additional or more focused analytical procedures 
concerning actual to budget variances and their 
underlying causes.
• Testing of larger samples of transactions of expendi­
tures for conformity with allowable cost principles.
• Consultation with the funding agency’s inspector gen­
eral or other oversight organization regarding specific 
risks and responses for particular programs.
• More focused testing of programs or cost categories for 
which the entity has a history of prior findings and 
questioned costs.
• More detailed testing of transactions made by or 
potentially affected by entity or FFA program managers 
who have motives to produce particular budgetary, 
programmatic, or financial results.
• Confirm transaction details with other governments 
(e.g., grants, tax collections, receivable/payable 
balances), pertaining to year-end cutoffs.
• Additional inquiry and tests on collectibility of inter­
fund receivables, particularly those reporting large 
continuing balances.
• More focused review of documentation of write-offs of 
uncollectible taxes and other receivables.
• Confirm with revenue sources to determine if revenue 
recognized was for services performed prior to year- 
end, and vouch revenue to bank statements to assure 
that the revenue was received in the availability period.
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Conduct a more rigorous search for unrecorded 
liabilities by more closely examining disbursements 
made after year-end.
More detailed analysis of investment portfolios and 
investment policies; and use of investment risk 
specialists to better assess the riskiness of the 
entity’s investments.
Misappropriation of  Assets
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts 
that cause a material misstatement of financial statements. 
Some of the following factors and conditions will be 
present in entities where the specific circumstances 
do not present a risk of m aterial misstatement. Also, 
specific controls may exist which mitigate the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk 
factors or conditions are present. When identifying risk 
factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in 
combination, present a risk of material misstatement of 
the financial statements.
A. Controls Lack of appropriate segregation of duties or indepen­
dent checks, especially in areas such as purchasing 
and force account labor supervision.
B. Auditor 
Responses
In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No.
82, an auditor may want to consider the following
responses to fraud risk factors. •
• Additional participant eligibility testing, including 
unannounced visits to intake centers, work sites, 
and other sites where the existence and identity of 
participants can be verified.
• Observation of benefit payment distribution to identify 
“ghost” program participants.
• Use of confirmation letters to assure the existence of 
program participants.
• Review of the governmental entity’s purchasing prac­
tices to make sure that prices are reasonable for the 
products purchased. (Inflated prices could indicate
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and disclose purchasing agent acceptance of bribes, 
gratuities, or kickbacks.)
• Examine outstanding encumbrances and encumbrances 
that were released in the first part of the next year to 
determine if the encumbering of funds was appropriate 
and legal.
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F raudulent F inancial R eporting
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts 
that cause a material misstatement of financial statements. 
Some of the following factors and conditions will be 
present in entities where the specific circumstances 
do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, 
specific controls may exist which mitigate the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk 
factors or conditions are present. When identifying risk 
factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in 





Over the Control 
Environment
• A motivation for management to engage in fraudulent 
financial reporting.
— Substantial political pressure on management 
creates an undue concern about FFA program 
accomplishments.
• A significant portion of management’s compensation 
represented by bonuses, stock options, or other incen­
tives, the value of which is contingent upon the entity 
achieving unduly aggressive targets for operating 
results, financial position or cash flow.
— A significant portion of entity-wide or FFA program 
management’s compensation or performance 
appraisals linked to FFA budgetary or program 
accomplishments or other incentives, the value or 
results of which are contingent upon the entity 
achieving unduly aggressive targets for budgetary or 
operating results.
• An excessive interest by management in maintaining 
or increasing the entity’s stock price or earnings 
trend through the use of unusually aggressive 
accounting practices.
— An excessive interest by management or employees 
in meeting or exceeding the entity’s budgetary




targets through the use of unusually aggressive 
accounting practices.
• An ineffective means of communicating and support­
ing the entity's values or ethics, or communication of 
inappropriate values or ethics.
— An ineffective or nonexistent means of communi­
cating and supporting the entity’s values or ethics, 
especially regarding such matters as acceptable 
business practices, conflicts of interests, and codes 
of conduct.
• Management displaying a significant disregard for 
regulatory authorities.
— Management displaying or conveying an attitude of 
disinterest regarding strict adherence to FFA rules 
and regulations such as those related to participant 
eligibility, benefit determinations, or eligibility.
• An individual or individuals with no apparent execu­
tive position(s) with the entity appear to exercise 
substantial influence over its affairs or over individual 
FFA programs (for example, a major donor or fundraiser, 
or a politician).
• New accounting, statutory, or regulatory require­
ments that could impair the financial stability or 
profitability of the entity.
— Imminent or anticipated adverse changes in program 
legislation or regulations that could impair the 
financial stability or profitability of the entity.
• High degree of competition or market saturation, 
accompanied by declining margins.
— High degree of competition for FFA funding, especially 
when accompanied by declining availability of FFA 
funding nation-wide or region-wide.
• Declining industry with increasing business failures 
and significant declines in customer demand.
— The entity is experiencing a stagnant tax base, revenue 
base or declining enrollments or eligible participants.
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— Declining FFA program funding, declining program 
participant populations, or declining benefit amounts.
Rapid changes in the industry, such as high vulnera­
bility to rapidly changing technology or rapid product 
obsolescence.
— Rapid changes in FFA programs, such as significant 
centralization or decentralization initiatives, funding 
shifts from federal to state or local levels, increases 
or decreases in participant populations, high vulner­
ability to significant changes in compliance require­
ments, or pending program elimination.
Threat of imminent program termination or significant 
reduction in scope, the effect of which could have a 





Significant pressure to obtain additional capital nec­
essary to stay competitive considering the financial 
position of the entity — including need for funds to 
finance major research and development or capital 
expenditures.
— Significant pressure to obtain additional funding 
necessary to stay viable and maintain levels of service 
considering the financial or budgetary position of 
the entity or of specific FFA programs, including 
need for funds to finance major research and 
development or capital expenditures.
Overly complex organizational structure involving 
numerous or unusual legal entities, managerial lines 
of authority, or contractual arrangements without 
apparent programmatic or business purpose.
— Significant subrecipient or subcontract relationships 
for which there appears to be no clear programmatic 
or business justification (for example, a subrecipient 
providing services it does not appear qualified to 
provide, or a vendor geographically distant from 
the entity when nearby vendors are available).
Unrealistically aggressive sales or profitability incen­
tive programs.




• A mix of fixed price and cost reimbursable program 
types that create incentives to shift costs or otherwise 
manipulate accounting transactions.
In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No.
82, an auditor may want to consider the following responses.
• Additional or more focused analytical procedures 
concerning actual to budget variances and their 
underlying causes.
• Testing of larger samples of transactions of expendi­
tures for conformity with allowable cost principles.
• Consultation with the funding agency’s inspector 
general or other oversight organization regarding 
specific risks and responses for particular programs.
• More focused testing of programs or cost categories 
for which the entity has a history of prior findings 
and questioned costs.
• More detailed testing of transactions made by or 
potentially affected by entity or FFA program 
managers who have motives to produce particular 
budgetary, programmatic, or financial results.
• Confirm transaction details with other governments 
(e.g., grants, tax collections, receivable/payable 
balances), pertaining to year-end cutoffs.
• Additional inquiry and tests on collectibility of inter­
fund receivables, particularly those reporting large 
continuing balances.
• More focused review of documentation of write-offs 
of uncollectible taxes and other receivables.
• Confirm with revenue sources to determine if revenue 
recognized was for services performed prior to year- 
end, and vouch revenue to bank statements to assure 
that the revenue was received in the availability period.
• Conduct a more rigorous search for unrecorded 
liabilities by more closely examining disbursements 
made after year-end.
• More detailed analysis of investment portfolios and 
investment policies; and use of investment risk 




An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts 
that cause a material misstatement of financial statements. 
Some of the following factors and conditions will be 
present in entities where the specific circumstances 
do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, 
specific controls may exist which mitigate the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk 
factors or conditions are present. When identifying risk 
factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in 
combination, present a risk of material misstatement of 
the financial statements.
A. Controls Lack of appropriate segregation of duties or indepen­
dent checks, especially in areas such as outreach, 
intake, eligibility determination, and benefits awards.
Lack of appropriate system of authorization and 
approval of transactions, such as purchasing, 
benefit determinations, and eligibility.
Lack of timely and appropriate documentation 




In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No.
82, an auditor may want to consider the following
responses, •
• Additional participant eligibility testing, including 
unannounced visits to intake centers, work sites, 
and other sites where the existence and identity of 
participants can be verified.
• Observation of benefit payment distribution to identify 
“ghost” program participants.
• Use of confirmation letters to assure the existence of 
program participants.
• Review of the governmental entity’s purchasing prac­
tices to make sure that prices are reasonable for the 
products purchased. (Inflated prices could indicate 
and disclose purchasing agent acceptance of bribes, 
gratuities, or kickbacks.)
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Examine outstanding encumbrances and encumbrances 
that were released in the first part of the next year to 








Over the Control 
Environment
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts 
that cause a material misstatement of financial statements. 
Some of the following factors and conditions will be 
present in entities where the specific circumstances 
do not present a risk of material misstatement Also, 
specific controls may exist which mitigate the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk 
factors or conditions are present. When identifying risk 
factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in 
combination, present a risk of material misstatement of 
the financial statements.
• An ineffective means of communicating and support­
ing the organization’s values or ethics, or communi­
cation of inappropriate values or ethics.
— Lack of an effective corporate compliance program.
• Inadequate monitoring of significant controls.
— Lack of oversight or control of various affiliations in 
an integrated health delivery system.
— Lack of management review of dispersed locations.
— Insufficient Board/senior management oversight of 
critical processes, such as:
► Establishment of allowance for uncollectible 
accounts and contractual adjustments, buildup 
of unallocated reserve.
► Incident monitoring, follow-up, and settlement.
► Business affiliations and combinations.
► Regulatory compliance.
• Management displaying a significant disregard for 
regulatory authorities.
— Failure to respond to recent regulatory reviews.




• A board of directors mainly comprised of local business 
people and doctors. A board comprised of such people 
combined with large available financial resources, 
creates the potential for insider business deals.
• A board of directors comprised of people who lack the 
necessary experience and skills to properly oversee a 
health care organization.
• Rapid changes in the industry, such as high vulnera­
bility to rapidly changing technology or rapid product 
obsolescence.
— A failure or inability to keep pace with the rapid 
growth in medical technology, if the financial stabil­
ity or profitability of the particular entity is placed 
at risk due to that failure or inability.
• Intense scrutiny by governmental bodies, watchdog 
groups, and other interested parties of the organiza­
tion, placing unusual pressure on management. 
Situations targeted for investigation might include:
► Improper billing of services performed by residents.
► Inappropriate transfers or discharges.
► Illegal arrangements involving physicians.
► Improper referrals.
► Billing for non-approved medical devices.
(Auditors should be aware of the existence of these types 
of situations in the health care industry. If these situa­
tions are identified on an engagement, they should be 
considered in the auditor’s assessment of material mis­
statement due to fraud.)
• Intense pressure from governmental bodies and 
health maintenance organizations to embrace cost 











In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No. 82, 
an auditor may want to consider the following response.
Allowance for Uncollectible Accounts and Contractual 
Adjustments.
If there is the risk of material misstatement concerning 
the allowance for uncollectible accounts and contractual 
adjustments, the auditor should consider taking a more 
substantive approach to testing the factors used to deter­
mine such allowances. Such steps might include more 
detailed analytical procedures such as analyses of historical 
contractual adjustments by specific payors to the recorded 
allowance or the testing/analysis of the collectibility of a 
sufficient number of accounts to arrive at an independent 
conclusion as to the adequacy of the allowance.
Misappropriation of Assets
A. Susceptibility 




An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts 
that cause a material misstatement of financial statements. 
Some of the following factors and conditions will be 
present in entities where the specific circumstances 
do not present a risk of material misstatement Also, 
specific controls may exist which mitigate the risk of 
material misstatement due to fr a ud, even though risk 
factors or conditions are present. When identifying risk 
factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in com­
bination, present a risk of material misstatement of the 
financial statements.
• Pharmaceutical inventory with high street values.
• Large amounts of cash payments received for 
medical care.
In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No.
82, an auditor may want to consider the following responses.
Cash Receipts
The auditor may have identified a risk of material mis­
statement relating to the potential embezzlement of cash 
receipts. The lack of internal accounting controls provides 
the opportunity for the embezzlement to be covered up
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through bad debt, contractual or other write-offs. In this 
situation, the auditor might expand the review of cash 
receipts to compare remittance advises to accounts posted 
as received or might review specific accounts which have 
been written-off for appropriateness.
Kickbacks From Suppliers
The auditor may have identified a risk of material mis­
statement relating to potential kickbacks from suppliers. 
Such kickbacks might result in the entity paying excessive 
amounts for goods. The auditor might have concluded that 
the lack of adequate internal accounting control over the 
purchasing process provides the opportunity for this to 
occur. The auditor might consider, in these circumstances, 
a more detailed analytical review of expenses and a review 
of a sample of invoices to compare amounts paid for spe­
cific items to amounts per purchase contracts or with 







Over the Control 
Environment
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts 
that cause a material misstatement of financial statements. 
Some of the following factors and conditions will be 
present in entities where the specific circumstances 
do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, 
specific controls may exist which mitigate the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk 
factors or conditions are present. When identifying risk 
factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in 
combination, present a risk of material misstatement of 
the financial statements.
• An excessive interest by management in maintaining 
or increasing the company’s stock price or earnings 
trend through the use of unusually aggressive 
accounting practices.
— Risk transfer criteria for reinsurance transactions 
rarely met.
— Use of discretionary reserves to manipulate earnings.
• A failure by management to display and communicate 
an appropriate attitude regarding internal control 
and the financial reporting process.
— Lack of Board/management oversight of critical 
processes:
► Underwriting — control risk, price risk.
► Reinsurance Activity — monitoring stability of 
reinsurers.
► Suspense account clearance.
► Treasury — securities/derivatives valuation (selec­
tion of models, methodologies and assumptions).14
13Refer to the “Introduction” of this Part for guidance on how to use this section.
14 For more information on derivatives refer to Derivatives — Current Accounting 
and Auditing Literature (AICPA Product #014888) and Internal Control Issues 
in Derivatives Usage: An Information Tool fo r  Considering the COSO Internal 




► Establishment of loss and loss adjustment 
expense reserves.
► Investment decisions.
— No business risk management responsibility 
or function.
— Management’s inattention to establishing independent 
reporting lines for key assurance functions (e.g., 
internal audit, quality control reviews of claims 
and underwriting, etc.)
• Management displaying a significant disregard for 
regulatory authorities.
— Existence of a regulatory enforcement action.
— Prior examination findings not addressed or inade­
quately addressed.
— Mandated restatements of regulatory financial 
reports due to inappropriate accounting treatment.
— Company assessed market conduct fines.
• Strained relationship between management and the 
current or predecessor auditor.
— Disputes with current or predecessor auditors 
regarding the reasonableness of sensitive estimates 
(e.g., loss and loss adjustment expense reserves, 
allowances for uncollectible reinsurance and other 
amounts).
• New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements 
that could impair the financial stability or profitabili­
ty of the entity. Possible situations may include:
— New criteria used by rating agencies to assign rat­
ings to insurers.
— Impact of codification of statutory accounting prin­
ciples.
— Applicability of GAAP for mutual insurers.
— Demutualization.
— Changes in risk-based capital requirements.
• Rapid changes in the industry, such as high vulnera­








— Rapidly changing distribution network results in 
different sales vehicles without adequate controls 
(e.g., possible use of the Internet).
Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on 
significant estimates that involve unusually subjective 
judgments or uncertainties, or that are subject to 
potential significant change in the near term in a 
manner that may have a financially disruptive 
effect on the company.
— Estimates for loss and loss adjustment expenses, 
reinsurance recoverables, DAC, and others based 
on unusually subjective judgments.
Significant related-party transactions not in the 
ordinary course of business or with related entities 
not audited or audited by another firm.
— Numerous intercompany reinsurance transactions.
Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, 
especially those close to year end that pose difficult 
“substance over form ” questions.
— High yields on investments that appear to be low-risk.
— Transactions that “convert” nonadmitted assets to 
admitted assets.
— Numerous and complex off-balance sheet financing 
transactions.
Unusually rapid growth or profitability, especially 
compared with that of other companies in the same 
industry.
— Unusual and considerable increases in the number 
of policyholders over a short period of time.
The company sells and buys an unusual and substan­
tial amount of securities that do not have an active 
market which could indicate “parking losses.”
Volatility of earnings due to CATs could cause the 
company to manipulate earnings.
Loans requested on life policies occurring soon after 
large deposits on the policy are made. The loan could 
be issued before the deposit check clears and then the 
check is returned for insufficient funds.
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M isappropriation of Assets
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts 
that cause a material misstatement of financial statements. 
Some of the following factors and conditions will be 
present in entities where the specific circumstances 
do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, 
specific controls may exist which mitigate the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk 
factors or conditions are present. When identifying risk 
factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in 
combination, present a risk of material misstatement of 
the financial statements.
A. Susceptibility 
of Assets to 
Misappropriation
Significant activity and/or balances present in 
suspense accounts.
Large volume of duplicate claims processed.
Large volume of claims paid to post office boxes.
Large volume of claims paid to persons other than 
the applicable insured.
Large volume of claims paid to employees.
B. Controls Lack of appropriate management oversight.
— Lack of adequate monitoring of underwriting policies 
and procedures.
— Significant amount of year-end or month-end trans­
actions which precludes normal review procedures.
— Extensive use of MGAs with little or no supervision 
by management.
Lack of appropriate segregation of duties or indepen­
dent checks.
— Lack of rotation or review of claim adjusters on 
long-term claims.
— Custodial reconciliations performed by individual 
who records the amounts to the ledger.
Large volume of system overrides (e.g., claim pay­
ments, commissions, etc.)
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I nvestment Companies  
Fraudulent Financial Reporting
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts 
that cause a material misstatement of financial statements. 
Some of the following factors and conditions will be 
present in entities where the specific circumstances 
do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, 
specific controls may exist which mitigate the risk of 
material misstatement due to fr a ud, even though risk 
factors or conditions are present. When identifying risk 
factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in 





Over the Control 
Environment
A failure by management to display and communi­
cate an appropriate attitude regarding internal
control and the financial reporting process.
— Lack of a clearly defined policy with respect to 
personal investing activities.
— Unusual and considerable influence of portfolio man­
ager over pricing sources used to value securities.
— Inadequate controls around the calculation of the 
net asset value.
— Reconciliation of security holdings with the custodian 
are infrequent or incomplete.
— The monitoring of the Fund’s tax status as a regulated 
investment company is not adequate.
— The monitoring of the Fund’s compliance with its 
prospectus requirements is inadequate.
— Tr ansfer agency controls are ineffective or imple­
mentation of user controls in a service center 
environment are ineffective.
— Lack of an appropriate policy regarding corrections 
of net asset value errors, or failure to comply 
with policy.
— Lack of Board members’ understanding of how 
portfolio management intends to implement the 
Fund’s investment objectives.






— Lack of Board members’ understanding of derivatives 
utilized by portfolio managers and involvement in 
approving or disapproving use of specific strategies 
such as embedded leverage.
Nonfinancial management's excessive participation 
in, or preoccupation with, the selection of accounting 
principles or the determination of significant estimates.
— An excessive focus on maintaining a high rate of 
dividend payments regardless of the Fund’s actual 
earnings.
A practice by management of committing to analysts, 
creditors, and other third parties to achieve what 
appear to be unduly aggressive or clearly unrealistic 
forecasts.
— Commitment to achieving a low targeted expense 
ratio based on unreasonable expectations of asset 
growth.
Known history of securities law violations or claims 
against the entity or its senior management alleging 
fraud or violations of securities laws.
— Past suspensions of ability to act as an investment 
adviser or requirement that the adviser be super­
vised by others.
Significant related-party transactions not in the ordi­
nary course of business or with related entities not 
audited or audited by another firm.
— Significant transactions with affiliates which are not 
approved by the board of directors in accordance 
with Section 17 of the Investment Company Act.
Undocumented or ill-defined soft-dollar arrangements.
Significant investments for which readily available 
market quotes are not available and procedures for 
estimating these values are not adequate.
Significant investment in derivative financial instru­
ments for which value is very difficult to estimate.
Significant investments are held which are being 
restructured due to default or bankruptcy and the 
restructuring transaction is initiated near year end.
no
Investment Com p anies
M isappropriation of Assets
An auditor's interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts 
that cause a material misstatement of financial statements. 
Some of the following factors and conditions will be 
present in entities where the specific circumstances 
do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, 
specific controls may exist which mitigate the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk 
factors or conditions are present. When identifying risk 
factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in 
combination, present a risk of material misstatement of 
the financial statements.
A. Controls Securities, not under the control of the custodian, fail 
to comply with self-custody rules.
Lack of any periodic review of a transfer agency’s con­
trol design and operation by an independent auditor 







Over the Control 
Environment
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts 
that cause a material misstatement of financial statements. 
Some of the following factors and conditions will be 
present in entities where the specific circumstances 
do not present a risk of material misstatement Also, 
specific controls may exist which mitigate the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk 
factors or conditions are present. When identifying risk 
factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in 
combination, present a risk of material misstatement of 
the financial statements.
• A significant portion of management’s compensation 
represented by bonuses, or other incentives, the value 
of which is contingent upon the entity achieving 
unduly aggressive targets for operating results, finan­
cial position or cash flow.
— A significant portion of management’s compensation 
is linked to unduly aggressive program accomplish­
ments or unduly aggressive fund-raising targets.
• Domination of management by one person or a small 
group without compensating controls such as effective 
oversight by the board of directors or audit committee.
— Executive director possesses significant power and 
latitude to manage programs, activities, and trans­
actions and to override controls. •
• Board members or management, charged with over­
sight responsibilities, lack the necessary background 
experience in NPO management and NPO program 
activities or lack a commitment to fulfilling their duties.
• A major donor or fundraiser exercises substantial 
influence over the affairs of the organization.








• High degree of competition or market saturation, 
accompanied by declining margins.
— Unusually intense competition for the limited pool 
of contributions and government grants exists, 
thereby pressuring management to present a favor­
able financial picture in the hope of attracting 
those contributions and grants.
— Political and economic events occur, causing dramatic 
decreases in government grants and contributions.
• An unusual focus by external financial statement users 
on the amounts reported as program, management and 
general, and fund raising expenses.
• The threat of imminent third-party funding termina­
tion or significant reductions in third-party funding.
• Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, 
especially those close to year-end that pose difficult 
“substance over form ” questions.
— The existence of numerous split-interest agree­
ments containing complex provisions.
• Overly complex organizational structure involving 
numerous or unusual legal entities, managerial lines 
of authority, or contractual arrangements without 
apparent business purpose.
— Significant subrecipient or subcontract relation­
ships, without a clear program purpose or business 
justification. •
• A mix of fixed price, units of service, and cost reim­
bursement program types funded by third parties 
that creates incentives to shift costs or manipulate 
accounting transactions.
• Diverse programs funded by multiple sources involving 
many complex requirements that must be complied 






In addition to the sample responses presented in SAS No.
82, an auditor of a not-for-profit organization may want
to consider the following responses.
• Send confirmations to donors to confirm, not only the 
amount of promises to give in the future, but to clarify 
the nature of any restrictions.
• Obtain information from comparable organizations with 
respect to the collectibility of contributions receivable.
• Perform more focused analytical procedures related to 
program-specific budgets.
• Test larger samples of expenditures for conformity 
with allowable cost principles.
• Extend confirmation procedures with donors to deter­
mine that all contribution revenue was recorded.
• Thoroughly analyze the allocation of costs to various 
programs.
M isappropriation of Assets
A. Controls
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts 
that cause a material misstatement of financial statements. 
Some of the following factors and conditions will be 
present in entities where the specific circumstances 
do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, 
specific controls may exist which mitigate the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk 
factors or conditions are present. When identifying risk 
factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in 
combination, present a risk of material misstatement of 
the financial statements.
• Lack of appropriate management oversight.
— Failure to develop adequate controls over contribu­
tions and grants, resulting from the assignment of 
scarce resources more to program activities and 
less to internal control. •
• Lack of job applicant screening procedures relating 
to employees with access to assets susceptible to 
misappropriation.
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— The presence of volunteers working in the organi­
zation, who have access to assets susceptible to 
misappropriation and who have not been 
adequately screened.
• Lack of timely and appropriate documentation for 
transactions.







Over the Control 
Environment
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts 
that cause a material misstatement of financial statements. 
Some of the following factors and conditions will be 
present in entities where the specific circumstances 
do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, 
specific controls may exist which mitigate the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk 
factors or conditions are present. When identifying risk 
factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in 
combination, present a risk of material misstatement of 
the financial statements.
• Management displaying a significant disregard for 
regulatory authorities.
— Failure to appropriately respond to findings from 
the latest commission-mandated management 
audit.
— Significant disallowances of allowable cost in latest 
rate proceeding.
• An excessive interest by management in maintaining 
or increasing the entity’s stock price or earnings 
trend through the use of unusually aggressive 
accounting practices.
— Inappropriate deferral of incurred cost or failure to 
write-off previously deferred cost pursuant to the 
provisions of SFAS No. 71.
— Failure to recognize a regulatory liability pursuant 
to the provisions of SFAS No. 71.




Proposed changes in the federal and state regulatory 
environment introducing a high level of competition into 
the market that may create pressure on profitability 
and potential losses related to “stranded investments.”







• Considerable pressure to maintain or reduce rates that 
may create pressure on earnings.
• Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on 
significant estimates that involve unusually subjective 
judgments or uncertainties, or that are subject to 
potential significant change in the near term in a 
manner that may have a financially disruptive 
effect on the entity.
— Consideration should be given to:
► Significant regulatory deferrals.
► Embedded regulatory assets.







Over the Control 
Environment
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts 
that cause a material misstatement of financial statements. 
Some of the following factors and conditions will be 
present in entities where the specific circumstances 
do not present a risk of material misstatement. Also, 
specific controls may exist which mitigate the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk 
factors or conditions are present. When identifying risk 
factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in 
combination, present a risk of material misstatement of 
the financial statements.
• An excessive interest by management in maintaining 
or increasing the entity's stock price or earnings 
trend through the use of unusually aggressive 
accounting practices.
— An excessive interest by management in maintain­
ing or increasing the reported amount of real estate 
assets through the use of unusually aggressive 
appraisal assumptions.
— The use by management of unusually aggressive 
accounting practices in recognizing revenue from 
real estate sales.
• Inadequate responses or an unwillingness to respond 
to inquiries about known regulatory or legal issues 
(e.g., the presence of environmental contamination 





Significant related-party transactions not in the ordi­
nary course of business or with related entities not 
audited or audited by another firm.
— Interdependent, multiple transactions between the 
same parties or their affiliates.
18 Refer to the “Introduction” of this Part for guidance on how to use this section.
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Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, 
especially those close to year end that pose difficult 
“substance over form ” questions.
— Complicated criteria for recognizing sales transac­
tions, making it difficult to assess the completeness 
of the earnings process.
— Significant “side agreements”or transaction terms 
not previously disclosed.
Key contracts awarded without a competitive bidding 
process.
M isappropriation of Assets
An auditor’s interest specifically relates to fraudulent acts 
that cause a material misstatement of financial statements. 
Some of the following factors and conditions will be 
present in entities where the specific circumstances 
do not present a risk of material misstatement Also, 
specific controls may exist which mitigate the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud, even though risk 
factors or conditions are present. When identifying risk 
factors and other conditions, you should assess whether 
those risk factors and conditions, individually and in 
combination, present a risk of material misstatement of 
the financial statements.
A. Susceptibility 
of Assets to 
Misappropriation
Significant unencumbered real estate that could be 
used as collateral for an unauthorized loan, the 
proceeds of which are distributed to an individual 
or outside entity.
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S m al l  P riv a te ly  O w ned  B usinesses19
The following listing of example risk factors for small, pri­
vately owned businesses includes SAS No. 82 example risk 
factors most relevant to these entities as well as additional 
example risk factors. This section should be used in eon- 
junction with the discussion on considering fraud risk 
factors for small businesses in Part One, Identifying Fraud 





Over the Control 
Environment
A motivation for management to engage in fraudulent
financial reporting.
— An interest by management to pursue inappropriate 
means to minimize reported earnings for tax-moti­
vated reasons.
— Adverse consequences on significant matters if 
poor financial results are reported, for example a 
violation of debt covenants.
— Adverse consequences on significant matters if good 
financial results are reported. Specific examples include 
management’s motivation to inappropriately reduce 
income taxes, to defraud a divorced spouse or a 
partner of his or her share of the profits or assets of a 
business, or to convince a judge or arbitrator that 
the business in dispute is not capable of providing 
adequate cash flow. Keep in mind that you are not 
required to plan your audit to discover personal 
information (i.e., marital status) of the owner-man­
ager. However, if you become aware of such infor­
mation, you should consider it in your assessment 
of risk of material misstatement due to fraud.
— Poor or deteriorating financial position when man­
agement has personally guaranteed significant 
debts of the entity.
— Significant pressure to obtain additional capital 
necessary to stay competitive.
— Threat of imminent bankruptcy or foreclosure.




— A practice by management of committing to creditors 
and other third parties to achieve what appear to 
be unduly aggressive or unrealistic forecasts.
Known history of claims against the entity or its senior 
management alleging fraud.
A failure by management to display and communicate 
an appropriate attitude regarding internal control and 
the financial reporting process.
Strained relationship between management and the 
current or predecessor auditor.
New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements 
that could impair the financial stability or profitability 
of the entity.
Declining industry with increasing business failures 
and significant declines in customer demand.
Rapid changes in the industry, such as high vulnerabil­






Inability to generate cash flows from operations while 
reporting earnings and earnings growth.
Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on 
significant estimates that involve unusually subjec­
tive judgments or uncertainties, or that are subject 
to potential significant change in the near term in a 
manner that may have a financially disruptive effect 
on the entity, such as timing of revenue recognition 
or significant deferral of costs.
Significant related-party transactions not in the 
ordinary course of business or with related entities 
not audited or audited by another firm.
Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, 
especially those close to year end, that pose difficult 
“substance over form” questions.
Overly complex organizational structure.
Unusually rapid growth or profitability compared with 
that of other similar companies.
Especially high vulnerability to changes in interest rates. 
Unusually high dependence on debt or marginal ability 
to meet debt repayment requirements.
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Small, Privately Owned Businesses
M isappropriation of Assets
A. Susceptibility 
of Assets to 
Misappropriation
Large amounts of cash on hand or processed.
Inventory characteristics, such as small size, high 
value or high demand.
Easily convertible assets.
Fixed asset characteristics, such as small size, 
marketability, or lack of ownership identification.
B. Controls (Keep in mind that the extent of your consideration of
risk factors relating to controls is influenced by the
degree to which susceptibility risk factors are present.)
• Lack of appropriate management oversight.
• Lack of appropriate segregation of duties or indepen­
dent checks — Inadequate segregation of duties is 
quite often understandable in a small business envi­
ronment in that it’s a function of the entity’s size. 
However, you should consider it in conjunction with 
other risk factors and with mitigating controls.
• Lack of job applicant screening procedures relating 
to employees with access to assets susceptible to 
misappropriation.
• Inadequate record keeping with respect to assets 
susceptible to misappropriation.
• Lack of appropriate system of authorization and 
approval of transactions (for example, in purchasing).
• Poor physical safeguards over cash, investments, 
inventory or fixed assets.
• Lack of timely and appropriate documentation for 
transactions (for example, credits for merchandise 
returns).
• Lack of a mandatory vacation policy for employees 
performing key control functions.
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P a r t   T h r e e
Common Frauds and Extended Audit Procedures
Common F rauds and E xtended Audit P rocedures
The purpose of this section is to help you design extend­
ed audit procedures whenever you believe previously 
planned audit procedures are not sufficient to respond to 
the assessed risk of material misstatement due to fraud. 
This chapter is organized according to audit area, and 
within each area you will find:
• A description of examples of some typical fraud 
schemes you might discover in that area;
• A listing of some symptoms to look for that may 
indicate the existence of fraud; and
• A description of some example audit procedures that 
may help you detect material misstatements result­
ing from those frauds.
For fraud schemes relating to the misappropriation of 
assets, a listing of supplemental internal control questions 
has been included to help you and your clients identify 
control weaknesses that leave them susceptible to fraud. 
(Note: Fraudulent financial reporting usually is perpetrat­
ed by management, who has the ability to override most 
internal controls. For this reason, the sections dealing 
with fraudulent financial reporting do not include a 
discussion of controls.)
This section, like the entire book, is written for auditors 
performing an audit in accordance with GAAS. When you 
extend your audit procedures, you should continually 
evaluate whether the possible misstatement is material 
to the financial statements. If, upon obtaining additional 
information, you find that the possible misstatement 
would be immaterial to the financial statements, addi­
tional audit procedures would be considered part of a 
fraud examination consulting engagement rather than 
part of a GAAS audit. Refer to Part One, Detection of 
Fraud or Misstatements That May Be the Result of Fraud 
for additional information on the difference between 
these types of engagements.
The material presented in this section consists of the 
author’s observations and recommendations. The exam­






The most common way in which a company (particularly 
a small business) is defrauded of cash is through fraudu­
lent disbursements. Under these schemes, the employee 
uses company checks to either (a) withdraw cash directly 
for his or her own benefit, or (b) pay personal expenses. 
For example—
• An employee writes checks payable to cash and 
posts the debit to various expense accounts. When 
the bank statement comes back with the canceled 
checks, she simply discards the ones she had cashed 
and performs the bank reconciliation.
• An employee uses company checks to pay personal 
credit card bills. Each month, he has a credit card 
bill approximately equal to the company’s required 
payroll tax withholding. Instead of making the pay­
roll tax deposit, he writes a check to his credit card 
company. He discards these checks when they are 
returned with the bank statements. He also discards 
the notices received from the IRS stating that the 
company’s payroll withholding deposits have not 
been made.
There are infinite variations of these types of frauds. 
People who commit these kinds of frauds are faced with 
two tasks. First, they must post a debit somewhere in the 
general ledger to disguise the disbursement. The clever 
embezzler will post this debit to an expense account 
(which is closed out at the end of the year, thus eliminat­
ing the audit trail), or to inventory (where differences 
between the books and the physical count flow through 
cost of sales, thus eliminating the audit trail). Second, the 
embezzler must have a way to avoid detection during the 
bank reconciliation process. In a small business, this 
usually is possible because of a lack of segregation of 
duties. It might also involve collusion.
Companies that handle large amounts of cash are also 
susceptible to theft of cash on hand. Industries such as 
retail sales or restaurants are particularly susceptible to 
these kinds of frauds. It would be rare that the theft of
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Common Frauds and Extended Audit Procedures
cash on hand would be material to an entity’s financial 
statements, but as a client service matter, you should be 
alert to the possibility. Common schemes include:
• Skimming. Gash is “skimmed” before it enters the 
accounting system. For example, the employee accepts 
cash but never prepares a receipt, or prepares a 
receipt for less than the amount taken.
• Substituting personal checks for cash. The employee 
takes money from the cash register and substitutes a 
personal check. In that way, the cash drawer is always 
“in balance,” but the employee never submits the 
personal check for deposit to the company’s bank 
account. Consequently, the employee receives free 
use of the cash.
• Fictitious refunds and discount. The employee 
records a refund and removes cash as if a refund 
had occurred. But no merchandise was returned or 
discount given.
• Altered credit card receipts. This is a problem in 
the restaurant business where the waitperson may 
increase the tip written on a credit card receipt.
What to Look For
In addition to the items listed in paragraphs 19, 20, and 
25 of SAS No. 82, be alert for the following, which may 
be present when the frauds described above are occur­
ring or have occurred;
• Missing checks or checks out of sequence
• Employee personal checks found in cash drawers
• Large, unexplained reconciling items in the bank 
reconciliations
• Unusual endorsements on checks
• Bank statements that do not include canceled 
checks
• Some canceled checks are missing
• Disbursements are unsupported by invoices or other 
documentation
• Customer complaints
• Altered or missing cash register tapes
• Unusual or unexpected voids or sales returns
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Example Audit Procedures
The following audit procedures should help detect the 
frauds described above. Depending on your assessment of 
the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, these pro­
cedures may be performed as part of an audit conducted 
in accordance with GAAS. Alternatively, they may be 
performed outside the scope of a GAAS audit. If your 
assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud requires you to respond and an example procedure 
is already part of your planned approach, consider 
expanding the extent of testing, perhaps by selecting 
more items.
• Examine bank reconciliations. A thorough review of 
bank reconciliations is one of the best ways to 
detect fraud relating to cash.
• Review bank statements and canceled checks. Look 
for checks made out to cash, employees, or unusual 
vendors. Compare endorsement to payee. Make sure 
all canceled checks are accounted for.
• Obtain a bank cut-off statement. Cut-off statements 
are requested from the bank and delivered directly 
to the auditor, who reconciles it.
• Perform analytical procedures (at high precision 
levels) on expense accounts. Investigate accounts 
with higher than expected balances.
• Search for and examine unusual expense account 
activity close to the end of an accounting period.
The theft of cash usually is concealed with a debit to 
an expense account because expenses are closed to 
retained earnings at the end of the accounting cycle. 
The clever embezzler will concentrate his or her 
theft at the end of the cycle to limit the amount of 
time the theft remains on the books.
• Perform surprise cash counts. These will sometimes 
turn up embezzlement of petty cash.
• Analyze sales discounts and returns. Compare current 
period to prior periods or breakdown activity by 
employee. Look for unusual patterns or trends.
• Review vendor list with management and investigate 
any payments to unknown or unusual vendors.
• Compare check endorsements to payee information.
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Common Frauds and Extended Audit Procedures
Expanding Your Internal Control Questionnaire
Your internal control questionnaire should have questions 
aimed at identifying your client’s vulnerability to the mis­
appropriation of cash. If any of the following questions 
are not included in your questionnaire, consider adding 
them. “No” responses may not change your control risk 
assessment or your assessment of the risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud; however, as a client service 
matter, you should consider discussing these items with 
your client and explaining how the lack of certain 
controls leaves the company exposed to fraud. Keep in 
mind that “no” responses may also indicate reportable 




Internal Control Questions 
Related to Fraud
Yes No
Are all bank accounts reconciled on a timely basis?
Is there adequate segregation of duties between 
cash receipt, cash disbursement, and bank 
reconciliation functions?
Does the company receive canceled checks along with 
its bank statements?
Do the bank reconciliation procedures include accounting 
for all canceled checks?
Are employees with cash disbursement and bank 
reconciliation duties required to take vacations and 
are other employees cross-trained to perform those 
functions when an employee is absent?
Has the company limited the logical access to 
computerized cash disbursement records?
Does the company limit the physical access to 
negotiable assets such as blank checks?
Does the owner review and sign all checks? If not, 
do disbursements over a certain dollar amount 
require dual signature or another control procedure?
If employees process a significant amount of cash 
transactions, does the company adequately control 
and monitor these transactions?
Does the company use an approved vendor list 













Common Frauds and Extended Audit Procedures




There are many frauds related to the improper recogni­
tion of revenue, ineluding:
• Recording fictitious sales. This may be accomplished 
by recording sales to nonexistent customers, or 
recording phony sales to legitimate customers. The 
latter schemes include: double billing, or billing for 
items not shipped or ordered. These schemes usually 
occur near the end of an accounting period and are 
concealed by issuing credit memos or other credit 
adjustments to accounts receivable in the period 
immediately following the balance sheet date.
• Recognizing revenue on transactions that do not 
meet the revenue recognition criteria. These include 
improper revenue recognition when the right of 
return exists, “bill and hold” transactions, or other 
transactions where the earnings process is not com­
plete. Rights of return and other sales terms that 
would preclude revenue recognition often are con­
cealed through the use of written side agreements 
or oral agreements not disclosed to the auditors.
• Sham transactions. For example, selling assets at 
inflated prices to an outside entity, while simultane­
ously buying assets at inflated prices from that same 
entity. These types of transactions are particularly 
difficult to detect because they involve collusion 
with a co-conspirator outside the entity.
• Recognizing revenue in the improper period. The
most common of these types of frauds is to recognize 
revenue on future, anticipated sales. This may be 
accomplished by altering dates on shipping documents 
or holding the books open until after the shipment 
has occurred.
What to Look For
In addition to the items listed in paragraphs 17 and 25 
of SAS No. 82, be alert for the following, which may be 
present when the frauds described above are occurring 
or have occurred:
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• Excessive credit memo and other credit adjustments 
to accounts receivable after the end of the account­
ing period
• Customer complaints and discrepancies in accounts 
receivable confirmations (for example, disputes over 
terms, prices, or amounts)
• Unusual entries to the accounts receivable subledger 
or sales journal
• Missing or altered source documents (for example, 
invoices or shipping documents) or the inability of 
the client to produce original documents in a rea­
sonable period of time
• A lack of cash flow from operating activities when 
income from operating activities has been reported
• Unusual reconciling differences between the sales 
journal and the general ledger
• Sales to customers in the last month before the end 
of the accounting period at terms more favorable 
than previous months
• Sales with affiliates and related parties
• Pre-dated or post-dated transactions
• Journal entries made to the sales or revenue account 
directly, that is, not posted from the accounts 
receivable subledger or sales journal
• Large or unusual adjustments to sales accounts 
made just prior to or just after the end of the period
Example Audit Procedures
The following audit procedures should help detect the 
frauds described above. Depending on your assessment of 
the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, these pro­
cedures may be performed as part of an audit conducted 
in accordance with GAAS. Alternatively, they may be 
performed outside the scope of a GAAS audit. If your 
assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud requires you to respond and an example procedure 
is already part of your planned approach, consider 
expanding the extent of testing, perhaps by selecting 
more items.
• Perform a thorough review of original source docu­
ments (not photocopies) including: invoices, shipping 
documents, customer purchase orders, cash receipts,
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Common Frauds and Extended Audit Procedures
and written correspondence between the client and 
the customer.
• Analyze and review credit memos and other 
accounts receivable adjustments for the period 
subsequent to the balance sheet date.
• As part of the accounts receivable confirmation 
effort, confirm with customers the terms of sales 
agreements, including the absence of right of return 
and terms that might preclude immediate revenue 
recognition.
• Analyze all large or unusual sales made in the last 
month prior to the end of the period. Vouch to 
original source documents. Confirm terms of the 
transaction directly with the customer.
• Scan the general ledger, accounts receivable 
subledger and sales journal for unusual activity.
• Compare operating cash flow to sales. Analyze by 





Typ ica l Frauds
Most frauds relating to the misappropriation of accounts 
receivable involve the diversion of payments received 
from customers. The scheme is fairly simple to perform. 
For example, an employee may open a personal bank 
account with a name similar to that of the company 
(Acme Inc. rather than Acme Company). Customer pay­
ments can then be taken by the employee and deposited 
into the employee’s bank account.
What varies in accounts receivable frauds is how the 
frauds are concealed. Common techniques include the 
following:
• Lapping. The payment from customer A is diverted 
by the employee. To keep customer A from com­
plaining, the payment from customer B is applied 
to customer As account. Customer C’s payment is 
applied to customer B’s account, and so on.
• Posting improper credits to the account. To conceal 
the fraud, the employee posts credit memos or other 
non-cash reductions (for example, representing a 
sales return or write-off) to the customer account 
from which the funds were diverted.
• Altering internal copies of invoices. The company’s 
copy of the sales invoice is altered to report an 
amount lower than that actually billed to the 
customer. When payment is received, the “excess” 
amount is diverted by the employee.
Another accounts receivable fraud involves the diversion 
of payments from written-off accounts. Most companies 
do not monitor the activity on accounts that have been 
written off, which provides the employee with the oppor­
tunity to divert payments from these customers and not 
be detected. For example, an employee will work with a 
customer to collect an overdue receivable. As the customer 
is about to pay, the employee writes off the account, 
removing it from the books.
Also, the author is aware of one fraud committed by an 
employee who made an arrangement with customers to 
“manage” their past due accounts. The employee took
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steps to make sure these customers’ accounts were 
always shown as current in the company’s books and 
records. This effectively gave the customers an unlimited 
amount of time to pay their bills and avoid late fees and 
interest charges. In exchange for this service, the 
employee received a kickback from the customers.
What to Look For
In addition to the items listed in paragraphs 19, 20, and 
25 of SAS No. 82, be alert for the following, which may be 
present when the frauds described above are occurring or 
have occurred:
• Unexplained differences noted by customers on their 
accounts receivable confirmations
• Significant delays between the date the customer 
states a payment was made and the date payment 
was recorded as received by the company
• A significant number of credit entries and other 
adjustments made to the accounts receivable records
• Unexplained or inadequately explained differences 
between the accounts receivable subsidiary ledger 
and the general ledger
• Discrepancies between customer names and amounts 
on deposit slips and subledger accounts and amounts 
credited
Example Audit Procedures
The following audit procedures should help detect the 
frauds described above. Depending on your assessment 
of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, these 
procedures may be performed as part of an audit conduct­
ed in accordance with GAAS. Alternatively, they may be 
performed outside the scope of a GAAS audit. If your 
assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud requires you to respond and an example procedure 
is already part of your planned approach, consider 
expanding the extent of testing, perhaps by selecting 
more items.
• Confirm account activity (not just the balance) with 
the customers directly. Be sure to confirm credit 
memo and sales return activity, as well as the date 
payments on account were made. Follow up on 
significant accounts receivable confirmations by 
contacting customers by telephone.
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• Perform analytical reviews of credit memo and write-off 
activity, for example, by comparing to prior periods. 
Look for unusual trends or patterns such as large 
numbers of credit memos pertaining to one customer 
or sales person, or those processed shortly after the 
close of an accounting period.
• Vouch credit memos and other write-offs to receiv­
ing records for returned goods, correspondence with 
customers, and other documentation supporting the 
transactions.
• Investigate all differences between the payment date 
reported by the customer and the payment date 
recorded by the company. Do not rely on company­
generated activity summaries — review both sides of 
the original checks or check copies.
• Analyze recoveries of written-off accounts.
• Obtain an understanding of how the accounts 
receivable aging is prepared and who has access to 
the data used to prepare the aging.
• Review collections of accounts receivable in subse­
quent periods to determine validity of sales in prior 
periods.
Expanding Your Internal Control Questionnaire
Your internal control questionnaire should have questions 
aimed at identifying the client’s vulnerability to the 
misappropriation of accounts receivable. If any of the 
following questions are not included in your question­
naire, consider adding them. “No” responses may not 
change your control risk assessment or your assessment 
of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud; however, 
as a client service matter, you should consider discussing 
these items with your client and explaining how the lack 
of certain controls leaves the company exposed to fraud. 
Keep in mind that “no” responses may also indicate 
reportable conditions or material weaknesses to be 
communicated to the client.
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Accounts Receivable
Internal Control Questions 
Related to Fraud
1. Are different employees responsible for preparing invoices, 
receiving payment, and maintaining accounts receivable 
records?
2. Has the company limited the logical access to 
computerized accounts receivable records and processes?
3. Are employees with accounts receivable responsibilities 
required to take vacations and are other employees 
cross-trained to perform those functions when an 
employee is absent?
4. Are credit memos approved and reviewed by 
management?
5. Does the entity have a method for tracking and 
monitoring customer complaints related to billing? Are 
these complaints periodically reviewed by management?
6. Is the accounts receivable subsidiary ledger reconciled 
to the general ledger account balance on a regular basis?
Yes No
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One of the more common inventory frauds is the theft of 
inventory for personal use. This is most likely to happen 
when inventory items are small and easy to steal, and 
the items have value to an employee as a consumer. For 
example, computer chips are small and easy to steal, but 
they have no value to the employee as a consumer. A 
laptop computer has the physical characteristics that 
make it susceptible to theft, plus the employee can use 
it immediately. The computer is more likely than the 
computer chip to be stolen for personal use.
A more lucrative inventory fraud is the theft of inventory 
for sale. For these frauds, it’s not necessary for the inven­
tory to have value to the employee as a consumer, since 
the goods won’t be used for personal use. A common 
scheme is for the receiving personnel to steal the goods 
from the receiving dock, before physical custody is estab­
lished by the warehouse. For example, the employee signs 
a receiving report stating that 100 units were received, 
but only 90 are stocked in the warehouse and 10 are 
placed in the trunk of the employee’s car. The missing 
units may not be discovered until the year-end physical 
inventory count.
For larger inventory items that are more difficult to 
transport, the receiving personnel may collude with the 
vendor’s delivery personnel. The delivery personnel 
diverts 10 units of inventory to another location and 
delivers the remaining 90 units. The receiving personnel 
prepares a receiving report indicating that all 100 units 
were received. The stolen merchandise is then sold and 
the proceeds split between the two.
Theft of scrap is another common fraud. For example, 
a hospital employee was convicted of stealing used 
x-rays, then recovering and selling the silver. In most 
companies, inventory scrap is not recorded or well- 
controlled, which makes it easy to steal. These thefts 
can be significant, especially in situations where the 
embezzler has the ability to inappropriately designate 
saleable inventory as scrap.
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What to Look For
In addition to the items listed in paragraphs 19, 20, and 
25 of SAS No. 82, be alert for the following, which may 
be present when the frauds described above are occur­
ring or have occurred:
• Large differences between the physical inventory 
counts and perpetual inventory records
• Unexpected or unexplained increases in inventory 
turnover accompanied by decreases in gross profit 
percentages
• Unexplained entries in the perpetual inventory 
records
• Key inventory ratios (for example, shrinkage, 
turnover, or gross profit) that vary significantly from 
industry norms or between company locations or 
inventory types
• Shipping documents (indicating that goods were 
shipped from the company) without corresponding 
sales documentation
Example Audit Procedures
The following audit procedures should help detect the 
frauds described above. Depending on your assessment 
of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, these 
procedures may be performed as part of an audit conducted 
in accordance with GAAS. Alternatively, they may be 
performed outside the scope of a GAAS audit. If your 
assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud requires you to respond and an example procedure 
is already part of your planned approach, consider 
expanding the extent of testing, perhaps by selecting 
more items.
• Analyze inventory shortages by location or product 
type. Compare key inventory ratios to industry 
norms. Look for unusual concentrations, patterns, 
or trends as a way to direct more detailed inquiries 
and investigations.
• Review receiving reports and look for indication of 
alternative shipping sites.
• Review supporting documentation for reductions to 
the perpetual inventory records.
• Compare shipping documents to corresponding 
documentation.
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Because of the nature of inventory theft, it may be difficult 
to detect using traditional audit techniques. If your client 
has reason to believe inventory is being stolen, a fraud 
examination may be required. For example, a fraud exam­
iner might perform surveillance of receiving personnel or 
surprise counts of items received into inventory.
Expanding Your Internal Control Questionnaire
Your internal control questionnaire should have questions 
aimed at identifying your client’s vulnerability to the 
misappropriation of inventory. If any of the following 
questions are not included in your questionnaire, consider 
adding them. “No” responses may not change your control 
risk assessment or your assessment of the risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud; however, as a client service 
matter, you should consider discussing these items with 
your client and explaining how the lack of certain 
controls leaves the company exposed to fraud. Keep in 
mind that “no” responses may also indicate reportable 
conditions or material weaknesses to be communicated 
to the client.
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Inventory
Internal Control Questions 
Related to Fraud
1. Does the client maintain adequate safeguard controls (for 
example, locked warehouses) over inventory susceptible to 
misappropriation?
2. Is there proper segregation of duties between employees 
responsible for inventory record-keeping and those 
responsible for its physical custody?
3. Are employees with inventory, shipping, and receiving 
responsibilities required to take vacations and are other 
employees cross-trained to perform those functions when 
an employee is absent?
4. Has the company limited the logical access to 
computerized inventory records?
5. Are physical inventory counts performed regularly? Are the 
count procedures adequate to ensure an accurate count?
6. Is scrap inventoried and controlled?
7. Is there proper segregation of duties between those with 
the authority to identify or designate scrap and those 







Inventory frauds are perpetrated to manipulate earnings. 
Inflated ending inventory balances reduce the amount of 
reported cost of goods sold, which results in improper 
increases to gross profit and net income. The usual method 
for inflating ending inventory is to report fictitious inven­
tory amounts. This can be done in numerous ways, 
including:
• Altering quantities reported on inventory count tags 
or sheets that were not reviewed by the auditors
• Entering inventory count tags or sheets for nonexis­
tent inventory
• Shifting the same inventory between several differ­
ent locations
• Altering or disguising the physical characteristics 
of inventory items to make it appear as if larger 
quantities are on hand (for example, hollow stacks 
of inventory that are made to appear solid, or 
inventory boxes filled with weights).
• Substituting cheaper, inferior quality inventory for 
more expensive, high quality inventory
In other instances, management may be predisposed to 
understate beginning inventory balances, which has the 
same desired effect of increasing current period earnings. 
For example, this scheme may be perpetrated when there 
has been a change in management and current manage­
ment wishes to report improved profitability. The most 
common method for understating beginning inventory is 
to overstate the allowance for inventory obsolescence.
What to Look For
In addition to the items listed in paragraphs 17 and 25 of 
SAS No. 82, be alert for the following, which may be pre­
sent when the frauds described above are occurring or 
have occurred:
• Inability to produce all inventory count tags or sheets
• Lack of control over the population of used count 
tags or sheets
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• Slow inventory turnover; increases in certain types 
of inventory or in branches or other locations not 
examined by auditors
• Vendor invoices supporting purchases are unavailable 
(for example, while performing price fieldwork)
• Significant changes in gross profit percentages
• Large unexplained reconciling differences between 
the inventory amounts recorded on the books and 
the physical inventory count
• Large increases in inventory balances without corre­
sponding increases in purchases
• Journal entries made directly to the inventory 
account rather than through the purchases journal
Example Audit Procedures
Your primary audit procedure relating to the existence of 
inventory is the physical inventory count. The following 
audit procedures, performed during the physical invento­
ry count, should help detect the frauds described above. 
Depending on your assessment of the risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud, these procedures may be per­
formed as part of an audit conducted in accordance with 
GAAS. Alternatively, they may be performed outside the 
scope of a GAAS audit. If your assessment of the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud requires you to 
respond and an example procedure is already part of 
your planned approach, consider expanding the extent of 
testing, perhaps by selecting more items.
• Account for all inventory count tags or sheets used 
during the physical count.
• Expand the number of test counts.
• Thoroughly examine all items counted ( for example, 
by opening sealed boxes to observe the contents).
• Perform physical inventory counts at all locations 
simultaneously.
• Use the work of a specialist to help determine the 
quality (for example, the purity, grade, or concentra­
tion) of the inventory items.
• Perform analytical procedures of gross profit.
Analyze according to location or inventory type.
• Perform analytical procedures of inventory balances 
and purchases. Analyze according to location or 
inventory type.
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The purchasing function is particularly vulnerable to fraud. 
For many small businesses it represents the largest area 
of the risk of embezzlement.
The most common fraud scheme is the payment of invoices 
to a fictitious company. To perpetrate this scheme, the 
embezzler establishes a fake entity (often with a P.O. Box 
for an address, and a name similar to that of a legitimate 
company) and gets the fake entity entered into company 
records as a legitimate vendor. The embezzler then produces 
invoices for the fake vendor, which are processed by the 
accounts payable system. Sometimes the embezzler is 
responsible for authorizing payment but other times not. 
The scheme may also require collusion between various 
employees, such as receiving (doctoring a receiving report 
to indicate something was received) and accounts payable 
(approving the invoice for payment).
Another common fraud is a kickback paid by vendors to 
the company’s purchasing agent. In collusion with suppliers, 
a purchasing agent may get paid a kickback for any num­
ber of activities including:
• Allowing the vendor to submit fraudulent billing and 
approving the payment. Examples of fraudulent 
billing practices include: billing for goods or services 
never performed or received, billing more than once 
for the same item, substituting lower quality items 
than the ones billed, or overbilling for the items 
delivered.
• Excess purchasing of property or services
• Bid rigging
Kickbacks are “off-the-book” frauds, that is, their con­
cealment is not recorded on the books of the company. 
For that reason, it is often difficult for auditors to detect 
the presence of kickbacks.
The most common payroll fraud is the use of ghost 
employees, where the embezzler enters fictitious employ­
ees into the payroll system and receives the resulting 
payroll checks. A variation on this scheme is to keep 
terminated employees on the payroll several pay periods
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after they leave their job. The embezzler then receives 
the paycheck for the terminated employee.
Another payroll fraud is an overpayment scheme. These 
schemes involve higher pay rates, inflated hours or days, 
or unauthorized bonus pay. Duplicate payroll checks for the 
exact amount of the legitimate check are also common.
What to Look For
In addition to the items listed in paragraphs 19, 20, and 
25 of SAS No. 82, be alert for the following, which may be 
present when the frauds described above are occurring or 
have occurred:
Fictitious vendors
• Photocopied invoices or invoices that have been 
tampered (for example, sections have been “whited 
out” and typed over)
• Invoice numbers from the same vendor that occur in 
an unbroken consecutive sequence
• Invoices from companies with a P.O. Box address 
and/or no phone number
• Invoices from companies with the same address or 
phone number as an employee
• The amount of each invoice from a particular vendor 
falls just below a threshold for review
• Multiple companies that have the same address and 
phone number
• Vendor names that appear to be a “knock-off” of 
well-established businesses (i.e., names spelled very 
similarly to well-established businesses)
Kickbacks
• Purchasing agent handles all matters related to a 
vendor even though it might be outside or below his 
or her normal duties
• Vendors who receive an inordinate amount of business 
from the company for no apparent business reason
• Vendor salesmen make frequent, unexplained visits 
to purchasing personnel
• Prices from a particular vendor are unreasonably 
high when compared to others
• Quality of goods or services received from a vendor 
is low
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• Tips or complaints from other employees or honest 
vendors
• Key contracts awarded with no formal bid process
• Purchase of excess goods
Ghost Employees
• Employees with duplicate addresses, cheeking 
accounts, or Social Security numbers
• Employees with no withholding taxes, insurance, or 
other normal deductions
Example Audit Procedures
The following audit procedures should help detect the 
frauds described above. Depending on your assessment 
of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, these 
procedures may be performed as part of an audit conducted 
in accordance with GAAS. Alternatively, they may be 
performed outside the scope of a GAAS audit. If your 
assessment of risk of material misstatement due to fraud 
requires you to respond and an example procedure is 
already part of your planned approach, consider expand­
ing the extent of testing, perhaps by selecting more items.
• Review selected invoices and look for evidence that 
the invoice has been doctored.
• Perform a computerized search of the vendor list and 
look for: P.O. Box addresses, duplicate addresses, 
and vendors with no phone number.
• Determine if vendors are listed in yellow pages of 
phone book. Call vendors if considered necessary.
• Perform a computerized match of the vendor list 
with a list of employees and look for matches of 
addresses or phone numbers.
• Perform a computerized sort of invoices by vendor and 
look for unusual sequencing or amount (indication 
of possible fictitious company). Look for unusual 
pricing and volume trends (indication of possible 
kickback).
• Review selected invoices and examine supporting 
documentation indieating goods or services were 
received.
• Perform a computerized search of payroll records 
to identify duplicate addresses, Social Security 
numbers, or bank accounts.
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• Verify Social Security numbers by calling the Social 
Security Administration.
• Review personnel files and look for those that con­
tain little or no evidence of activity (for example, a 
lack of performance evaluations, requests for 
changes to withholdings, or retirement plan 
options).
• Observe a payroll check distribution. Determine why 
unclaimed checks were not claimed.
Because kickbacks are conducted off-the-books, they may 
be difficult to detect using traditional audit techniques. If 
your client has reason to believe a purchasing agent is 
accepting kickbacks, a fraud examination may be required.
Expanding Your Internal Control Questionnaire
Your internal control questionnaire should have questions 
aimed at identifying your client’s vulnerability to the 
misappropriation of assets in the purchasing and payroll 
functions. If any of the following questions are not included 
in your questionnaire, consider adding them. “No” responses 
may not change your control risk assessment or your 
assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud; however, as a client service matter, you should 
consider discussing these items with your client and 
explaining how the lack of certain controls leaves the 
company exposed to fraud. Keep in mind that “no” 
responses may also indicate reportable conditions or 
material weaknesses to be communicated to the client.
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Purchasing and Payroll
Internal Control Questions 
Related to Fraud
1. Is there adequate segregation of duties between purchasing, 
receiving, and the accounts payable functions?
2. Are employees with purchasing and accounts payable 
responsibilities required to take vacations and are other 
employees cross-trained to perform those functions when 
an employee is absent?
3. Has the company limited the logical access to comput­
erized vendor, accounts payable, and payroll records?
4. If the company chooses suppliers based on competitive 
bids, are all bids date stamped when received and opened 
at the same time under dual control?
5. Does the accounts payable system include controls to 
avoid duplicate payments?
6. Are new vendors reviewed by management before being 
added to the list of qualified vendors?
7. Does the company have a written policy on the amount 
and the type of gifts an employee can accept from suppliers 
and customers? Is that policy communicated to employees, 
customers, and suppliers?
8. Does the company include a “right to audit” clause in its 
contracts with major suppliers?20
9. Are new employees approved by management before being 
added to the payroll records?
10. Are there controls in place to ensure that terminated 
employees are removed from records in a timely manner?
11. If the size of the entity permits it, does the owner-manager 
periodically review the payroll records to determine if every 
employee listed is personally known to him or her?
Yes No
20Right to audit clauses can be included in contracts or printed on the back of all purchase orders. Under a right to 
audit clause, the company reserves the right to audit the vendor’s books at any time. Vendors who know their 
records are subject to examination generally are reluctant to make bribery payments.
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The most common types of computer schemes involve 
input tampering. This can be accomplished by altering, 
forging, or fabricating computer input documents. In an 
entity with inadequate logical access control (which is 
common for small businesses), input tampering is quite 
easy to accomplish. The more common computer input 
schemes include:
• Entering false transactions. For example, entering 
invoices for fake vendors into the accounts payable 
system, or recording false credit memos to accounts 
receivable.
• Entering phony file maintenance transactions. File 
maintenance activities include transactions such 
as changing a customer’s address or adding a new 
employee to the payroll. Phony file maintenance 
transactions can lay the groundwork for any number 
of frauds, for example the use of ghost employees to 
embezzle funds.
• Failure to enter legitimate transactions or file main­
tenance instructions. For example, when an employee 
is terminated, that information should be entered 
into the computer system to immediately remove 
that employee from the payroll records. A failure
to do so creates a ghost employee.
• Altering input data. For example, changing the 
amounts, dates, or other information contained on 
the input data.
Other computer frauds involve program modification 
schemes, sometimes referred to as “throughput frauds.” 
To accomplish these schemes requires an understanding 
of and the ability to modify computer application pro­
grams. Typical schemes include:
• Unauthorized instructions. A computer programmer 
may place unauthorized instructions into a computer 
program so that the computer will perform unautho­
rized functions (for example, making payments to a 
vendor not listed on an approved list).
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• Siphoning funds. Funds can be siphoned in small 
amounts from a large number of accounts, for example, 
pennies and portions of pennies (due to rounding) 
can be shaved from thousands of savings accounts. 
The money is then accumulated in a single account 
that is accessed by the embezzler.
• Direct manipulation of accounts. Computer programs 
may be altered to obtain direct access to manipulate 
files without authorization. For example, file mainte­
nance changes may be accomplished without the 
input of the normal documentation.
What to Look For
Computers often are used to accomplish the frauds listed 
elsewhere in this section of the publication. Observing 
signs of other frauds may lead you to one of the computer 
frauds schemes listed above. In addition to the items listed 
elsewhere, be alert for the following, which may be pre­
sent when the frauds described above are occurring or 
have occurred:
• Inability to process computer applications in a timely 
manner
• Unexplained differences in batch or hash totals, or 
other means to control computer input
• Undocumented or unauthorized account postings, file 
changes, or modifications to application programs
• Unexplained differences between the general ledger 
and computerized accounting records (for example, 
a computer spreadsheet) maintained on a separate 
computer
Most small businesses use microcomputers, either to 
process accounting information or to prepare or summa­
rize information for input (for example, through use of a 
spreadsheet). The use of microcomputers and a highly 
decentralized computer processing environment can leave 
a company vulnerable to various fraud schemes due to:
• A lack of segregation of duties. The same person can 
prepare a source document (for example, an invoice), 
process the information (prepare a spreadsheet 
summary for the day or month), and review the 
output (review the output and input the totals to 
the general ledger).
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• Lack of logical access control. Many off-the-shelf com­
puter programs contain logical access controls such as 
password protection. Unfortunately, entities often fail 
to install these controls or they do so ineffectively.
• Lack of adequate computer processing controls. Most 
microcomputer accounting packages contain controls 
to ensure the accuracy of processing or to identify 
conditions that require user follow-up (for example, 
exception reports). Many entities fail to properly 
implement these controls.
When gaining an understanding of the entity’s internal 
controls, be alert for weaknesses relating to the entity’s 
use of microcomputers. An excellent source of additional 
information is an Auditing Procedure Study published by 
the AICPA, Auditing in Common Computer Environments 
(product no. 021059).
Example Audit Procedures
The following audit procedures should help detect the 
frauds described above. Depending on your assessment 
of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, these 
procedures may be performed as part of an audit conducted 
in accordance with GAAS. Alternatively, they may be 
performed outside the scope of a GAAS audit. If your 
assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud requires you to respond and an example procedure 
is already part of your planned approach, consider 
expanding the extent of testing, perhaps by selecting 
more items.
• Review documentation supporting a selection of 
financial transactions or file maintenance procedures.
• Review error reports, batch processing totals, and 
other user controls over the input and processing of 
financial transactions or file maintenance procedures.
• Reconstruct accounts or files from original source 
documents.
Expanding Your Internal Control Questionnaire
Your internal control questionnaire should have questions 
aimed at identifying your client’s vulnerability to computer 
fraud. If any of the following questions are not included in 
your questionnaire, consider adding them. “No” responses 
may not change your control risk assessment or your
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assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud; however, as a client service matter, you should 
consider discussing these items with your client and 
explaining how the lack of certain controls leaves the 
company exposed to fraud. Keep in mind that “no” 
responses may also indicate reportable conditions or 
material weaknesses to be communicated to the client.
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Computer Schemes
Internal Control Questions 
Related to Fraud
1. Is there proper segregation of duties between the 
authorization of input, the preparation of input, and the 
reconciliation of output?
2. Are employees with computer input duties required to take 
vacations and are other employees cross-trained to perform 
those functions when an employee is absent?
3. Is there proper segregation of duties between computer 
programmers and computer operators?
4. Has the company implemented effective logical access 
controls, including access to application programs, master 
files, and data bases?
5. Does the company have adequate controls to ensure the 
adequacy and legitimacy of input data?
6. Does the company have adequate controls to ensure that 
changes to computer applications are authorized and they 
function as planned?
7. Are exception reports, error listings, and other computer­
generated items that require user follow-up investigated 
and resolved in a timely manner?
8. Are spreadsheets and other microcomputer applications 
used to process significant accounting information checked 






Paragraph 37 of SAS No. 82 describes the documentation 
requirements relating to your consideration of fraud. That 
paragraph requires you to document evidence of the 
performance of the assessment of the risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud. Remember, there’s no require­
ment to label your assessment ( “high”, “medium”, or 
“low”, for instance) as you do for other risk assessments 
nor is there a requirement to describe your thought process 
or rationale used to make the assessment. You are only 
required to document evidence that you performed an 
assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud. As discussed in Part One, Assessing the Risk of 
Material Misstatement Due to Fraud, this assessment is a 
separate risk assessment, distinct from your assessment 
of inherent and control risk. Although the assessment 
may be performed in conjunction with your inherent and 
control risk assessment, it’s a separate thought process 
and should be documented as such.
To document evidence of your performance of this risk 
assessment you should document:
• The risk factors identified as present
• Your response to those risk factors (either individually 
or in combination)
• Fraud risk factors or other conditions, if any, identi­
fied during the performance of fieldwork that cause 
you to believe that an additional audit response is 
required
If, as a result of your assessment, you conclude that a 
further response is appropriate, that response should also 
be documented.
See Part One, Documentation Requirements for further 
discussion of the documentation required by SAS No. 82. 
There is no prescribed format (for example, a checklist 
or a memo) or standard language required to comply with 
these documentation requirements. You are allowed a 
great deal of flexibility.
Some practitioners prefer to document items and judg­
ments that go beyond the requirements of SAS No. 82
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because they find this information useful in the event 
that others may ask how certain decisions were reached. 
Other practitioners prefer to limit their documentation 
to the minimum required. The following examples 
demonstrate that range of possibility and illustrate some 
approaches you might take to document your considera­
tion of fraud in a financial statement audit. Each of the 
three examples includes sample documentation that just 
meets the requirements of SAS No. 82 and sample docu­
mentation that goes beyond that required by the SAS.
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Sample Documentation
E xample # 1
C lien t  N ame: L ake V iew  Office  T ower 
F raud R isk: F raudulen t  F inancial Reporting 
Additional Audit Response Required? No
Description Lake View Office Tower is a partnership whose primary 
asset is a four-story office building. The partnership leases 
space to others under operating leases, in a section of 
town that has experienced steadily increasing vacancy 
rates. The related mortgage contains covenants about 
rent rolls and the partnership financial condition that are 




The following memo in the workpapers goes beyond the 
documentation requirements of SAS No. 82 relating to 
this client.
Consideration of Fraud
While planning the audit of Lake View Office Towers, certain 
items came to our attention that we considered to be fraud risk 
factors. Those risk factors are:
• Debt covenants that are difficult to maintain
• Deteriorating financial position when management has per­
sonally guaranteed significant debts of the entity
These conditions suggest a possible motivation for the partners to 
overstate the entity’s financial results, as a way to fraudulently 
maintain debt covenants and avoid having to perform under the 
personal guarantee.
The debt covenants relate to the financial position of the entity 
and certain items (primarily vacancy and lease rates) related to 
the rent roll.
The primary asset of the partnership is the office building; the pri­
mary liability is the related mortgage. A material overstatement of 
the financial position of the entity could occur only through an 
overstatement of the building or an understatement of the mort­
gage. Changes in these accounts beyond normal betterments and 
principal reductions would be obvious in the financial statements. 
Our audit procedures include a review of supporting documents 
for significant building additions and confirmation of the debt 
balance with the lenders. Additionally, we test the rent roll 
(including significant lease terms) by reviewing a sample of lease 
agreements and modifications. We believe these audit procedures 
are sufficient to obtain reasonable assurance that the financial 





Author’s note: The above memo goes beyond the docu­
mentation requirements of SAS No. 82 in that it includes 
a discussion of the rationale for how the identified risk 
factors could lead to material misstatement of the finan­
cial statements due to fraud. It also includes the audi­
tor’s conclusion that the response adequately addresses 
the assessed risk. Documentation of this conclusion is 
not required.
The following memo in the workpapers complies with 
the documentation requirements of SAS No. 82 relating 
to this client.
Consideration of Fraud
While planning the audit of Lake View Office Towers, we noted that 
the Company's financial position is deteriorating and management 
has personally guaranteed significant debts. Furthermore, we noted 
that the Company’s debt covenants are becoming difficult to 
maintain. In response, our planned audit procedures include the 
following steps:
• Test significant building additions
• Confirm debt balance with the lender




E xample # 2
Client  Name: Gas-N-Go Convenience Stores 
Fraud Risk: Misappropriation of  Assets 
Additional Audit Response Required? No
Description Gas-N-Go Convenience Stores is a chain of nine conve­
nience stores operating in the metro area.
Sample
Documentation
The following memo in the workpapers goes beyond the 
documentation requirements of SAS No. 82 relating to 
this client.
Consideration of Fraud
While planning the audit of Gas-N-Go Convenience Stores, certain 
items came to our attention that we considered to be fraud 
risk factors relating to the misappropriation of assets. Those risk 
factors are:
• Large amounts of cash on hand or processed — Most of the 
sales are cash sales. Additionally, the stores cash personal and 
payroll checks as an accommodation to their customers. This 
service requires the stores to maintain large amounts of cash 
on hand, particularly on or around the paydays of the large 
employers located nearby.
• Inventory characteristics that make it susceptible to theft — 
Each store sells groceries and deli products that are small and 
easily stolen. The stores also sell beer, wine, cigarettes and 
lottery tickets, which are easy to steal and convert to cash.
Our discussions with the controller about the risk of misappropri­
ation of assets indicated that the following points mitigate the risk 
of asset misappropriation:
• Additional control procedures are being implemented as a 
result of a fraud that occurred at one of the stores during the 
year. Note that the fraud did not materially impact the finan­
cial statements. The fraud required the collusion of three 
store managers and began with the theft of approximately 
$ l0,000 cash from an unusually large deposit caused by high 
levels of check cashing activity during the holidays. The store 
managers concealed the fraud by kiting deposits and submit­
ting false information to the accounting department about 
cash balances. The controller discovered the fraud by observ­
ing that deposits reported by the store managers did not agree 
with deposits shown on the bank statements and that daily 
cash balances did not periodically decline as low as expected. 
All of the loss is covered by insurance. The controller now —
1. Requires area supervisors to perform surprise cash 
accounts at all of the stores regularly during the year.
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2. Has a courier collect deposits daily from each of the stores 
and bring them to the office where the deposit tickets are 
verified.
• Accounting information is maintained (by store) showing 
sales, cost of sales, and inventories according to major 
sources and the major categories of expenses. Inventories are 
counted monthly by an outside counting service. The 
controller investigates significant differences between the 
services’ counts and the store inventories, as well as signifi­
cant differences between the actual and expected cost of 
sales percentages.
• The exposure from lottery tickets is small because the State 
lottery commission controls tickets with winnings above $50.
We have corroborated that these procedures are in place through 
inquiry and observation and we will perform the following previ­
ously planned procedures;
• Observe cash and inventory counts at the end of the year for 
a sample of stores.
• Perform trend analyses using the store information, looking 
separately at stores open full years and those open partial 
years.
• Compare store gross profit percentages with percentages used 
in retail inventory calculations.
• Review fluctuations in daily cash balances of selected stores 
before and after year-end.
We believe these audit procedures are sufficient to obtain reason­
able assurance that the financial statements are free of material 




Author's note: The above memo goes beyond the 
documentation requirements of SAS No. 82 in that it 
describes the controls in place that mitigate the risk 
associated with the identified risk factors. The auditor 
has also documented the inquiries made of management 
related to fraud. These inquiries are required but the 
documentation of their performance is not. (See para­
graph 13 of SAS No. 82.) Furthermore, the memo includes 
the auditor’s conclusion that the response adequately 
addresses the assessed risk.
The following memo in the workpapers complies with the 
documentation requirements of SAS No. 82 relating to 
this client.
Consideration of Fraud
Each Gas-N-Go store processes large amounts of cash and main­
tains inventories that can be easily converted into cash. However,
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as is typical for convenience store operations, the Company has 
controls in place to minimize the risk of loss from misappropria­
tion of assets. Misappropriations found have been immaterial to 
the financial statements and covered by insurance. Industry pub­
lications indicate that misappropriations totaling approximately 
1% of retail sales are to be expected. Our previously planned 
audit procedures are designed to appropriately reduce the risk of 
material misstatement due to errors or fraud.
Author’s note: This documentation is very similar to 
the sample documentation (minimum required) for 
Example #1. However, in Example #2, the auditor 
makes a general reference to the previously planned 
audit procedures rather than including a description of 
the specific procedures relevant to the assessed risk.
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E xample  # 3
C lien t  N ame: I nternet Solutions 
F raud R isk: Fraudulen t  F inancial R ep o r ting 




See Internet Solutions Case Study in Part One, Chapter 
One, Appendix A for background information.
The following memo in the workpapers goes beyond the 
documentation requirements of SAS No. 82 relating to 
this client.
Consideration of Fraud
While planning the audit of Internet Solutions, we identified the 
presence of certain fraud risk factors. Those risk factors are:
• The Company operates in a declining industry, both in terms 
of margins and customer demand.
• The Company’s industry is marked by rapidly changing 
technology.
• The Company reported unusually rapid growth when com­
pared with that of other companies in the same industry.
• The Company will be unable to consummate its initial public 
offering if revenue and profitability growth are not reported.
• The Company is unable to generate cash flows from opera­
tions despite reporting revenue and earnings from operations 
growth.
We identified these risk factors through the performance of ana­
lytical reviews and other planning procedures, including inquiries 
of the client.
In response to these identified fraud risk factors, we developed an 
overall engagement response that included an increase in the 
involvement of the audit partner at all phases of the engagement, 
including planning, supervision, and review.
The above noted risk factors impact the audit areas of revenue 
recognition, accounts receivable and inventory valuation. During 
the planning phase of the audit, we believed that our planned 
audit procedures in these areas were adequate to obtain reason­
able assurance that the financial statements were free of material 
misstatement due to fraud.
During the performance of fieldwork, the identification of other 
conditions and the evaluation of audit results caused us to change 
our judgment regarding the assessment of risk of material mis­
statement due to fraud. Identified conditions include:
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• A discrepancy between the invoice date (3/31/XX) and ship­
ping date (10/2/XX) of a particular sale. Company management 
was unable to explain this discrepancy, which caused us to 
expand the scope of our sales cut-off fieldwork.
• Unavailability of other than faxed confirmation replies for an 
inordinate number of accounts receivable confirmations. In 
response to this condition, we spoke to all customers who 
reportedly sent faxed confirmation replies and we received 
signed, original replies from all those contacted.
As a result of these and other procedures, we discovered 
misstatements relating to revenue and accounts receivable. See 
workpaper XX for a calculation of the related audit adjustment.
Author’s note: The above documentation goes beyond 
the requirements of SAS No. 82 in that the auditor has 
included a discussion of the thought process and ratio­
nale used to evaluate the identified risk factor and other 
conditions noted. The memo also includes a discussion 
of the results of the extended audit procedures, which is 
not required by SAS No. 82.
Sample The following memo in the workpapers complies with the
Documentation_ documentation requirements of SAS No. 82 relating to
Minimum Required this client.
Consideration of Fraud
During the planning of this audit, we identified fraud risk factors 
related to the entity’s financial condition and its profitability 
(particularly when compared to others in the same industry and 
the declining industry in which the company operates). We also 
noted that the company is unable to generate cash flows from 
operations (despite reporting revenue and earnings from opera­
tions growth) and that the company will be unable to consummate 
its initial public offering if revenue and profitability growth are not 
reported. These were also considered to be fraud risk factors. As 
a result of the identification of these risk factors we increased the 
involvement of the audit partner at all phases of the engagement. 
Initially, the planned nature, timing, and extent of audit proce­
dures was determined to be adequate.
While performing the audit procedures, other conditions came to 
our attention that caused us to reevaluate our original assessment. 
These other conditions included unexplained discrepancies 
between invoices and shipping documents and an unusually high 
number of faxed confirmation replies. As a result of these identi­
fied conditions we expanded the scope of our fieldwork relating to 
sales cut-off, and we received original, signed replies to all 
confirmation requests.
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Sample Engagement L e t t e r for a Small B usiness Audit
[CPA Firm Letterhead]
[Date]
[Client’s Name and Address]
Dear.
This will confirm our understanding of the arrangements for our audit of the
financial statements o f_________[client name] for the year ending_______
[balance sheet date].
We will audit the Company’s financial statements for the year ending______
[balance sheet date] for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the fairness with 
which they present, in all material respects, financial position, results of operations 
and cash flows in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.
We will conduct our audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable 
assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstate­
ment, whether caused by error or fraud. An audit includes examining, on a test 
basis, evidence that supports the amounts and disclosures included in the financial 
statements. It also includes assessing the accounting principles used and estimates 
made by management, as well as evaluating the overall financial statement pre­
sentation. Our audit is designed to provide reasonable assurance of detecting 
misstatements that, in our judgment, could have a material effect on the financial 
statements taken as a whole. Consequently, our audit will not necessarily detect 
misstatements less than this materiality level that might exist due to error, 
fraudulent financial reporting, or misappropriation of assets. The Company’s 
management is responsible for establishing and maintaining a sound system of 
internal control, which is the best means of preventing or detecting errors, 
fraudulent financial reporting, and misappropriation of assets.
Assistance to be supplied by your personnel, including the preparation of sched­
ules and analyses of accounts, is described on a separate attachment. Timely 
completion of this work will facilitate the completion of our audit.
As part of our engagement for the year ending_________[balance sheet
date], we will also prepare the federal and state income tax returns for________
[client name].
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Our fees will be billed as work progresses and are based on the amount of time 
required at various levels of responsibility, plus actual out-of-pocket expenses. 
Invoices are payable upon presentation. We will notify you immediately of any 
circumstances we encounter that could significantly affect our initial estimate of 
total fees of $ _________.
If this letter correctly expresses your understanding, please sign the enclosed 
copy where indicated and return it to us.









Sam ple Engagem ent Letter for a Sm all Business Audit
[Client Letterhead]
[Auditor’s Report Date]
In connection with your audit of the financial statements of 
name] as of________[balance sheet date] and for th e____
______[client
__[period] then
ended, for the purpose of expressing an opinion as to whether the financial state­
ments present fairly the financial position, results of operations, and cash flows
of________[client name] in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles, we (I) confirm, to the best of our (my) knowledge and belief, the 
following representations made to you during your audit:
1. We are (I am) responsible for the fair presentation in the financial statements 
of financial position, results of operations, and cash flows in conformity with 
generally accepted accounting principles. We are (I am) also responsible for 
adopting sound accounting policies, establishing and maintaining internal 
control, and preventing and detecting fraud.
2. We (I) have made available to you —
a. All financial records and related data.
b. All minutes of meetings of shareholders, directors, and committees of 
directors, or summaries of actions of recent meetings for which minutes 
have not yet been prepared.
c. Information relating to all statutes, laws, or regulations that have a direct 
effect on our financial statements.
d. All reports from other accountants who have been engaged to make a 
review of interim financial information of significant components of the 
reporting entity, its subsidiaries, or its other investees.
e. All information relating to contracts with and results of work by specialists.
3. We (I) have apprised you of all (There are no) instances of fraud perpetrated 
on or within the Company of which we are (I am) aware.
4. We (I) have no plans or intentions that may materially affect the carrying 
value or classification of assets and liabilities.
5. The following have been properly recorded or disclosed in the financial statements:
a. Related-party transactions and related amounts receivable or payable, 
including sales, purchases, loans, transfers, leasing arrangements, 
and guarantees.
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b. Capital stock repurchase options or agreements or capital stock reserved 
for options, warrants, conversions, or other requirements.
e. Arrangements with financial institutions involving compensating balances 
or other arrangements involving restrictions on cash balances and 
line of credit or similar arrangements.
d. Agreements to repurchase assets previously sold.
e. Security agreements under the Uniform Commercial Code.
f. Contractual obligations for purchases of assets.
g. Liens, encumbrances, or subordination of assets pledged as collateral in 
any way.
h. Subordination of any liabilities.
i. All leases or rental obligations under long-term leases.
j. Information relating to risks and uncertainties regarding nature of 
operations, use of estimates in the preparation of financial statements, 
certain significant estimates, and current vulnerability due to certain 
concentrations in accordance with SOP No. 94-6.
k. Environmental liabilities, which must be disclosed in accordance with 
SFAS 5 criteria as interpreted by SOP No. 96-1, paragraph 5.6.
6. There are no —
a. Violations or possible violations of laws or regulations whose effects 
should be considered for disclosure in the financial statements or as a 
basis for recording a loss contingency.
b. Other material liabilities or gain or loss contingencies that are required to 
be accrued or disclosed by SFAS No. 5.
e. Unasserted claims or assessments that our lawyer has advised us are prob­
able of assertion and must be disclosed in accordance with SEAS No. 5.
d. Communications from regulatory agencies concerning noncompliance 
with, or deficiencies in, financial reporting practices that could have a 
material effect on the financial statements.
e. Material transactions that have not been properly recorded in the 
accounting records underlying the financial statements.
7. Provision, when material, has been made to —
a. Reduce excess or obsolete inventories to their estimated net realizable 
value.
b. Reduce all investments for permanent declines in value.
e. Adjust long-lived assets, certain identifiable intangibles, and related good­
will in accordance with SEAS No. 121.
8. The Company has satisfactory title to owned assets, and there are no such
liens or encumbrances on assets nor has any asset been pledged.
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9. Provision has been made for any material loss to be sustained in the fulfillment 
of, or from inability to fulfill, any sales commitments.
10. Provision has been made for any material loss to be sustained as a result of 
purchase commitments for inventory quantities in excess of normal require­
ments or at prices in excess of the prevailing market prices.
11. We (I) have complied with all aspects of contractual agreements that would have 
a material effect on the financial statements in the event of noncompliance.
12. No events have occurred subsequent to the balance sheet date that would 
require adjustment to, or disclosure in, the financial statements.
Very truly yours,
[Chief Financial Officer]
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